WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: R. v. T.F., 2012 ONCA 737
DATE: 20121031
DOCKET: C54212
BEFORE: Goudge, Rouleau and Watt JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
T.F.
Appellant
COUNSEL:
Vincenzo Rondinelli and Lori Anne Thomas, for the appellant
Eric Siebenmorgen, for the respondent
Heard and released orally: October 25, 2012
On appeal from the finding of guilt entered on April 8, 2011 by Justice Steven R. Clark of the Ontario Court of Justice, sitting without a jury.
APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT
[1] The issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge could reasonably have inferred that the appellant knew his brother had a knife that morning. In our view, that inference was reasonably available on this evidence. The appellant had previously engaged in a fight with C.A., and had together with his brother visited the house where C.A. and A.A. lived in the middle of the night to send a message.
[2] It was reasonable to infer that the appellant and his brother would have been prepared for, and indeed waited for a confrontation with C.A. and A.A. the next day.
[3] The four-minute video and the eye witness evidence leading up to the fight built on this base. The appellant and his brother were together in close contact and talking during that time. His brother was clearly clutching something right under his hoodie. Given the recent events between the appellant and his brother on one hand, and C.A. and A.A. on the other, the conduct of the appellant, vis a vis his brother in the few minutes leading up to the fight, is in our view a sound basis for the trial judge to draw the inference that the appellant knew his brother had a knife.
[4] The appeal must be dismissed.