WARNING

THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT AND IS SUBJECT TO:

110(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply

(a) in a case where the information relates to a young person who has received an adult sentence;

(b) in a case where the information relates to a young person who has received a youth sentence for a violent offence and the youth justice court has ordered a lifting of the publication ban under subsection 75(2); and

(c) in a case where the publication of the information is made in the course of the administration of justice, if it is not the purpose of the publication to make the information known in the community.

(3) A young person referred to in subsection (1) may, after he or she attains the age of eighteen years, publish or cause to be published information that would identify him or her as having been dealt with under this Act or the Young Offenders Act , chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, provided that he or she is not in custody pursuant to either Act at the time of the publication.

111(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.

138(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act , chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

DATE: 20240325 DOCKET: C68479

Hourigan, Thorburn and Coroza JJ.A.

BETWEEN

His Majesty the King Respondent

and

Dujon Taylor Appellant

Counsel: Angela Ruffo and Cara Barbisan, for the appellant Kevin Pitt, for the respondent

Heard: March 13, 2024

On appeal from the conviction entered on November 8, 2019 and the sentence imposed on March 6, 2020 by Justice Wailan Low of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting without a jury.

REASONS FOR DECISION

A. Introduction

[1] The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded restricted firearm; possession of a restricted firearm; occupying a motor vehicle knowing a firearm is present; dangerous driving; and assaulting a peace officer. He was acquitted of attempting to take a weapon from a peace officer engaged in the execution of his duty; possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking; and possession of the proceeds of crime. He appeals his convictions. At the conclusion of the appellant’s submissions, we dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.

B. Background

[2] The factual background to these charges is as follows. The appellant and three other males were arrested at a gas station while they sat in a car that was subject to a police takedown. In the vehicle, which the appellant had been driving, police found a loaded restricted firearm in the space between the driver’s seat and the central console, a plastic bag containing 28g of marijuana, a small electronic scale, and a quantity of 9 mm ammunition. The appellant had $1,195 in cash on his person at the time of his arrest.

[3] The original target of the police takedown was Carlito Torres-Aray, the passenger in the front seat of the car who had been identified as a suspect in relation to a prior shooting. Earlier, while the police surveilled Torres-Aray, they observed him enter the car the appellant was driving. Two youths, J.M. and K.T.B., later got into the car. At the gas station, the police boxed the car in with two unmarked vehicles. Plainclothes police officers got out of their vehicles and approached the car with firearms drawn. The appellant put the car into reverse gear, striking one of the officers in the knee and shin with the driver’s side car door. Another officer was also struck and dragged backward by the car.

[4] The trial judge found that the appellant put the car in reverse as he was being apprehended by the officers in order to escape arrest or detention, which she held was a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person. The trial judge also found that the appellant was aware that he was being apprehended by the police because the officers shouted the word “police” several times as they approached the car. In making these findings, the trial judge rejected the testimony of the youths, who were in the back seat of the car, that the officers did not self-identify as police and that the car was reversing before the doors were opened by the officers.

[5] Regarding the firearm charges, the trial judge found that there was circumstantial evidence that established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had possession of the firearm and knowledge that it was a loaded restricted firearm.

C. Analysis

[6] Two principal submissions are advanced on appeal. First, the trial judge did not correctly apply the reasonable doubt standard with respect to the convictions for dangerous driving and assaulting a police officer. Second, the verdicts on the firearm offences were unreasonable. We are not persuaded by either submission.

[7] On the dangerous driving and assaulting police convictions, the appellant submits that the trial judge did not adequately consider the issue of his mens rea given the speed at which the takedown occurred, the fact that he was surprised by the police action, and that he was found by the trial judge to have panicked.

[8] We do not accept this submission. The trial judge explicitly considered the appellant’s mens rea and found that he acted deliberately. This finding was made in the context of the factual record reviewed in her reasons and there was no need for the trial judge to avert specifically to the circumstances referred to by the appellant on appeal in making this finding.

[9] The appellant also challenges the trial judge’s findings that K.T.B. and J.M. were inconsistent in their testimony regarding the issues of whether the car was moving before the police reached the vehicle and whether the police identified themselves. In our view, those findings were open to trial judge to make on the record. In any event, the trial judge found – as she was entitled to do – that K.T.B. and J.M. were not credible witnesses and that, in one instance, their testimony had a “flavour” of collusion.

[10] On the firearm convictions, the appellant submits that, given that the weapon started out as a starter pistol, it is possible that he was not aware that it was a loaded restricted firearm. Therefore, he submits that guilt was not the only available inference in relation to the firearm offences and thus the verdicts are unreasonable.

[11] We conclude that the trial judge made no error in finding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of the firearm. This evidence included the fact that it was found in a vehicle that the appellant had care and control of, in which recent documents pertaining to him were located. Further, the firearm was located in the area most proximate to the driver. In addition, rounds that fit the firearm were found in the back of the car, which tied the firearm to someone with a deeper connection to the car than a passenger.

[12] The appellant further submits that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he was aware of the weapon’s loaded and restricted characteristics. We disagree. The firearm was a modified 9mm starter pistol modified to fire live .380 cartridges or 9mm blank cartridges with an affixed lead ball. The inference that the appellant had knowledge that this was a restricted and loaded weapon was well rooted in the evidence. The firearm was loaded with .380 rounds in the magazine and was operational as a normal firearm. This ammunition type differs from the ammunition the firearm was notionally designed to fire. It can reasonably be inferred that the selection of this ammunition demonstrated a desire to have the firearm operate as a deadly weapon. In addition, the make, model, and serial number had all been removed from the weapon in an effort to make it untraceable, which further suggests that it was meant to be used as an operable weapon.

[13] Finally, we observe that the appellant did not testify to provide an alternative available inference. The suggestion that he might have thought that the weapon was merely a starter pistol is purely speculative. It does not render the verdicts on the weapons offences unreasonable.

D. Disposition

[14] For the foregoing reasons, the conviction appeal is dismissed. The sentence appeal was abandoned and is therefore dismissed.

“C.W. Hourigan J.A.”

“Thorburn J.A.”

“S. Coroza J.A.”