Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-10-16 Docket: COA-24-CV-1330

Judges: Hourigan, Sossin and Pomerance JJ.A.

Between

Steven David Bazar and Marie Monique Julienne Deguire Applicants (Respondents)

and

Bruce Trail Conservancy Respondent (Appellant)

APPLICATION UNDER Rule 14.05(3)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure

And Between

Bruce Trail Conservancy Applicant (Appellant)

and

Steven David Bazar and Marie Monique Julienne Deguire Respondents (Respondents)

APPLICATION UNDER Rule 14.05(3)(e) and Section 71 of the Land Titles Act

Counsel

Samuel Nash and Logan Schroeder, for the appellant

Mathew Kersten, for the respondents

Heard: October 8, 2025

On Appeal

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Meredith Donohue of the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 1, 2024, with reasons at 2024 ONSC 6091.

Reasons for Decision

[1] The respondents, Steven Bazar and Marie Deguire, sought and obtained an order for adverse possession in relation to a triangle of land consisting of 1.6 acres. The land abuts a farm property owned by the appellant, Bruce Trail Conservancy. The appellant challenges the ruling below on various grounds.

[2] To obtain an order for adverse possession, a claimant must establish: (1) actual possession of the land; (2) an intention to exclude the true owner from their property; and (3) effective exclusion of the true owner from their property: Kosicki v. Toronto (City), 2025 SCC 28, at para. 27; McClatchie v. Rideau Lakes (Township), 2015 ONCA 233, 53 R.P.R. (5th) 169, at paras. 9-11. Actual possession is established where the act of possession is open and notorious, adverse, exclusive, peaceful, actual and continuous: Kosicki, at para. 27. All of the requirements must be established throughout a ten-year period occurring entirely before the land was placed under the land titles system: Armstrong v. Moore, 2020 ONCA 49, 15 R.P.R. (6th) 200, at para. 18; Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 4; Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5, s. 51.

[3] The application judge found that each of these requirements was satisfied. She considered the evidence of persons who occupied the disputed area prior to the respondents. For many years, the Slak family lived on the land. Mayda and Tony Slak moved to the area with their parents in 1978, who were deceased at the time of the application. The Slak children, now adults, offered evidence establishing that, from 1979 onwards, the family had cleared the land, excavated the pond, maintained beehives, lit bonfires, and planted trees, including the trees that now line the disputed property line. The evidence from the Slaks was confirmed in various respects by other witnesses who had lived in the area. It was contradicted in some respects by Tim Masterman, whose family had owned the farm property up until the time it was sold to the appellant. However, the application judge found Mr. Masterman's evidence to be "not persuasive" and "less reliable" than the evidence of others, including the Slaks.

[4] On the basis of the evidence that she accepted, the application judge found that the test for adverse possession had been met.

[5] The appellant raises various issues. It argues that there was no evidence to support the finding that the respondents intended to exclude and did effectively exclude the titled owner from possessing the land. We disagree. Intention is usually proved by way of inference. In this case, the inference that the respondents intended to exclude the titled owner from the land flowed logically and inexorably from the evidence before the court. So too did the findings of actual possession, and effective exclusion of the titled owner.

[6] The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the reasons, alleging that the application judge merely offered conclusory statements, without adequate explanation. We again disagree. The reasons must be read as a whole. The application judge summarized the relevant evidence in several paragraphs and her reasons make clear what she did and did not accept. The decision, while brief, seized the substance of the matter. It told the parties what was decided and why. It was sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. Nothing further was required.

[7] Finally, the appellant argues that the application judge erred in her demarcation of the boundary separating the disputed area from the surrounding farmland. The suitability of a line of demarcation will depend on the particular facts of the case. Here, there was no fence surrounding the disputed area, but a line of trees, planted years earlier by the Slak family, served as a functional equivalent. We see no error in the application judge's conclusion that the trees stood as a "clear, physical demarcation" and would signal to third parties that the property beyond the trees belonged to the occupiers of that land.

[8] As for the particulars, the application judge found that the "clearest boundary line" was a "straight diagonal line" that "roughly" followed the path of the deciduous trees. She attached, as Schedule "A" to her decision, a visual representation of the boundary, based on a sketch the appellant had used for real estate purposes. Given her verbal description and visual depiction of the boundary, there could be little doubt over where property was to be divided.

[9] In any event, any uncertainty could have been rectified in the court below. Toward the end of her reasons, the application judge expressly invited the parties to seek "further clarification or orders" from the court as might be necessary. The parties agree that no such clarification was sought.

[10] In short, we see no basis on which to intervene. The appeal is dismissed. As agreed, costs in the amount of $25,000, all inclusive, to be paid to the respondents.

C.W. Hourigan J.A.

L. Sossin J.A.

R. Pomerance J.A.

Footnote

[1] In the court below, the respondents brought an application seeking an order for adverse possession. The appellant brought a cross-application seeking an order discharging four notices which had been registered against the appellant's land in relation to the adverse possession claim.