Papageorgiou

The respondent father brought a motion seeking to enroll the child in reunification therapy, alleging parental alienation, and requesting police enforcement of an existing parenting order.

The child had been refusing to attend the father's home due to COVID-19 concerns and sibling conflict.

The court found no evidence of parental alienation or that the child required therapy.

The court declined to order police enforcement, finding it potentially traumatic, but amended the parenting schedule to gradually reintroduce overnight visits, emphasizing the mother's positive obligation to facilitate parenting time.

The moving party brought a motion to consolidate the responding party's civil proceeding for defamation and malicious prosecution with their ongoing family law proceeding, and to strike the responding party's pleadings for non-compliance with multiple court orders.

The court granted the consolidation to avoid inconsistent findings and duplicate legal fees.

The court also struck the responding party's pleadings due to her blatant disregard for twelve previous court orders, her inappropriate conduct in stealing the moving party's private emails, and her failure to attend the motion hearing.

The matter was directed to proceed to an uncontested trial, and the moving party was awarded full indemnity costs.

The respondent brought a motion for the release of the net proceeds of sale of two jointly owned properties.

The applicant opposed the full release, seeking to have a portion held in trust to secure her equalization claim, and brought a cross-motion for the partition and sale of a third property.

The court ordered a partial release of the proceeds, holding $778,000 in trust to secure the applicant's equalization claim, finding she had established a strong claim and a risk of dissipation.

The court also granted the cross-motion for the partition and sale of the third property, finding no compelling reason to delay the sale until trial.

The mother brought an urgent motion for interim decision-making authority, permission to register the 17-year-old child in a school of her choice, and the appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The child had voluntarily left the father's home to live with the mother and wished to attend in-person school, which the father opposed.

The court granted the mother's requests, finding that the child's views and preferences should be given significant weight given his age, and that the high conflict between the parents necessitated interim sole decision-making authority for the mother.

The applicant father brought a motion for increased and unsupervised parenting time with the parties' three-year-old child.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, alleging the father had substance abuse issues, posed a danger to the child, and that the child was immunocompromised and at risk due to COVID-19.

The court found the mother's evidence of substance abuse to be historical and vague, and noted the father had passed numerous drug and alcohol tests.

The court concluded the mother's restrictions were excessive and not in the child's best interests, granting the father's motion for unsupervised parenting time, including overnights, subject to continued breathalyzer testing at pick-up and drop-off.

Following the separation of a common-law couple, a dispute arose over the ownership of their dog.

The applicant, who had adopted the dog, paid for most of its expenses, and was listed as the owner on all documentation, sought a declaration of ownership and the return of the dog after the respondent took the dog from the street.

The respondent claimed joint ownership or, alternatively, a constructive trust and a shared residential schedule.

The court found that the applicant was the sole lawful owner based on financial contributions, documentation, and primary caregiving, and declined to impose a constructive trust or shared custody arrangement for policy reasons.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an order for his 15-year-old daughter to attend reunification therapy and for equal parenting time, alleging parental alienation by the respondent mother.

The court dismissed the motion for reunification therapy, finding no expert evidence to support the allegations of alienation and noting the lack of a detailed therapy proposal.

Relying on a Voice of the Child report indicating the daughter's reluctance to spend time with the father due to his historical lack of involvement, the court ordered limited parenting time subject entirely to the daughter's wishes.

The father brought an urgent motion and obtained sole custody of the child based on allegations of the mother's substance abuse and flight risk.

The mother subsequently proved the allegations false and sought shared decision-making and parenting time.

The court found the father's actions were strategic and not in the child's best interests.

The court ordered shared decision-making and a graduated parenting schedule leading to week-about parenting.

The court also found the mother would suffer undue hardship if ordered to pay child support and ordered the father to pay retroactive child support.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support, an advance on equalization, and reinstatement of health benefits following a short marriage.

The applicant was unable to work due to a severe injury, while the respondent claimed he had been laid off from his parents' business shortly after the motion was commenced.

The court imputed income to the respondent, finding him intentionally unemployed, and awarded the applicant interim spousal support of $3,445 per month based on the basic needs/hardship exception to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The court also ordered the reinstatement of health benefits but dismissed the request for an advance on equalization due to genuine issues requiring a trial.

Following a summary judgment with divided success, the parties sought a determination on interest and costs.

The court held that Marquest was entitled to the contractual interest rate of 15 percent on the promissory note, running until the date funds were received.

Regarding costs, the court balanced Marquest's contractual right to substantial indemnity costs for enforcing the note against Stone's substantial success on its more complex counterclaim.

The court awarded Stone $30,000 in partial indemnity costs, net of any costs Marquest was entitled to.

The successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following the dismissal of the action against her on summary judgment.

The court found that the plaintiffs had made unsubstantiated allegations of fraudulent concealment based on bare suspicion, took shifting positions on the limitation period, and rejected reasonable offers to settle.

The court concluded that this conduct was worthy of sanction and awarded the defendant $45,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis, reducing the claimed amount for proportionality.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment claiming damages for wrongful dismissal, aggravated damages, and punitive damages.

The defendant employer initially terminated the plaintiff for cause but later withdrew the allegation, relying instead on a without cause termination provision in her employment agreement.

The court found the termination provision void for lack of consideration and held that the employer's conduct—including creating a toxic workplace, suspending her, and making unfounded cause allegations—amounted to a repudiation of the contract.

The court awarded 11 months' reasonable notice, $50,000 in aggravated damages, and $25,000 in punitive damages.

Five organizations brought motions to intervene in an application challenging the constitutionality of the Safe Streets Act.

The applicant consented and the respondent did not oppose.

The court applied the test for intervention under Rule 13.02 and found that all five proposed intervenors—the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Aboriginal Legal Services, Justice for Children and Youth, the Income Security Advocacy Centre, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association—met the criteria.

Each organization demonstrated special expertise, a real and substantial interest in the proceedings, and the ability to provide an important and distinct perspective.

The motions to intervene were granted.

The plaintiff sued the City of Toronto for injuries sustained after tripping on a pothole in a pedestrian crosswalk.

The City brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred because the plaintiff failed to provide notice within 10 days as required by s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act.

The court dismissed the City's motion and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on this issue, finding the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for the delay and the City suffered no prejudice.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties sought full indemnity costs of $141,573.04.

The court departed from the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs, finding the action lacked the hallmarks of a SLAPP, the plaintiff had substantial merit to her claim, and the moving parties had unnecessarily complicated the proceeding by initially pursuing summary judgment.

The court awarded the moving parties partial indemnity costs fixed at $55,603.21, matching the plaintiff's own partial indemnity costs calculation.

The defendant brought a motion to enforce a $125,000 settlement agreement in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing she never instructed her former counsel to accept the offer and that she suffered from psychological impairments that affected her ability to provide informed consent.

The court found that the communications between the plaintiff and her former counsel lacked clarity, particularly regarding the net amount the plaintiff would receive.

Given the plaintiff's documented chronic pain and psychological impairments, the court concluded that enforcing the settlement would create a real risk of clear injustice.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging civil fraud and breach of trust in connection with a real estate development venture.

The plaintiffs invested funds in two properties, which the defendants subsequently mortgaged and sold without the plaintiffs' knowledge or consent.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud and a serious risk of asset dissipation, granting the Mareva injunction and ancillary orders requiring the defendants to disclose their worldwide assets and account for the sale proceeds.

The applicant brought motions to convert a condominium application and counter-application into an action, consolidate them with an ongoing defamation action, permit the use of discovery evidence across proceedings, and strike a defamation pleading in the counter-application.

The court found the matters were deeply interwoven, involving the same factual matrix regarding the applicant's conduct and social media posts about the condominium board.

To avoid inconsistent findings and multiplicity of proceedings, the court ordered the conversion and consolidation.

The court also granted leave to use discovery evidence and struck the defamation pleading with leave to amend for failing to provide adequate particulars.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement reached regarding unpaid invoices for software development services.

The defendants repudiated the settlement, arguing it was conditional, induced by duress or fraud, and that prior settlement communications were privileged.

The court found the communications were not privileged as they were necessary to prove the settlement.

The court held that an objective reading of the communications showed a binding agreement on all essential terms, and rejected the defendants' claims of duress and fraud, noting the defendants chose to settle despite having concerns about the invoices.

The motion was granted and the settlement enforced for $200,000.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim against her on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs argued that the defendant fraudulently concealed her involvement in faulty renovations, delaying the discoverability of their claim.

The court found no evidence of fraudulent concealment and concluded that the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of their potential claim against the defendant well before the limitation period expired.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claim against the defendant was dismissed.