Court of Appeal for Ontario

CITATION: R. v. Rose, 2010 ONCA 200

DATE: 20100316

DOCKET: C50497

Before: Blair, LaForme JJ.A. and Durno J. (Ad Hoc)

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Leando Magnus Rose

Appellant

Counsel:

Vincenzo Rondinelli, for the appellant

Lucas Price, for the respondent

Heard: March 15, 2010

On appeal from the convictions imposed by Justice J.A. Ramsay of the Superior Court of Justice dated April, 21, 2009.

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The appellant raises two grounds of appeal from his conviction on a charge of possession of trafficking. He argues first that the verdict was unreasonable and, secondly, that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a single interjection by the trial judge during the Crown’s examination of the key witness, Ms. Findlayter.

[2] We would not give effect to either ground of appeal. In our view, there was ample basis on the circumstantial evidence for the trial judge to find, as he did, that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence he accepted was that the appellant was in possession of the vehicle and that he had sufficient knowledge and control of the drugs to be in possession of them in law. There was no issue that if the appellant was in possession of the cocaine, it was possession for the purposes of trafficking. It follows that the trial judge could reasonably have reached his conclusion on the totality of the evidence.

[3] We see no basis for the allegation of apprehension of bias. There is a very high threshold for such a finding. In the context of the exchanges that had just occurred between the Crown, defence counsel and the judge respecting earlier attempts to examine Ms. Findlayter on statements made to her by others, and given that the trial judge ultimately permitted the question to continue, we do not see anything improper in the single interjection he made. This is not a case like R. v. Camardi, [2009] O.J. No. 163 where it was clear that the trial judge’s single interjection signalled a prior mind set respecting credibility. That is not the case here.

[4] The appeal is therefore dismissed.