CITATION: Stronach v. Stronach, 2022 ONSC 389
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NOS.: 749/50, 750/21, 758/21, 765/21, 764/21, 768/21, 769/21
DATE: 20220118
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
D. L. CORBETT, MEW and FAVREAU JJ.
BETWEEN:
ANDREW STRONACH
Matthew Gourlay, Marie Henein and Daniella
Murynka, for Andrew Stronach
Plaintiff (Respondent)
- and -
BELINDA STRONACH, NICOLE
Peter F.C. Howard, Michael Barrack, Iris
WALKER, FRANK WALKER and ALON
Fischer and Jessica Lam, for Belinda Stronach
OSSIP in their capacities as Trustees of the
Andrew Stronach 445 Family Trust;
Alan Mark and Melanie Ouanounou, for Frank
BELINDA STRONACH and ALON OSSIP
Walker and Nicole Walker
in their capacities as Trustees of the 445327
Trust; BELINDA STRONACH, NICOLE
Linda Plumpton, Gillian Dingle and Rachael
WALKER and FRANK WALKER in their
Saab, for Stronach Consulting Corp.
capacities as Trustees of the Stronach 2011
Trust; BELINDA STRONACH in her
Mark Gelowitz, Craig Lockwood and Simon
capacity as Trustee of the Belinda Stronach
Cameron, for Alon Ossip
in her capacity as Trustee of the BSFIN
Investments Trust - 2011; BELINDA
Nina Bombier, for Elfriede Stronach
STRONACH in her capacity as Trustee of the
Adena North Trust; NICOLE WALKER and
FRANK WALKER in their capacities as
Trustees for the Andrew Stronach Family
Trust; NICOLE WALKER and FRANK
WALKER in their capacities as Trustees for
the Andrew Stronach Special Trust;
BELINDA STRONACH, NICOLE
WALKER and FRANK WALKER in their
capacities as Trustees for the Andrew
Stronach 2011 Trust; BELINDA
STRONACH, NICOLE WALKER and
FRANK WALKER in their capacities as
Trustees for the Belinda Stronach 2011 Trust;
BELINDA STRONACH, NICOLE
WALKER and FRANK WALKER in their
capacities as Trustees for the Elfriede
Stronach 2011 Trust; BELINDA
STRONACH in her capacity as Trustee of the
Andrew Stronach Family Trust – 2015;
BELINDA STRONACH, NICOLE
WALKER and FRANK WALKER in their
capacities as Trustees of the Belinda Stronach
445 Family Trust; 2305218 ONTARIO INC.
in its capacity as Trustee for the Woodington
Trust – 2011; BELINDA STRONACH,
NICOLE WALKER and FRANK WALKER
in their capacities as Trustees of the ST Trust;
BELINDA STRONACH, ALON OSSIP,
FRANK WALKER and NICOLE WALKER
in their personal capacities and STRONACH
CONSULTING CORP.
Defendants (Appellants)
AND BETWEEN:
SELENA STRONACH
Matthew P. Gottlieb, Shaun Laubman and
Philip Underwood, for Selena Stronach
Plaintiff (Respondent)
- and -
BELINDA STRONACH, NICOLE
Peter F.C. Howard, Michael Barrack, Iris
WALKER, FRANK WALKER, ELFRIEDE
Fischer and Jessica Lam, for Belinda Stronach
STRONACH and ALON OSSIP, in their
capacities as Trustees of the Andrew Stronach
Alan Mark and Melanie Ouanounou, for Frank
445 Family Trust; BELINDA STRONACH,
Walker and Nicole Walker
ELFRIEDE STRONACH and ALON OSSIP,
in their capacities as Trustees of the 445327
Linda Plumpton, Gillian Dingle and Rachael
Trust; BELINDA STRONACH, FRANK
Saab, for Stronach Consulting Corp.
WALKER, ELFRIEDE STRONACH and
NICOLE WALKER, in their capacities as
Mark Gelowitz, Craig Lockwood and Simon
Trustees of the Stronach 2011 Trust;
Cameron, for Alon Ossip
BELINDA STRONACH, FRANK
WALKER, ELFRIEDE STRONACH and
Nina Bombier, for Elfriede Stronach
NICOLE WALKER, in their capacities as
Trustees of the Stronach 2011 Trust;
BELINDA STRONACH in her capacity as
Trustee of the BSFIN Investment Trust;
2305218 ONTARIO INC. in its capacity as
Trustee for the Woodington Trust; BELINDA
STRONACH and ELFRIEDE STRONACH
in her capacity as Trustee of the Adena North
Trust; FRANK WALKER, ELFRIEDE
STRONACH and NICOLE WALKER, in
their capacity as Trustees for the Andrew
Stronach Family Trust; BELINDA
STRONACH, ELFRIEDE STRONACH,
FRANK WALKER and NICOLE WALKER
in their capacities as Trustees for the Andrew
Stronach 2011 Trust; BELINDA
STRONACH, NICOLE WALKER and
FRANK WALKER, in their capacities as
Trustees of the ST Trust; BELINDA
STRONACH, ELFRIEDE STRONACH,
FRANK WALKER and NICOLE WALKER,
in their personal capacities
Defendants (Appellants)
Heard by ZOOM at Toronto: Dec. 10, 2021
REASONS FOR DECISION
BY THE COURT
[1] Four appeals are brought, with leave of this court (2021 ONSC 7135), from a decision of Cavanagh J. dated 26 August 2021 (2021 ONSC 5758).
[2] The motion judge struck out portions of fresh as amended statements of defence of the appellants on the ground that they pleaded documents and communications that are subject to settlement privilege.
[3] The impugned pleadings concern matters that are prima facie subject to settlement privilege. It is not clear that this privilege has been waived or that there is another basis for admitting these privileged matters into evidence. Therefore, these matters ought not be pleaded and ought not be the subject of disclosure and discovery prior to trial. Admissibility of evidence that is prima facie covered by settlement privilege remains an evidentiary ruling that may be raised with the trial judge, who will decide that issue on the foundation provided to assess the privilege issues on the complete record before them at trial. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeals.
Background
[4] These appeals arise in relation to two actions, one brought by Andrew Stronach, and the other by his daughter Selena Stronach. These actions are two of three related lawsuits concerning the Stronach family business and trusts.
[5] One of the three actions – brought by Frank Stronach and Elfriede Stronach (the “Frank/Elfriede Action”) – was settled in August 2020, following a judicial mediation conducted by Hainey J. Subsequently, on 26 May 2021, Cavanagh J. granted the plaintiffs in the remaining actions leave to amend their respective pleadings (2021 ONSC 3801).
[6] A comprehensive summary of the background to the litigation is found at paras. 4-16 of Cavanagh J.’s May 2021 decision. The thrust of the allegations in the remaining actions is that the defendants have breached their duties in their capacities as trustees of trusts in which the plaintiffs have a beneficial interest, and that the defendants Belinda Stronach and Alon Ossip have directed the affairs of Stronach Consulting Corp. and its affiliated corporations in a manner unduly oppressive and/or unfairly prejudicial to and/or that unfairly disregards the rights and interests of the plaintiffs.
[7] The statements of claim delivered by the plaintiffs referred to a document entitled “Agreement between Frank Stronach and Belinda Stronach Regarding Division of Stronach Family Assets to Resolve all Litigation” (the “May 2020 Agreement”), which Belinda Stronach and Frank Stronach signed on 13 May 2020. In granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their statements of claim, Cavanagh J. rejected arguments by Belinda Stronach and other defendants that the May 2020 Agreement was intended to be kept confidential and, hence, that the document was covered by settlement privilege and should not be referred to in the statement of claim.
[8] The amended statements of claim also refer to events said to have occurred subsequent to the May 2020 Agreement, including allegations that Belinda Stronach and Frank Stronach orchestrated a pressure campaign to get the acquiescence of Andrew Stronach and Selena Stronach to the May 2020 Agreement and, when this was not successful, entered into an agreement in August 2020 (the “2020 Belinda/Frank Agreement”) notwithstanding the express and repeated objections of Andrew and Selena. It is further alleged that the trustees entered into and implemented the 2020 Belinda/Frank Agreement for their own personal benefit and without regard for and contrary to Andrew or Selena’s interests.
[9] The appellants, Belinda Stronach, Frank and Nicole Walker, and Alon Ossip, each delivered fresh as amended statements of defence in response to the amended statements of claim.
[10] The plaintiffs brought motions to strike out portions of these amended defences. In broad strokes, they object to references in these pleadings to:
(a) positions alleged to have been taken by the plaintiffs during the settlement process, including the judicial mediation; and
(b) the role played by two Independent Observers (“IO’s”), appointed by the court to supervise the administration of certain trusts pending the trial and, in particular, the IO’s role in the course of, and in relation to, the mediation and the implementation of the 2020 Belinda/Frank Agreement
Decision of the Motion Judge
[11] In his comprehensive reasons for decision, the motion judge first set out the legal principles with respect to settlement privilege. He identified Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2013 SCC 37, as the leading case. After referring to the introductory comment of Abella J., at para. 2 of Sable, that “the purpose of settlement privilege is to promote settlement”, the motion judge set out the two-part test (Sable, at para. 19) to be applied where settlement privilege is asserted over documents and communications made in furtherance of settlement. First, the party asserting privilege must show that they are prima facie protected by settlement privilege; and, if this is done, the party seeking disclosure on the ground that an exception to the privilege applies must show that, on balance, a competing public interest outweighs the public interest in encouraging settlement.
[12] Applied to motions to strike out pleadings, the motion judge held that if the evidentiary record is such that the court is unable to determine whether the impugned pleadings allege documents or communications that are prima facie subject to settlement privilege, the moving party will have failed to discharge its initial burden, and the motion should be dismissed. The question of admissibility of the allegedly privileged documents or communications would be left to the trial judge.
[13] If, on the other hand, the moving party discharges its initial burden, the responding party would have the onus of showing that an exception to the privilege applies. The motion would be dismissed if the responding party was unable to show that the documents or communications were not subject to settlement privilege. Or the responding party could show that the evidentiary record is not sufficient to determine whether an exception applies or not. In such circumstances, the moving party would not have met its onus of showing that the impugned pleadings should be struck out, and the question of admissibility of the allegedly privileged documents or communications would be left to the trial judge.
[14] The motion judge noted that the judicial mediation had been a joint mediation to facilitate discussions directed to a global settlement of all three actions involving the Stronach family. The fact that the plaintiffs may not have participated in all aspects of the mediation (for example, those that were directed to settlement of the Frank/Elfriede action) did not make them strangers to those parts of the mediation and, as such, unable to assert settlement privilege over communications during such parts of the mediation. Although the fact of settlement of the Frank/Elfriede action, and the terms of that settlement, became known publicly, that did not lead to the conclusion that communications during the mediation that related to the settlement were not privileged.
[15] Addressing the role of the IO’s, while the motion judge accepted that there was nothing inherently privileged about the role of the IO’s, the allegations by the defendants that the IO’s had not raised any concerns about the settlement would, if allowed to stand, result in the loss of settlement privilege over communications that had occurred during the mediation involving the IO’s with the parties or their representatives, with each other, and with the judicial mediator.
[16] Therefore, the motion judge first satisfied himself that the plaintiffs had discharged their onus of showing that the requirements for settlement privilege in relation to the mediation had been satisfied and that the mediation, in its entirety, was, prima facie, subject to settlement privilege. The motion judge then rejected the submission that the plaintiffs, through their pleadings, had waived privilege over the matters in respect of which they were asserting privilege and, further, that the justice of the case required that the moving parties should be able to respond to the allegations against them in the manner pleaded, because this outweighed the public interest in encouraging settlement.
[17] The motion judge declined to read the plaintiffs’ pleadings as putting in issue Belinda Stronach’s conduct and communications throughout the seven-month mediation. The fact that documents were prepared for the purpose of the mediation and communications took place with other participants during the mediation, including the IO’s, which related to and concluded with the settlement with Frank and Elfriede Stronach was not a basis for finding an exception to settlement privilege, whether based on waiver or the justice of the case. Nor did the fact that some of the communications, and a valuation which was prepared during the course of the mediation, would assist the defence of the plaintiffs’ claims, provide a basis for overriding the settlement privilege based on considerations of the overall justice of the case.
Standard of Review
[18] The usual appellate standards of review apply, as set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33. Questions of law are subject to review on a standard of correctness. Questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law from which a legal principle is not readily extricable are reviewable on a standard of palpable and overriding error.
Issues
[19] While the various appellants did not all place emphasis on the same arguments, three broad issues arise:
(a) Did the motion judge properly apply the test under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194”?
(b) Did the motion judge err in holding that the plaintiffs had not waived settlement privilege (and hence, that the documents and communications were, prima facie, privileged)?
(c) Did the motion judge err in holding that the justice of the case did not require an exception in the circumstances?
Application of the Test Under Rule 25.11
[20] A court may strike out all or part of a pleading on the ground that the pleading may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action.
[21] Before turning to the application of the test, it is helpful to consider the context in which these appeals arise.
[22] Three warring factions of the Stronach family became embroiled in litigation. They were sent to mediation. Positions were exchanged. Proposals were discussed. Due diligence was done. Advice and guidance were sought. In the end, two of the factions settled – the 2020 Belinda/Frank Agreement. The third group – Andrew and Selena - did not settle. In fact, Andrew and Selena object to the 2020 Belinda/Frank Agreement. They say it represents a brand new wrong, committed against them by Belinda Stronach and the other trustees. They amended their pleadings in the remaining actions to reflect this.
[23] The appellants argue that the motion judge reformulated the test for a motion to strike by finding that a moving party need only show that pleadings are prima facie covered by privilege, at which point the onus shifts to the responding party to show that waiver or an exception to the privilege applies.
[24] The respondents counter that the motion judge applied settled law in striking portions of the pleading where he found the facts pleaded to be clearly inadmissible because they were plainly and obviously privileged.
[25] As a matter of general principle, pleadings motions are not the appropriate stage in an action to engage in what is essentially a trial judge’s function of determining the admissibility of evidence at trial. Nevertheless, when issues of privilege are raised in the context of a pleadings motion, it is necessary for the court to consider whether a pleaded communication or document is subject to privilege. This is primarily because the pleadings define the issues in an action and, hence, the scope of discovery.
[26] As a general rule, a judge hearing a Rule 25.11 motion must refrain from engaging in an evaluation of the admissibility of evidence, a task which is more appropriately undertaken by a trial judge, while at the same time ensuring that a fair trial is not prejudiced or delayed.
[27] In the context of a motion to strike portions of a pleading that refer to what are alleged to be privileged communications or documents, Rule 25.11 permits a court to determine the issue where it is feasible and appropriate to do so. This will depend, in large measure, on the nature of the impugned allegations and the evidentiary record that is available to the motion judge.
[28] The question of whether the motion judge properly applied the test under Rule 25.11 boils down to whether it was appropriate for the motion judge to make a finding that the IO communications, the EY valuation and the July communications were prima facie covered by privilege. In Belsat Video Marketing Inc. v. Zellers Inc., 2003 44163 (ON SC), Master MacLeod (as he then was), at para. 23, stated that unless the pleading is self-evidently an improper reference to the contents of a settlement discussion, it is not possible at the pleadings motion stage to determine whether settlement privilege should apply. In Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. v. Penn West Petroleum Ltd., 2013 ABCA 10, the Alberta Court of Appeal observed, at para. 28:
… not only must the ambit of the settlement privilege be broad, but the exceptions to the exclusionary rule must be narrowly construed and only be given effect where another policy objective can be shown to outweigh any impact that may arise to the settlement objective.
[29] In the present case, the motion judge had before him a substantial evidentiary record. Unlike many strikeout motions, which occur at a very early stage of the litigation, the litigation was already mature at the time that the strikeout motion arose, directed as it was to a fresh as amended statement of defence which was responding to a fresh as amended statement of claim.
[30] That said, the appellants raise concerns which would be more valid if the effect of the motion court judge’s decision had been to make evidentiary rulings that were binding on the trial judge. He did no such thing. Even without the struck-out portions of their defences, the defendants have joined issue with the allegations made with the plaintiffs. The impugned sections of the pleadings relate essentially to evidence that they wish to be able to tender in support of their defences that they did not breach their fiduciary obligations or engage in self dealing.
[31] We find no fault in the conclusion of the motion judge that he had before him a sufficient record to deal with the settlement privilege issues raised by the plaintiffs on the Rule 25.11 motion before him. That record was sufficient for him to conclude it was plain and obvious that the impugned paragraphs addressed documents and communications that were prima facie privileged.
Did the plaintiffs waive settlement privilege?
[32] The position of the appellants is that the plaintiffs, having pleaded the elements of the May 2020 Agreement and the 2020 Belinda/Frank Agreement, and having made allegations concerning a pressure campaign and pleaded the express and repeated objections made by the plaintiffs to the settlement agreements, waived any settlement privilege that might otherwise apply.
[33] That privilege may be waived expressly or by implication. In Hallman v. Pure Spousal Trust (Trustee of), 2009 49643 (ON SC), D.M. Brown J. observed, at para. 8, that:
Whether intended or not, waiver may occur when fairness requires it, for example if a party has taken positions which would make it inconsistent to maintain the privilege.
[34] The motion judge accepted the submissions of the plaintiffs that their allegations related only to conduct prior to and outside of the judicial mediation. That finding was consistent with his earlier ruling on the plaintiffs’ motions for leave to amend their statements of claim, which was not appealed.
[35] The appellants maintain that the judge erred. The plaintiffs in their pleadings are said to have put in issue the trustees’ state of mind. They are accused of not having properly taken into account the plaintiffs’ interests. Throughout the mediation and the settlement discussions the trustees would doubtless have heard the plaintiffs advocating their positions and interests. It would be implausible for them to say that they were not aware of those positions and the interests of the plaintiffs as perceived by them. But in such circumstances the settlement privilege does not evaporate in the face of the trustees’ desire to use what was communicated (or not said or done) during a settlement process to subsequently defend themselves against the allegations that they engaged in self-dealing and breached their fiduciary obligations be entering into the 2020 Belinda/Frank Agreement. Put another way, the appellants would not be entitled to rely upon privileged settlement discussions and events to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. The fact that they may allege that they did so would not defeat the privilege.
[36] The motion judge’s conclusion, based on the record before him, was that the plaintiffs had not expressly or implicitly waived settlement privilege, was reasonable and supported by the evidence and by the correct application of legal principle. It is entitled to deference.
Does the justice of the case require an exception in the circumstances?
[37] Courts will not interfere with the trustees’ actions, unless:
(a) Such actions are unauthorised by the power conferred by the trust;
(b) The trustees would not have acted as they did if they had considered things that they should not have, or failed to take things into account that they ought to have considered: Edell v. Sitzer (2001), 2001 27989 (ON SC), 55 OR (3d) 198 (S.C.J.)
[38] The moving parties argue that they will need to adduce evidence about what they did and did not consider in coming to the terms of the Frank/Belinda settlement (including the involvement of the IO’s, the Ernst & Young valuation, and correspondence that occurred in July 2020). They also submit that the effect of striking out the impugned portions of their pleadings is to render them unable to fully defend themselves against the plaintiffs’ claims.
[39] One of the issues remaining in dispute between the parties to these actions concerns the value of certain shares. During the course of the mediation, a valuation was obtained from Ernst & Young. It was obtained expressly without prejudice and for use in the mediation. The trustees may well have relied on the valuation when they agreed to settle with Frank and Elfriede. They argue that the justice of the case demands that they be able to refer to the valuation as evidence of their state of mind and, specifically their repudiation of the allegations of self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duty.
[40] According to the appellants, the motion judge misapplied Mueller Canada Inc. v. State Contractors Inc. (1989), 1989 4117 (ON SC), 71 O.R. (2d) 397 (H.C.J.). In that case, the two defendants in an action had settled a dispute between them. The plaintiff then sued both defendants, alleging that one defendant had breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff. In the course of discovery, the plaintiff sought production of a letter containing the settlement between the defendants, a term of which was that details of the settlement would not be disclosed to third parties. Production was ordered. According to Doherty J. (as he then was), at para. 13:
Where documents referable to the settlement negotiations or the settlement document itself have relevance apart from establishing one party’s liability for the conduct which is the subject of the negotiations, and apart from showing the weakness of one party’s claim in respect of those matters, the privilege does not bar production.
[41] Doherty J. noted that the plaintiff had pleaded the contractual relationship between the defendants, as established by the settlement letter, in issue, the existence of the agreement having been admitted by the defendants.
[42] The motion judge regarded the decision in Mueller as distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case had not been a participant in the settlement process between the defendants. The agreement between the defendants lay at the heart of the plaintiff’s claim against them.
[43] By contrast, in the present cases, the terms of the settlement agreements are known. The plaintiffs, while they did not ultimately settle, were participants in judicial mediation. These are important distinctions and the motion judge correctly recognised them as such.
[44] The appellants want to plead that the IOs were kept fully informed and that the IOs did not express concerns about the settlement. The IOs, like the mediator or a pre-trial judge are neutrals. What they say, or fail to say, is and must be entirely without prejudice.
[45] We do not accept that the overarching interests of justice require that the defendants be able to plead, as material facts, things that were said or not said by the participants in the judicial mediation process, including the IO’s. The same logic would apply to documents created for the purpose of the mediation, such as the valuation.
[46] It bears remembering that pleadings shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which a party relies for the claim or defence, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved: Rule 25.06. This is a provision that is all too often honoured in the breach, rather than the observance. While it was not raised before the motion judge as a basis for striking out the impugned portions of the defendants’ pleadings, it might well have formed an alternative ground for doing so.
[47] We see no issue of fairness or public interest which outweighs the preservation of the settlement privilege. The defendants have joined issue on all of the allegations made against them by the plaintiffs. They dispute that their actions have the purpose or intention of preferring their own interests to those of the plaintiffs. That issue is squarely before the court and the nature and extent of the evidence that will be adduced in relation to their defence will be a matter for the trial judge.
[48] We would add this. The motion judge was alert to the potential mischief of permitting the impugned pleadings to stand. Not only would the extent of the evidence that might be adduced on discovery be significantly broadened, but there would be the spectre of the lawyers representing the various parties involved in the mediation ending up as witnesses. In Singh v. PCPO, 2018 ONSC 203 (Div. Ct.), at para. 57, this court reiterated that exceptions to the settlement privilege must be narrowly construed and only be given effect where another policy objective can be shown to outweigh any impact to the settlement objective. And as Mr. Laubman put it in argument, “truth seeking is not a recognised exception to settlement privilege”.
[49] In conclusion, it is important to underscore that the motion judge was dealing with a pleadings motion. His rulings are not evidentiary rulings. At the pleadings stage the impugned allegations should not be permitted. The resulting potential mischief is too great. The responding parties (plaintiffs) should not be required to plead over to them, provide disclosure in respect to them, conduct discoveries in respect to them.
[50] The motion judge’s decision does not preclude a proper foundation being laid to adduce the evidence which the appellants seek to rely on at trial. At that juncture, the trial judge can rule on admissibility. If admissibility is sought on the basis of special circumstances, there is a balancing to be done that would have to take into account the effect on the trial (for example, if allowing it in would require counsel to go into the witness box). But these points cannot be taken in isolation, and on their face would open up to the trial process a large part of the mediation process. In the absence of waiver, that should not be allowed to happen. Certainly not at this stage of the litigation.
Order and Costs
[51] The appeal is dismissed. The parties have agreed on costs and shall incorporate their agreement into the formal order reflecting this decision.
D.L. Corbett J.
Mew J.
Favreau J.
Released: 18 January 2022
CITATION: Stronach v. Stronach, 2022 ONSC 389
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NOS.: 749/50, 750/21,758/21, 765/21, 764/21, 768/21, 769/21
DATE: 20220118
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
D. L. CORBETT, MEW and FAVREAU JJ.
BETWEEN:
ANDREW STRONACH
Plaintiff (Respondent)
– and –
BELINDA STRONACH et. al.
Defendants (Appellants)
AND BETWEEN:
SELENA STRONACH
Plaintiff (Respondent)
– and –
BELINDA STRONACH et. al.
Defendants (Appellants)
REASONS FOR DECISION
D. L. CORBETT, MEW and FAVREAU Jj.
Released: 18 January 2022