Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death under s. 219(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent in failing to conduct a thorough daily inspection of his semi-trailer, resulting in a dual wheel detaching and striking a vehicle, fatally injuring the occupant.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for criminal negligence, and (2) the trial judge erred in using the appellant's prior compelled testimony in violation of s. 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal accepted the second ground, finding the trial judge improperly used the appellant's prior incriminating testimony to undermine his credibility and reject his defence at trial.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing that the sentencing judge erred by rejecting a joint sentencing submission for a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting four children in 2004 and received a determinate sentence.

While on probation, he sexually assaulted two of his own children and breached a prohibition order.

The sentencing judge imposed an indeterminate sentence based on psychiatric evidence that the appellant's pedophilia could not be managed in the community and that he posed a danger to children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the legal test and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant could not be managed in the community.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal, hearing the appeal concurrently with a co-accused's similar appeal, found no unreasonable delay, agreeing with the trial judge's calculation of 27 months net delay.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: (1) that the conviction was unreasonable given the inconsistency with a co-accused's acquittal, and (2) that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding trial delay.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, as the co-accused testified and was believed while the appellant's witness was rejected as untruthful.

The trial delay of 27 months fell within the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The sentence of ten years was upheld as fit given the large quantity of cocaine involved and the appellant's prior conviction for the same offence.

The appellants appealed from the dismissal of an application for mandamus challenging a Justice of the Peace's refusal to issue process arising from a private information.

The lower court found that the Justice of the Peace had acted within jurisdiction and did not deny the appellants natural justice.

The appeal was scheduled for hearing but faced adjournment requests due to the co-appellant's health concerns.

The court granted one final opportunity for oral submissions to be heard on a peremptory basis.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding a guilty plea conviction and refusing to admit new evidence to set aside the plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by applying the Palmer test when rejecting the affidavit in the application to set aside the guilty plea.

Leave to appeal was granted.

However, upon examination of the record, including the detailed plea inquiry conducted by the original trial judge, the court found that the appellant fully understood and agreed to the plea and the underlying facts.

The appellant's claim of misunderstanding regarding a mandatory weapons prohibition was rejected as the record showed the trial judge and appellant's counsel had made clear that the prohibition would be mandatory.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing his friend during a physical altercation that began as a fist fight and escalated when the deceased produced a knife.

The appellant admitted to causing the death but claimed self-defence.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 12 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of various evidence, the jury charge on self-defence and provocation, and the sentencing decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, though it identified an error in sentencing that had no impact on the outcome.

The appellant appealed his convictions on multiple firearm and drug offences.

The central issue was whether evidence seized during a warrantless search on March 6, 2012 should have been admitted despite a prior illegal warrantless search on February 29, 2012.

The trial judge had excluded evidence from the first search but admitted evidence from the second search, which was conducted pursuant to a warrant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) analysis by impermissibly diminishing the seriousness of the Charter breach and considering irrelevant factors.

The court held that the deliberate and ongoing nature of the police misconduct required exclusion of the evidence to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions related to a drive-by shooting, arguing that the trial judge's factual findings were unreasonable.

Specifically, he challenged the findings that the stolen vehicle apprehended in a church parking lot was the same vehicle involved in the shooting, and that he was in the vehicle during the incident, citing differing evidence on the number of occupants and insufficient fingerprint and saliva evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge reasonably relied on a constellation of direct and circumstantial evidence to support his conclusions and eliminate alternative inferences.

The applicant, a Francophone, was convicted of driving without insurance after his paralegal pled guilty on his behalf in English.

He appealed to the Ontario Court of Justice, where he was assisted by an interpreter and indicated he wanted a bilingual appeal and had experienced communication issues with his paralegal.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal after the applicant confirmed he had authorized the guilty plea.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing his language rights were violated.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, finding that whether a Francophone appellant is entitled to a bilingual appeal even if they did not request a bilingual trial raises an issue of public interest and the proper administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because he lacked sufficient time to stage the crime scene without pre-planning, which the jury rejected by acquitting him of first degree murder.

He also argued the trial judge erred in refusing to disclose information from a confidential informant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the jury to conclude the staging occurred within the available two-hour window, and upholding the trial judge's application of the innocence at stake test to maintain informant privilege.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide reasons for her decision.

The trial judge had given her decision with reasons to follow, but no reasons were delivered more than three years later.

The Court of Appeal held that the brief reasons provided did not meet the Sheppard test and did not permit appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the global sentence of seven years imposed on the respondent for attempted murder, threatening death, and breach of probation.

The respondent had a history of domestic violence against the complainant and was on probation at the time of the vicious stabbing attack.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly unfit given the aggravating factors, including the respondent's failure to accept responsibility.

The appeal was allowed, and the global sentence was increased to nine years (eight and a half years for attempted murder and six months consecutive for breach of probation), less credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in using her false statements in a Family Court affidavit as circumstantial evidence of guilt and misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant concocted portions of her affidavit to cast suspicion away from herself.

The court also found no material misapprehensions of the evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention in a maximum secure facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition was reasonable, supported by evidence, and the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available.

The Court agreed that any disposition below maximum security would compromise public safety and rejected the appellant's request for an absolute discharge.

The appellant, a person of Roma ethnicity who was granted 'protected person' status in Canada, appealed his committal for extradition to Hungary and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him.

He argued that the extradition judge erred in refusing a stay for abuse of process, that the judge's comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the Minister of Justice erred in consulting the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration regarding his risk of persecution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and holding that the Minister of Justice properly assessed the risk of surrender under the Extradition Act framework, which differs from the immigration risk assessment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the Crown's late disclosure that a co-occupant of the searched premises was incarcerated at the time of the search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that defence counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to challenge the search warrant based on the information available, and the late disclosure did not affect trial fairness.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the trial judge's use of documentary evidence and an error regarding unanalyzed drug residue, concluding the verdict was not unreasonable.

In the context of a ministerial reference regarding Steven Murray Truscott's 1959 murder conviction, the court addressed two preliminary issues.

First, the court granted the appellant's request to have the panel hear witness evidence viva voce rather than out of court.

Second, the court dismissed a motion by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to permit camera access to the proceedings, finding that recording is prohibited under s. 136(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the statutory exemptions did not apply because the Crown did not consent.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's detailed and exemplary reasons.

Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The administrators of two mental health centres appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board transferring a patient, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, from a maximum security facility to a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board applied the wrong legal test by using the 'least onerous and least restrictive' standard to determine the conditions of the patient's hospital detention under s. 672.54(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Board for a rehearing with directions to apply the correct legal test and obtain further information regarding the patient's previous transfer and the suitability of the medium security facility.