Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-10-08 Docket: COA-24-CV-1391

Justices: Thorburn, Coroza and Gomery JJ.A.

Between

Linda Ellacott, On Her Own Behalf Plaintiff (Appellant)

and

The Waterloo Police Board, Police Chief Brian M. Larkin, Police Constable Chauhan, M (Badge #1572) and Police Constable Costello, S. (Badge #5435) Defendants (Respondents)

Counsel

Linda Ellacott, acting in person

David Boghosian and Luciana Amaral, for the respondents

Heard: September 19, 2025

On appeal from the order of Justice Michael G. Emery of the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 4, 2024, with reasons reported at 2024 ONSC 6075.

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

[1] Linda Ellacott appeals the dismissal of her action by way of summary judgment. In her lawsuit against the respondent, Waterloo Regional Police Services (the "Waterloo Police"), its chief and two employees, her central allegation was that they unlawfully disclosed to her employer that she was married to a federal parolee, thereby causing her to lose her job as a supervisor at a halfway house for federal parolees. She asserted various causes of action and claimed over $800,000 in damages.

[2] The appellant contends that the motion judge misunderstood or misinterpreted the evidence, leading to a miscarriage of justice, and that there are unresolved issues of fact that require a trial.

[3] We disagree. In clear and cogent reasons, the motion judge canvassed the record, made findings on uncontroverted evidence, and identified and applied the relevant legal principles.

Background

[4] The appellant chose not to cross-examine the respondents on their affidavit evidence, and the motion judge accepted that their evidence was uncontradicted.

[5] The appellant was employed as a supervisor at a halfway house operated under contract with Correctional Service Canada. As a supervisor, she had access to information about federal parolees and she was subject to conflict of interest protocols.

[6] In 2020, the appellant married Chris Ellacott, who is on lifetime parole for first degree murder and sexual assault and is listed on the sex offender registry. During two community assessments with Mr. Ellacott's parole officer, the appellant did not disclose her employment at the halfway house. She likewise did not disclose her marriage to a federal parolee to her employer because, as Mr. Ellacott later acknowledged to his parole officer, it "did not look good".

[7] In July 2021, the Waterloo Police began investigating a possible animal cruelty charge against the appellant based on complaints by neighbors who reported sounds of a woman in the Ellacotts' trailer beating or killing a dog one evening. When two officers attended at the Ellacotts' residence to investigate these complaints the next morning, the appellant was not home but Mr. Ellacott volunteered to them that he was a federal parolee and that his wife worked at a halfway house for federal parolees. He denied any knowledge of what had happened to the appellant's dog, which was no longer in the residence. The officers found Mr. Ellacott's denial suspicious and warned him that he might be charged with obstruction of justice.

[8] While the investigation was underway, one of the officers contacted Detective Constable (DC) Steve Tremblay, a detective in the Waterloo Police's Offender Management Unit. The unit is responsible for overseeing high-risk federal parolees on release, particularly those who are on the sex offender registry. The officer told DC Tremblay about the interaction with Mr. Ellacott and the disclosure that his wife, the appellant, worked at a halfway house for federal parolees.

[9] DC Tremblay then contacted Mr. Ellacott's parole officer and advised her of the appellant's employment as well as the animal cruelty investigation. The parole officer told her supervisor that Mr. Ellacott was married to a supervisor at a federal halfway house, the supervisor shared this information with the Hamilton parole office, and that office relayed it to the appellant's employer. The employer immediately placed the appellant on leave (with pay). After an investigation, it terminated her employment.

[10] Prior to initiating this lawsuit, the appellant filed a complaint with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario in December 2021, alleging that the disclosure of her place of employment by the Waterloo Police to Mr. Ellacott's parole officer breached the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56 (the "Municipal Privacy Act"). In June 2022, the Information and Privacy Commissioner's office advised the appellant that the police had reasonable grounds for disclosing this information; that it was the parole office, and not the police, who notified her employer about the identity of her husband; and that the information disclosed in any event might not qualify as "personal information" under the Municipal Privacy Act.[1]

The Motion Judge's Decision

[11] The appellant's lawsuit named the communications supervisor who made a note of the noise complaints received by the Waterloo Police and the officer who attended at the Ellacotts' residence and later followed up with the appellant. The motion judge found that there was no evidence that either of these respondents communicated information about the appellant to anyone outside the Waterloo Police. He accordingly dismissed the claim against them.

[12] The motion judge then considered whether the remaining two respondents, the Waterloo Police and the police chief, were vicariously liable for the appellant's damages as a result of DC Tremblay's conduct or directly liable due to a failure to train and supervise officers.

[13] The motion judge concluded that DC Tremblay did not owe the appellant a duty of care and that, even if he did, he did not breach it. He found that DC Tremblay contacted Mr. Ellacott's parole officer in the performance of his duties under the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 then in force. He accepted the detective constable's uncontradicted affidavit evidence that he shared information with Mr. Ellacott's parole officer because he believed that Mr. Ellacott might have violated his parole conditions; he was concerned about the appellant's role as a community contact for Mr. Ellacott; and he thought that the appellant might be in a conflict of interest.

[14] The motion judge further found that DC Tremblay's disclosure of the appellant's employment to Mr. Ellacott's parole officer did not breach the Municipal Privacy Act. Even assuming this was personal information protected under the Act, the motion judge found that the disclosure was made reasonably and in good faith for law enforcement and correctional purposes.

[15] The motion judge concluded that there was no basis to hold the Waterloo Police or its chief vicariously liable for negligence, breach of privacy (intrusion on seclusion), or misfeasance in public office, nor was there any basis to hold them directly liable for a failure to train or supervise officers. He accordingly dismissed the action against these remaining respondents.

No Error Identified in the Motion Judge's Reasons

[16] We are not persuaded that the motion judge made any error of law or principle, or any palpable and overriding error of fact or mixed fact and law. His conclusions are consistent with the relevant provisions of the Police Services Act, the Municipal Privacy Act, and the principles governing the duty of care and the right to privacy.

[17] The appellant relies on R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 43, which states that:

People provide information to police in order to protect themselves and others. They are entitled to do so with confidence that the police will only disclose it for good reason. The fact that the information is in the hands of the police should not nullify their interest in keeping that information private from other individuals.

[18] As the motion judge found, however, there was "good reason" for DC Tremblay to disclose the appellant's employment to Mr. Ellacott's parole officer. Paragraph 32(e) of the Municipal Privacy Act states that:

An institution shall not disclose personal information in its custody or under its control except …

(e) where permitted or required by law or by a treaty, agreement or arrangement made under an Act or an Act of Canada.

[19] Section 41(1.2) of the Police Services Act permits disclosure of personal information about an individual in accordance with the regulations, where disclosure is made for the purpose of law enforcement, for correctional purposes, or for the protection of the public. Per the regulation under the Act (Disclosure of Personal Information, O. Reg. 265/98, s. 5), a police officer may disclose personal information about an individual if the individual is under investigation for an offence under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

[20] On the evidence before him, the motion judge found that DC Tremblay's disclosure was for purposes permitted under the Police Services Act while the appellant was under investigation for the Criminal Code offence of animal cruelty. He noted that, even if DC Tremblay had disclosed personal information, the police chief and Waterloo Police are shielded from liability for such disclosure provided it was made in good faith, pursuant to s. 49(2) of the Municipal Privacy Act, which states that:

No action … lies against a head, or against a person acting on behalf or under the direction of the head, for damages resulting from the disclosure or non-disclosure in good faith of a record or any part of a record under this Act.…

[21] We see no error in the motion judge's analysis, nor in his finding that there was no evidence that DC Tremblay failed to meet the relevant standard of care, based on the principles in Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129.

[22] The appellant argues that some of the motion judge's findings are inconsistent with evidence from examinations for discovery in a related action she has taken against other defendants. Her filing of these transcripts in this court's record breaches the deemed undertaking rule. The respondents also had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who gave this evidence. We have disregarded it.

Disposition

[23] The appeal is dismissed, with all-inclusive costs of $10,000 to the respondents.

"Thorburn J.A."

"S. Coroza J.A."

"S. Gomery J.A."

Footnote

[1] Section 2(2.1) of the Municipal Privacy Act states that personal information does not include "the name, title, contact information or designation of an individual that identifies the individual in a business, professional or official capacity."