Court Information

Date: 2015-01-30

Ontario Court of Justice

Between: Her Majesty the Queen — and — Stephen Ainsworth

Before: Justice J.F. Adamson

Heard on: January 20 and 21, 2015

Reasons for Judgment released on: January 30, 2015

Counsel:

• T. Hewitt for the Crown
• S. Ainsworth on his own behalf

ADAMSON J.:

Introduction

[1] Stephen Ainsworth represented himself before me at a trial which commenced on January 20th, 2015 and concluded the next day. He stands charged with obstructing the police, contrary to the Criminal Code, as well as eight driving related offences. All of the charges arose from a traffic stop which occurred on February 2, 2014 on Lakeridge Road, Scugog Township in the Region of Durham, Province of Ontario.

[2] The case presented two broad issues:

1. How to deal with the various substantive and procedural motions and arguments brought by Mr. Ainsworth that amounted to his denial of all authority save that of his God.

2. Did the Crown prove the actual charges beyond a reasonable doubt?

Pseudo-Legal Arguments (O.P.C.A.)

[3] In dealing with the first issue I cite with approval the decision of O'Donnell J of this Court in R. v. Duncan 2012 O.J. No. 6405. I join with Justice O'Donnell in praising the efforts and adopting the reasoning of Associate Chief Justice Rooke of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in Meads v. Meads 2012 ABQB 571, [2012] A.J. No. 980. In that case Justice Rooke was faced with a self-represented litigant in a matrimonial matter who raised a number of issues that Justice Rooke labelled organized pseudo legal commercial arguments or O.P.C.A.'s. In dealing with the matter Justice Rooke produced 736 paragraphs, the purpose of which (at paragraph 3) is to:

"Uncover, expose, collate and publish the tactics employed by the O.P.C.A. community, as part of a process to eradicate the growing abuse that these litigants direct towards the justice and legal system…"

[4] Justice Rooke describes such litigants as having several common characteristics including:

• A characteristic set of strategies
• Specific, but irrelevant formalities that they appear to believe are significant
• Commercial sources for many of their materials

And critically at (paragraph 4): "They will only honour state, regulatory, contract, family, fiduciary, equitable and criminal obligations if they feel like it. And typically they don't".

[5] The crux of Mr. Ainsworth's submissions to me were that he was subject only to the laws of his God and that the laws of man had no dominion over him as he had not volunteered to participate in the contract that he feels is their foundation. If this alone did not clearly identify him as an O.P.C.A. litigant his other arguments surely brought the point home. These included:

• His motion to defeat the proceedings by way of "set-off"
• His motion to defeat proceedings because the Crown had not rebutted his affidavits by their own
• His motion that the Highway Traffic Act was invalid as it was not endorsed (at least on someone's copy) by the Queen's printer
• His argument that Canada and all its laws are a corporate fiction
• His demand that various witnesses, the Crown and the Judge produce their oaths of Office for inspection
• His refusal to acknowledge any legal effect of the name Stephen David Ainsworth (instead purporting to be called Elijah, Stephen Elijah or Stephen Son of I Am) unless he needed something from the government
• Et cetera and Ad Nauseam

[6] Justice Rooke dealt with these matters exhaustively in Meads (supra) in part so judges in future would be spared that burden and so that these litigants would not succeed in their apparent aim of bogging down the justice system with nonsensical arguments which would have to be dealt with piecemeal by each and every judge they appear before. I therefore adopt Justice Rooke's reasoning and dismiss all of these arguments raised by Mr. Ainsworth for the reasons so ably stated in the above case.

[7] Having established that Mr. Stephen Ainsworth is subject to the Criminal Code of Canada, the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario and the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, I will turn now to the actual merits of the case.

Merits of the Case

Identification and Driving Offences

[8] The Crown led evidence from three witnesses. P.C. Ouellette testified that he stopped the defendant for speeding at a rate of 120 kilometres per hour in an 80 kilometre per hour zone. It was clearly established that the speed detection was properly executed. The officer also noticed that the van in question had no licence plates and requested assistance based on that fact. P.C. Ouellette then approached the driver, and lone occupant, of the van and asked him to identify himself. Mr. Ainsworth replied as he feels he should. He did not give the name by which he is known to the government because he didn't think he was required to. He instead responded with the nonsensical name by which he likes to style himself when he feels he doesn't need anything from the government. He backed up his assertion of identification by providing a card which he produced himself. Under cross-examination he quite candidly admitted that his view was that he could call himself Mr. Pencil if he felt like it and such should be sufficient to identify himself. Mr. Ainsworth took advantage of his time in the witness box to present many of his O.P.C. arguments. I have no hesitation in finding, based on the patent absurdity of these arguments and his statements about how he reconciles them with his government identity, that he knew full well that his obligation pursuant to the Highway Traffic Act was to provide his government recognized name and that he deliberately failed to do so. That clearly makes out the charge of failing to identify himself pursuant to that Act. This issue might also have been important for the obstruct police charge except that P.C. Ouellette located Mr. Ainsworth's health card in the vehicle, was satisfied that he now knew who he was, and released him from the criminal arrest unconditionally.

[9] I accept P.C. Ouellette's evidence that at this point he directed Mr. Ainsworth back to his van to await the various provincial offences tickets (including Part 3 summonses) that he was preparing. He also made clear to Mr. Ainsworth that the vehicle would be towed. Mr. Ainsworth also admitted in his evidence that he knew he was directed by P.C. Ouellette to wait and not to drive the vehicle. I accept P.C. Ouellette's evidence that establishes that the vehicle did not have insurance or licence plates and had not been registered as required when Mr. Ainsworth became its owner. Mr. Ainsworth also did not surrender the permit as he did not have one, nor did he surrender his driver's licence. All of these facts were also cheerfully admitted by Mr. Ainsworth in his evidence, as he forcefully argued that these laws do not apply to him. Sadly for him, they do.

Obstruction of Police

[10] I now turn to the issue of the obstruct police. The information reads that Mr. Ainsworth did willfully obstruct P.C. Ouellette, a peace officer in the execution of his duty. P.C. Ouellette's duties that morning included issuing appropriate provincial offences notices to Mr. Ainsworth. He was also under a positive duty to prevent Mr. Ainsworth from committing the same offences again which would obviously occur if Mr. Ainsworth moved the vehicle.

[11] The Crown Attorney has urged me to find that what happened next is the basis of the obstruct police charge. P.C. Ouellette believed that he had Mr. Ainsworth's only keys in his pocket. P.C.'s Prins and Seibert and Sgt. Heitzner had all arrived in separate vehicles to assist. Mr. Ainsworth urged the other officers to arrest P.C. Ouellette and invoked his "right of habeas corpus" so as to be taken before a Judge. Of course, as he was not even in custody, that particular writ was a non-starter. The officers declined. Mr. Ainsworth then indicated that he wanted his wallet and keys returned and shared that once they were he would be on his way. A discussion ensued wherein the officers, ultimately including Sgt. Heitzner, advised Mr. Ainsworth that it was not an option to drive his van as it was not insured. Sgt. Heitzner (who was called as a defence witness) went so far as to say that Mr. Ainsworth would be arrested if he attempted to drive away. Mr. Ainsworth did just that. After telling the officers that he was going to the van to make arrangements for a ride he produced a second set of keys and drove his vehicle forward onto the roadway.

[12] While the officer's accounts differ somewhat as to his speed and the distance he travelled all agree that they including, P.C. Ouellette, had to maneuver their vehicles and stop Mr. Ainsworth with a rolling block. At this point Mr. Ainsworth was still under the lawful direction of P.C. Ouellette to wait and not to drive the van.

[13] Again Mr. Ainsworth quite cheerfully agreed with those facts. He indicated that he drove away because he had been told by Sgt. Heitzner that if he did he would be arrested and thus would have access to a judge via habeas corpus. Sgt. Heitzner was clear that he said no such thing. I believe him. As an experienced officer he was well aware that weekend bail hearings are conducted by a justice of the peace and that even seeing that individual would not happen if Mr. Ainsworth was willing to sign other forms of release. Mr. Ainsworth was thus in contradiction of his own very credible witness when he asserts that he was told that moving the van would get him before a judge. This explanation of his understanding is also so twisted, implausible and convoluted that I find unequivocally that it was fabricated, after the fact, to attempt to build a legal argument that was otherwise without foundation.

Mr. Ainsworth simply disobeyed the lawful direction of P.C. Ouellette to remain at the scene and not drive his vehicle. He did so because he felt that the officer had no authority over him or his vehicle. He was wrong. It is beside the point whether Mr. Ainsworth's views are honestly held. Section 19 of the Criminal Code of Canada holds that "Ignorance of the Law by a person who commits an offence is not an excuse for committing that offence". Three elements need to be proven to establish the offence in question: That there was an obstruction, that the officer was in the execution of his duty and that the person obstructing did so willfully. P.C. Ouellette was a peace officer. His duties included maintaining the safety of the public through the proper enforcement of provincial statutes. He was so engaged in all his dealings with Mr. Ainsworth. Mr. Ainsworth obstructed P.C. Ouellette in the execution of that duty by both leaving the scene and doing so in a vehicle that was uninsured, un-plated and not registered. He did so of his own free will and caused P.C. Ouellette and the other officers to participate in a rolling block as a result. The charge of obstruct police has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and I find him guilty of that charge.

Findings of Guilt

[14] As previously stated earlier on in these reasons, the Provincial offences were proven as well. I therefore also find Mr. Ainsworth guilty of:

• Speeding at a rate of 120 kilometres in an 80 kilometre zone, contrary to Section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act
• Fail to identify himself, contrary to Section 39.1(6) of the Highway Traffic Act
• No insurance, contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act Section 2(1)(a)
• Fail to surrender a licence, contrary to Section 33(1) of the Highway Traffic Act
• Driver fail to surrender permit, contrary to Section 7(5)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act
• Fail to have plates, contrary to Section 7(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act
• Owner no permit applied for, contrary to Section 11(2) of the Highway Traffic Act
• Fail to have current validated permit, contrary to Section 7(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act

Released: January 30, 2015

Signed: Justice Adamson