Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

— And —

Anthony Glaros

Before: Justice P. Harris

Ruling on Section 11(b) Application

Reasons for Judgment released on February 6th, 2014.

Counsel:

• N. Delgado for the Crown
• A. Romain for the Defence

Harris, J.:

[1] Introduction

Anthony Glaros was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and excess alcohol on September 23rd, 2011. The Information was sworn on October 3, 2011. On January 9th, 2013, the second day for trial, the Defendant applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed. As a result of the late filing of a number of court appearance transcripts which were unavailable until just days before the return of the s. 11(b) application, the "Delay Application" was deferred until after the trial was completed (should the Defendant be found guilty). On June 7th, 2013, I found the Defendant guilty of the "over 80 mgs." charge and this delay application was adjourned to eventually be heard on January 2 and 3, 2014. After hearing evidence and extensive submissions from counsel on January 2nd and 3rd, 2014, I dismissed this Application, with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

The Chronology

[2] October 3, 2011

Date Information sworn; charges were pending from date of arrest, Sept. 23, 2011. Delay calculations start from October 3rd, 2011, according to s. 11(b) case authorities.

[3] November 1, 2011

First appearance; Defendant requests adjournment to retain counsel. Allocation of delay from previous date to this date ─ neutral intake.

[4] December 6, 2011

Second appearance; counsel partially retained, disclosure provided. Allocation of delay from previous date to this date ─ neutral intake.

[5] December 21, 2011

Third appearance; Defence and Crown pretrial discussions continuing; Defence requests adjournment for further resolution discussions. Allocation of delay from previous date to this date ─ neutral intake.

[6] January 4, 2012

Fourth appearance; Defence and Crown in continuing resolution discussions. Allocation of delay from previous date to this date ─ neutral intake.

[7] February 1, 2012

Fifth appearance; Resolution discussions continuing, judicial pretrial set for Mar. 5, 2012. Case remanded to date of judicial pretrial. Allocation of delay from previous date to this date ─ neutral intake.

[8] March 5, 2012

Sixth appearance; Defence previously advises that judicial pretrial no longer required and indicates 'Defence accepts resolution proposal.' On this date Resolution offer rescinded due to new charges. Judicial pretrial rescheduled for Mar. 29, 2012. Allocation of delay from previous date to this date ─ neutral intake. (Inherent time requirements include all of the steps taken until both sides are ready to set a date for trial including…pre-trial meetings: R. v. Morin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 25 at paras. 41, 42 – See Inherent Delay heading below).

[9] March 29, 2012

Seventh appearance; judicial pretrial conducted on this date. Trial date set for one day, August 24, 2012, by agreement of counsel on trial verification form. Defence counsel indicates on the record that "we're prepared to set a one day trial" and indicated he is available for trial the second week of May and thereafter and "there's no further preparation that's required." Allocation of delay from previous date to this date ─ neutral intake. (While some authorities have held that delay caused to conduct a judicial pre-trial is institutional delay (See: R. v. G. (C.R.), (2005), 206 C.C.C. (3d) 262 (Ont. C.A.)), the more recent authorities have concluded that this type of delay is part of the inherent time requirements of the case and carries neutral weight in the s. 11(b) analysis. As stated in R. v. Tran 2012 ONCA 18: "a judicial pre-trial to set the trial date(s) is a reasonable and necessary case management tool in busy judicial centres designed to ensure overall timeliness of the system and thus protect the Charter rights of Accused generally in presentation of their cases provided the Court is available for a judicial pre-trial within a reasonable time." (See also: R. v. Khan (2011), 2011 ONCA 173, 270 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at paras. 44-5 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Emanuel 2012 ONSC 1132, at paras. 14-15)).

[10] August 24, 2012

Eighth appearance; Defendant arrived for trial at 10:30 am. Discussion with Justice B. Cavion in court regarding fact he was pre-trial Judge. Defendant elects to proceed to trial before a different jurist. Record indicates case was transferred to available court at approximately 11:00 am. Trial commences as a blended voir dire in respect to a Charter Application alleging breaches of the Defendant's section 8, 9, and 10(b) rights. After the matter proceeded to the end of the court day, lengthy discussions ensued about available dates for continuation. Trial was adjourned to January 9th and 10th, 2013 for further evidence. (See allocation of delay to Aug. 24, 2012, below under ISSUE A).

[11] January 9, 10, 2013

Ninth appearance: case proceeds with continuing blended voir dire on Charter applications while hearing trial evidence at the same time (Charter I). New Charter Application alleging breaches of sections 7 and 11(b) of the Charter filed, and for reasons stated on record (transcripts not filed with adequate notice in accordance with the Rules) these Charter Applications (Charter II) were adjourned for later hearing. Trial was adjourned to February 6th, 2013 for further evidence on voir dire. (See allocation of delay to January 9th, 2013, below under ISSUE B).

[12] February 6th, 2013

Tenth appearance: case proceeds with continuing blended voir dire and submissions on Charter I Applications while hearing trial evidence at the same time. Trial adjourned to Feb. 13th, 2013 for judgment on the Charter I Applications ─ allocation of delay to Feb. 6th, 2012 ─ inherent delay. (Inherent time requirements for further evidence when initial trial estimates prove be insufficient: R. v. Allen (1996), 110 CCC (3d) 331; 1 CR (5th) 347; 92 OAC 345 (Ont. C.A.)).

[13] February 13th, 2013

Eleventh appearance: judgment rendered on Charter I Applications. Applications are dismissed and intoxilizer results are admitted into evidence. Trial adjourned to continue March 5th, 2013 ─ inherent delay. (Time required for consideration of all evidence and submissions over previous four trial dates in order to render judgment - part of inherent trial process).

[14] March 5th, 2013

Twelfth appearance; trial proceeds with Defendant testifying and submissions on trial issues commenced. Trial is adjourned to March 25th, 2013 for a voir dire hearing on the admissibility of the hearsay statements of Catherine Kang pursuant to the principled exception to the hearsay rule ─ inherent delay. (Inherent time requirements for further evidence when initial trial estimates prove be insufficient: R. v. Allen, supra.)

[15] March 25th, 2013

Thirteenth appearance; case continues with voir dire Application for admission of the hearsay statement of Ms. Kang for the truth of its contents. Trial adjourned to April 22nd, 2013. (See allocation of delay to March 25th, 2013, below under ISSUE C).

[16] April 22nd, 2013

Fourteenth appearance; voir dire on hearsay statement continues. Trial adjourned to continue on May 14th, 2013. (See allocation of delay to April 22, 2013, below under ISSUE D).

[17] May 14, 2013

Fifteenth appearance; voir dire concluded and a statement of agreed fact was admitted in respect to the hearsay statement. Defence applied to reopen and further defence evidence was admitted and submissions concluded after which the trial was adjourned for judgment on the impaired operation and excess alcohol issues to June 7th, 2013 ─ inherent delay. (Inherent time requirements for further evidence when initial trial estimates prove be insufficient: R. v. Allen, supra.).

[18] June 7th, 2013

Sixteenth appearance; judgment rendered and Defendant found guilty of the "over 80 mgs." charge and acquitted of the impaired operation charge. Case is adjourned to October 4 and 7, 2013 for hearing of Application regarding Charter II issues. Allocation of delay from previous date to this date ─ inherent delay. (Time required for consideration of all evidence and submissions over previous seven trial dates in order to render judgment - part of inherent trial process).

[19] October 4, 5, 2013

Seventeenth appearance; Charter Applications were not proceeded with on these dates because of the fact that I was unavailable due to bereavement leave. Case was rescheduled for hearings to January 2nd and 3rd, 2014. Inherent delay ─ Defence not making an issue of the delay from … [June 7 to October 4th]: "from the point today to then. I don't think that would be material to Your Honour's decision…" Transcript, June 7, 2013, Page 14.

[20] January 2, 3, 2014

Eighteenth appearance; Charter Application under section 11(b) proceeded with. Section 7 Application abandoned. Section 11(b) Application dismissed with reasons to follow and Defendant sentenced on "over 80 mgs." charge ─ inherent delay to these dates. (When a judge who is seized of a matter falls ill [or is required to contend with family-related health issues] the delay will be part of the inherent time requirements of the case, not counting against the Crown or the defence: R. v. MacDougall, [1998] S.C.J. No. 74).

Inherent Delay

[21] Neutral Intake and Pre-Trial Discussions

First, the defence takes the position that for a relatively uncomplicated drink/drive case, the Court should allocate 2 months to accommodate neutral intake functions in accordance with R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 (SCC). In Morin, it was also stated that when adjournments take place for continuing pre-trial discussions, that delay is to be classified as "neutral intake." The time it took for Crown counsel to make a decision about a reduced charge or the fact an offer was retracted when Mr. Glaros was charged with further offences is irrelevant to the s. 11(b) calculation. The point is, both counsel agreed to these delays while negotiations were underway. And the delay necessitated by the need to reschedule a judicial pre-trial is also inherent delay as noted above.

[22] Trial Readiness and Counsel Preparation

As to trial readiness, Sopinka J. in Morin commented that the time required for counsel to prepare and to clear their calendars when taking on a new case, is part of the inherent time requirements of the case. On the facts in R. v. Morin, counsel had sought "the earliest date" for trial and was given a date that was just over thirteen months away. Sopinka J. held that this entire thirteen month period was not systemic or institutional delay. He reasoned as follows:

"As counsel for the defence did not indicate a readiness for trial but merely a request for the earliest trial date, it is somewhat unclear whether the case for the defence was as yet ready for trial …I am prepared to infer from the totality of the facts that an institutional delay of about twelve months was involved. This time period is the time from which the parties were ready for trial until the point at which the courts were able to accommodate this case." [Emphasis added.]

[23] Analysis of Delay to First Trial Date (August 24, 2012)

Accordingly, ISSUE A, or the allocation of delay to the first trial date, Aug. 24, 2012, will be resolved as follows: (1) Mr. Romain stated on the record March 29th, 2012 that as of the second week of May, 2012, he was available for trial: Transcript page 4; that represents one and one-quarter months inherent delay. (2) Mr. Romain at that time also stated: "there's no further preparation that's required." However the Crown must also have an opportunity to prepare for trial. Under the Rules of The Ontario Court of Justice in Criminal Proceedings, the Crown is entitled to a 30 day notice period to prepare and respond to Charter motions which were filed in advance of the August 24th, trial date: R. v. Murphy 2013 ONSC 6272. I therefore allocate a further 30 days to trial preparation; (3) deducting a total of two and one-quarter months of neutral or inherent delay from four and three quarters months to August 24th is assessed as 2.5 months.

Analysis of Delay to January 9, 2013

[24] Delay Between Trial Dates

Defence counsel in the instant case, submits that the trial coordinators erred in placing the first day of trial in a court in which the judicial pre-trial judge was presiding and that mistake lead to the trial not being completed resulting in the need for a second trial date ─ which resulting delay should be assessed as institutional. Respectfully, I do not agree. First, the Defendant did not arrive at court until 10:30 am and it appears from the record (Transcript I August 24, 2012, page 6) that the case was to be traversed to another trial court "starting at 11:00" am. Second, there was no possibility that this trial with (at that time) one Charter Application under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) would have been completed in one day even if it had started at 10:30 am; subsequent dates are deemed inherent delay when initial trial estimates prove be insufficient, R. v. Allen, supra. Third, while the Supreme Court has held in R. v. Godin 2009 SCC 26, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) that defence counsel were not required to hold themselves "in a state of perpetual availability", here, the defence was almost completely unavailable, offering only October 11th, and December 10, 11, and 12. 2012. Taking all of the foregoing reasons into account, I have determined that the four and three-quarter months to January 9th, 2013 should be considered inherent delay as a result of the following commentary in R. v. Allen, supra:

When addressing s. 11(b), one must consider the inherent time requirements needed to get a case into the system and to complete that case: R. v. Morin, supra, at p. 16. Those time requirements can include adjournments necessitated by the need to find additional court time when initial time estimates prove inaccurate: R. v. Hawkins, (1991), 6 O.R. (3d) 724 at 728 (C.A.), aff'd, , (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 64 (S.C.C.); R. v. Philip reflex, (1993), 80 C.C.C. (3d) 167 at 172-73 (Ont. C.A.). The inherent time requirements needed to complete a case are considered to be neutral in the s. 11(b) calculus. The recognition and treatment of such inherent time requirements in the s. 11(b) jurisprudence is simply a reflection of the reality of the world in which the criminal justice system operates. No case is an island to be treated as if it were the only case with a legitimate demand on court resources. The system cannot revolve around any one case, but must try to accommodate the needs of all cases. When a case requires additional court resources the system cannot be expected to push other cases to the side and instantaneously provide those additional resources.

[25] Conclusion on ISSUE B

Accordingly, the delay referred to in ISSUE B above, between trial dates August 24, 2012 and January 9th, 2013 should be allocated to the inherent category.

Analysis of Delay from March 5th to April 22 (The Kang Voir Dire)

[26] Late Disclosure of Witness Information

Defence counsel in the instant case, submits that the Crown supplied mandated disclosure of the address and contact information of Catherine Kang to the defence so late in the proceedings (December 12, 2012) the information was useless, "the evidence was effectively lost," and having no opportunity to bring the witness to court under subpoena, the Defendant had no choice but to apply for a voir dire for the purpose of obtaining a ruling that her hearsay statement could be used by the defence for substantive purposes under the principled exception to the hearsay rule. The defence argues that these additional trial days should be assessed against the Crown for having placed the defence in a position where it had no alternative but to proceed with this two day application. Respectfully, I do not agree.

[27] Lack of Realistic Prospect of Success

First, the application had no realistic chance of success, particularly in respect to the reliability requirement, given the reality that any trier of fact would have had virtually no basis on which "to assess the statement's truth and accuracy," this being the statement of a passenger who had been in the Defendant's vehicle who was interviewed by police briefly as she stood next to the car: R. v. Khelawon 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 (S.C.C.). Second, it was clear that Ms. Kang was not willing to assist the Defendant in any way.

[28] Witness Unwillingness and Lack of Diligence

In her statement she said that the Defendant had not consumed any alcohol in her presence since she met him at 10:30 pm (he was arrested at 1:10 am) and she did not notice any signs of intoxication. Further, she did not notice any weaving on the road prior to the vehicle being parked on Sherbourne Street, Toronto, because she was "watching videos" on her cellphone. On balance, her evidence would have been helpful to the defence, if she maintained that position in her testimony. The problem is that, according to P.C. Rhandawa, "she does not want anything to do with the case" and refused to allow her contact information to be given to the defence. She moved shortly after the date P.C. Rhandawa spoke to her by telephone. After later attempting to contact her through her father on a number of occasions, P.C. Rhandawa testified he was "threatened by the father not to call him again."

[29] Speculation Regarding Witness Assistance

The point to being made is that it is arguable on these facts that the defence was attempting to obtain the value of this witness' statement without the inconvenience of her testimony which may well have been less than helpful. In the face of this hostility from a so-called "chill buddy" of the Defendant, I am not satisfied that had the witness, Ms. Kang, been available for trial, that her evidence would have ultimately assisted the Defendant. It is important to note that Ms. Kang was the passenger in his vehicle and ostensibly his friend. Indeed, Mr. Glaros testified that he had her "cell number" and called her after his release and "apologized for the night and got no reply." He made no other efforts to locate or contact her except emailing a mutual friend, Mark who was out of the country. He was not aware of any efforts made by his counsel to reach her. In my view, it is pure speculation that the availability of her evidence would have assisted the Defendant rather than harming his case. Indeed, even if she were brought to court by the police, it would be highly unlikely that any experienced defence counsel would have summoned her directly to the witness stand. To justify this additional trial delay, I would have to be satisfied that had the "Kang" evidence been available it would have assisted the defence in a material way: R. v. Hayes [2003] O.J. No. 4590 (C.A.) at para. 35. I am not so satisfied. In terms of the allocation of delay from March 5th to April 22nd, ISSUES C & D, I would attribute responsibility for that period to the defence. At the very least it was inherent delay as a result of underestimated court time needed for all trial issues. The defence argues it was delay caused by the Crown for not providing disclosure of her contact information in a timely manner resulting in the loss of her evidence.

[30] Crown's Disclosure Obligations

The Crown is placed in a difficult position when a witness states that she does not want her contact evidence released to the defence. The record discloses that the Crown and police made reasonable efforts to contact Ms. Kang and bring her to court. Rather than providing the contact information long after it was clearly useless to the defence, the better Crown practice would have been to have sought a "Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326" ruling from the Court on the first trial date August 24th, 2012. Still, because I am not satisfied the defence exercised reasonable diligence in ensuring the presence of this "friendly" witness at trial or that she would necessarily have assisted the Defendant if she testified, I have concluded that the fairest disposition of this delay issue is to assess it as part of the inherent time requirements when the court time required is underestimated.

Further Analysis of Delay Issues

[31] Underestimation of Trial Time

In my view, in the instant case, applying Allen, supra, when the Accused elected to present a Charter Application under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) on August 24, 2012, a substantial re-adjustment was necessary in terms of trial time requirements. Having asserted "we're prepared to set a one day trial", the underestimation of trial time required naturally results in an assessment that all subsequent delay beyond the one day requested, must be allocated as inherent according to R. v. Allen. I would attribute the entire 10 months delay after August 24th, 2012, including the Kang voir dire, to the inherent time requirements needed for the system to respond to the request for additional trial dates. Further, in view of the amount of additional time required to complete the case and the attempts made at every stage to obtain the earliest continuation dates, I regard the 10 month period it took to complete the trial (to June 7th, 2013) as both reasonably expeditious considering the fact seven further trial dates were accommodated and as well, properly reflective of the inherent time requirements needed to reschedule all of the necessary trial litigation to ensure that all issues raised were properly aired and carefully considered. In summary, I would not hold the Crown responsible for any of the delay after August 24th, 2012.

[32] Systemic Delay Calculation

A strict adherence to the binding case authorities, in my view, has the effect of limiting institutional delay in this case to the period of systemic delay leading up to the first trial date (August 24, 2012) ─ a mere 2.5 months. If I am wrong in this assessment and the thirty minute (or so) delay in transferring the trial to a different court, on August 24th, 2012, necessitated a second trial because the system was not able to provide the Defendant with a full day for trial ─ then an additional 4.5 months institutional delay must be added to the calculation resulting in an effective total institutional delay allocation of seven (7) months.

Prejudice

[33] Stress and Anxiety

Additionally, the defence position is that in addition to the failure to provide a full day for trial, the "Kang contact information" disclosure delay to December 12, 2012 brought about the loss of this witness' evidence and impaired the Defendant's ability to defend himself on these allegations ─ all of which resulted in a substantial degree of prejudice to the Defendant's fair trial interests. As noted above, I understand the Defendant's position on this issue ─ but I just cannot agree that the "loss" of this evidence had any meaningful ramifications. First, she was his friend and he was driving her home. Second, Mr. Glaros had a working telephone number for her for months after his arrest. Third, he knew where she worked, who her friends were, and the area in which she lived. And yet there is no evidence he took any steps to find her and speak to her (besides calling her once and getting no reply and calling a mutual friend who was out of the country), let alone any effort to secure her attendance at court. As noted above, the hostility she and her family displayed towards any involvement in this case leaves the unmistakable impression she would not have assisted him in his defence.

[34] Affidavit Evidence and Medical Documentation

The Defendant testified about the effect of these charges or him, and filed an affidavit detailing the prejudice he feels he has sustained. He stated that as a result of the delay in completing his case, he has experienced enhanced stress and anxiety with each additional trial date as well as financial stress that has been extremely taxing on him and his family. The various trial events were frustrating and caused added stress. He also states the unavailability of Ms. Kang as a witness was distressing and added to his anxiety. There is no doubt that there is considerable stress and anxiety that could be inferred from the point of view of a Defendant facing so many different days for trial. I do note that no medical evidence was filed. It must be said that self-diagnosis is often not the most reliable evidence. There is a modest evidentiary burden on the Defendant to establish that the adverse health effects are attributable to delay if the evidence is to be given any significant weight. There is no requirement that medical evidence be tendered, but his evidence would be more persuasive if his health conditions could be established objectively and independently as being caused by the delay to trial.

[35] Assessment of Prejudice

In the end result, I am satisfied that the Defendant has suffered a modest degree of actual prejudice to his security interests as a result of trial delay on these charges causing increasing stress, anxiety and a negative impact on his work and family. The one qualification that would temper that assessment is the fact there were other charges proceeding at the same time, one of which was arguably more serious (personation). Still, the financial costs of a considerable number of court appearances, represents an additional prejudicial impact. And it must be said that a relatively modest degree of inherent prejudice can be inferred in respect to this Defendant as a result of the general stigma, and the vexations and vicissitudes of 7 months of systemic delay in having these pending criminal accusations concluded. I do note though that there has been no assertion of prejudice to his liberty interests. I conclude that there is credible evidence which I accept that he has suffered a degree of actual prejudice to his security interests as a result of trial delay in terms of stress, anxiety and financial distress.

[36] Characterization of Prejudice

In my view the appropriate characterization of prejudice in this case considering the lack of any negative impacts on his liberty interests should be considered "modest" but not insignificant.

The Morin Factors

[37] Application of the Morin Test

Whether delay has been reasonable is assessed by considering the length of the delay, less any periods that have been waived by the defence, and then by taking into account the reasons for the delay (inherent time requirements, Accused's actions, Crown's actions, limits on institutional resources), the prejudice to the Accused and finally by balancing the interests that s. 11(b) seeks to protect: R. v. Godin, 2009 SCC 26, [2009] S.C.J. No. 26 para 18. Accordingly, the issues under consideration will be dealt with in the above-noted order in accordance with the analytical steps articulated by Sopinka, J. in R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 at 778, and considered in arriving at a s. 11(b) conclusion:

(1) Length of Delay

The time from the laying of the charge to the last trial date is about 21 months which calls for an inquiry. It goes without saying that the Crown has the responsibility to bring the Accused to trial and ensure that trial proceedings are not unduly delayed.

(2) Waiver of Time Periods

According to Morin, supra, any agreement by counsel to a future date does not constitute a waiver, and accordingly there have been no delay waivers in this case.

(3) Reason for the Delay

(a) Inherent time requirements ─ A normal intake period in which all preliminary activities should take place is generally 2 months for this type of case. However, based on the conclusions under the "Inherent delay" heading above, I have determined that the period from charge to set date should be allocated as an inherent or neutral time period. In addition, there is an inherent delay calculation attributable to trial readiness issues in the months following the setting of the trial date. I have assessed a period of two and one-quarter months under the category of 'trial readiness' inherent delay. Further, for reasons indicated above, I have allocated the 'Kang voir dire' delay to the inherent category.

(b) Actions of the Accused – As noted under the "Kang Voir Dire" heading above, but balancing all factors, this delay was deemed inherent.

(c) Actions of the Crown – As noted under the "Kang Voir Dire" heading above, but balancing all factors, this delay was deemed inherent.

(d) Limits on Institutional Resources – At the highest, the systemic delay in this case is 7 months which is below the classic 8-10 month delay guidelines as formulated in seminal decisions such as Ascov/Morin. The delay, while not ideal would represent a constitutionally acceptable period of delay.

(e) Other reasons for delay – There are no other reasons for delay.

(4) Prejudice to Accused

I have determined that the prejudice in this case is relatively modest for the reasons noted above. Additionally, the authorities (see R. v. G(C.R.), [2005] O.J. No. 3764 (C.A.)) would suggest that the tolerable delay in this case would be closer to the upper end of the 8-10 month guidelines having regard to the fact that there were no real delay impacts on his liberty interests.

Balancing

[38] Societal Interest in Trial on the Merits

Bearing in mind the Ontario Court of Appeal directions in R. v. Qurereshi, [2004] O.J. 4711 (C.A.) and R. v. Seegmiller [2004] O.J. 2004 (C.A.), the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighs the Accused and society's interest in a trial without unreasonable delay, given the delay and prejudice in this case, in my view.

Conclusion

[39] Final Determination

A seven month period of delay, while not ideal, is within constitutionally acceptable levels, considering the modest degree of actual prejudice. As a result of the above analysis, I have concluded that the Defendant's section 11(b) Charter rights have not been breached and the Application will therefore be dismissed.

P. Harris, J.

February 6th, 2014.