WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act…
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
CITATION: R. v. K.R., 2010 ONCA 505
DATE: 20100709
DOCKET: C50964
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Moldaver, Simmons and Juriansz JJ.A.
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty The Queen
Respondent
and
K.R.
Appellant
Gavin S. MacKenzie, for the appellant Holly Loubert, for the respondent
Heard and endorsed: July 9, 2010 On appeal from conviction by Justice Lloyd Budzinski of the Ontario Court of Justice dated April 10, 2009.
APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT
[1] We agree that it may not be clear how the trial judge used his finding that the appellant provided false information to the authorities. However, even assuming the trial judge found that portions of the appellant's affidavit filed in the Family Court proceedings were concocted and that he used that finding as a piece of circumstantial evidence tending to support the Crown's case, in our view, it was open to the trial judge to do so.
[2] There was ample evidence to support concoction relating to the appellant's assertions in her affidavit that after returning from a visit to his father the child's face was swollen, he would scream when she tried to change his diaper, the daycare workers at the shelter noticed the same changes and that the appellant took a polygraph test and was told she had passed. Such evidence included: the evidence undermining the appellant's claim that the child had visited his father on the occasion in issue; the appellant's failure to report the child's injuries at an earlier stage; the fact that none of the child care workers noticed any injuries; the evidence of the one polygraph operator for the police service that the appellant did not take a polygraph and the timing and circumstances of the statement. The appellant was clearly attempting to mislead the court to cast suspicion away from herself.
[3] We are not persuaded that the trial judge's reasons demonstrate any material misapprehensions of the evidence. We read his comment that the appellant took flight as referring to the January incident when the appellant left her children unattended at the shelter for a couple of hours. The evidence concerning the record keeping logs at the shelter, the systems for monitoring the presence of residents, and of the appellant's generally responsible behaviour supports the trial judge's findings that the child did not visit his father on the date alleged.
[4] The appeal is dismissed.