Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-627556 DATE: 2020-08-17 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

9383859 Canada Ltd. Plaintiff – and – Musab Saeed, Mian Imran Saeed, Nirmalarajah Gunarajah, Viveka Ramesh, Mohinder Sansoye, Ramesh Senthilnathan, Kubeskran Navaratnam, Ronald Lachmansingh and Marilyn Reiter-Nemetz Defendants

Counsel: Sandeep Singh, for the Plaintiff James R.G. Cook, for Kubeskran Navaratnam Scott Martin, for Marilyn Reiter-Nemetz Bronwyn M. Martin, for Ronald Lachmansingh

HEARD: July 7, 2020

C.J. Brown J.

Endorsement

[1] The defendants/moving parties, Kubeskaran Navaratnam, Marilyn Reiter-Nemetz and Ronald Lachmansingh, all lawyers, bring this motion to dismiss the claim as against them pursuant to Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, without leave to amend, on the basis that it discloses no reasonable cause of action as against them and/or is statute-barred. Ms. Reiter-Nemetz also submits that the action is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. Mr. Lachmansingh also argues that the statement of claim fails to recognize his absolute immunity in the circumstances of this case.

[2] The action arises from a failed real estate transaction. The plaintiff, 9383859 Canada Ltd. (“938”), signed an agreement of purchase and sale (“APS”) to purchase property municipally known as 28 Carolwood Crescent, Markham in the amount of $1,700,000, with a closing date of May 5, 2016. The plaintiff then assigned its rights under the APS to Musab Saeed, a co-defendant in this action. The vendors, N. Gun raja, V. Ramesh and Mohinder Sansoye, failed to close the transaction on the scheduled closing date. An extension of the closing was negotiated pursuant to the assignment agreement, but again failed to close. The vendors subsequently sold the property to other buyers.

[3] Ms. Saeed commenced an action against the vendors for specific performance of the APS. Mr. Lachmansingh acted as counsel for Ms. Saeed in the related APS litigation, CV-16-544750.

[4] The plaintiff commenced this action against the parties and opposing lawyers involved in the transaction and litigation arising from the APS, including Mr. Navaratnam, as counsel for Ms. Saeed, Ms. Reiter-Nemetz as counsel for the vendors, Mr. Lachmansingh as the original litigation lawyer for Ms. Saeed, Ms. Saeed’s father as a “representative” of Ms. Saeed in the related action mentioned above, the vendors, and Ramesh Senthilnathan as the “representative” and “husband” of the vendor, V. Ramesh.

[5] The plaintiff Corporation is a corporation whose “sole director and owner” is Sandeep Singh. Mr. Singh was granted leave June 4, 2020 to represent the Corporation pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Allegations Against Each Lawyer

The Claims Brought by the Plaintiff as against Kubeskaram Navaratnam

[6] Mr. Navaratnam, counsel to the assignee, Ms. Saeed, is alleged to have failed to notify the plaintiff or his lawyer of Ms. Saeed’s failure to complete the purchase of the property. The plaintiff alleges that Mr. Navaratnam acted in negligence in breaching of the [Assignment] Agreement”.

[7] According to the alleged facts in the statement of claim, 938 Canada signed an agreement of purchase and sale on February 15, 2016 to purchase property located at 28 Carolwood Crescent, Markham. On March 15, 2016, 938 Canada assigned its rights under the APS to the co-defendant, Ms. Saeed, as assignee, pursuant to a written assignment agreement. However, the assignment transaction was not completed on May 5, 2016 as scheduled.

[8] Mr. Navaratnam, counsel to the assignee, Ms. Saeed, is alleged to have failed to notify the plaintiff or his lawyer of Ms. Saeed’s failure to complete the purchase of the property. The plaintiff alleges that Ms. Saeed breached the assignment agreement as of May 5, 2016. He further alleges that Mr. Navaratnam acted in negligence in breaching of the [Assignment] Agreement”.

[9] That is the only allegation as against Mr. Navaratnam in the statement of claim.

[10] At all material times, Mr. Navaratnam was retained by Ms. Saeed, who was adverse in interest to the plaintiff. He never acted for the plaintiff, 938, which had its own lawyer.

[11] The statement of claim was issued on September 17, 2019 more than two years after the allegations against Mr. Navaratnam.

The Allegations against Marilyn Reiter-Nemetz

[12] The Allegations against Marilyn Reiter-Nemetz

[13] Ms. Reiter-Nemetz was the lawyer retained to act on behalf of the vendors with respect to the APS. She was never the lawyer for the plaintiff. At no time did she act on behalf of 938 in the transaction, which Corporation was always a party adverse in interest to the vendors, and had its own lawyer as regards the transaction. It is of note that, in the statement of claim, the plaintiff concedes that Ms. Reiter-Nemetz owed a duty of care to her clients.

[14] As against Ms. Reiter-Nemetz, the plaintiff alleges the following:

(1) As “the Vendors [sic] lawyer… [she] in negligence denied the opportunity to… 938… to exercise [the Extension Term in the APS]… and breached in negligence [paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Assignment Agreement]”;

(2) “did not inform… the Assignor … 938 or its lawyer and denied the opportunity in negligence for transfer of information and transfer of property [sic] to… 938… and violated the legal rights of… 938 after… Saeed breached the terms of the Agreement”;

(3) “failed to notify [938] of the clause requiring notification to [938] and notwithstanding the duty of care only to lawyer’s client and caused damages to [938] and in violation of paragraph 3 and 4 of [the Assignment Agreement] and paragraph 8 of [the APS];

(4) “acted in negligence” based on statements made in the Statement of Defence of the Vendors and Mortgagee in the Saeed action, dated August 15, 2016, including that:

(i) On or about April 29, 2016, Saeed’s counsel advised Reiter-Nemetz that Saeed was “willing to work with the [“Vendors”] if they needed to postpone the closing in order to deliver vacant possession [of the Property]. This offer was reiterated on May 3, 2016”;

(ii) In accordance “with [Saeed’s] offer to extend… on or about May 4, 2016, [Reiter-Nemetz] advised [Saeed’s] counsel that in order to deliver vacant possession of the property, [Saeed] had to execute a statutory declaration that she intended to occupy the premises herself. Because [Saeed] only advised [the Vendors] of the [Assignment to Saeed] on May 2, 2016, the statutory declaration could not have been executed prior to this date;

(iii) Reiter-Nemetz “advised [Saeed’s] solicitor of this development, and sought to extend the closing to May 10, 2016 in order to address all outstanding issues between them. [Reiter-Nemetz] advised that if extension was not granted, the APS would be treated as null and void”;

(iv) The Vendors “continued to try to close the transaction and ultimately paid Tenant [who occupied the Property] to move out as [Saeed] never provided the requisite statutory declaration. Ultimately, the [Vendors] sought to close the transaction on May 16, 2016 by tendering the documents to [Saeed’s] counsel;

(v) Shortly after [Saeed] refused to close the transaction on May 16, 2016, [the subsequent purchasers of the Property] contacted [the Vendors] regarding the Property”;

(vi) The subsequent purchasers of the Property were “independent, arm’s-length third parties who had previously sought to purchase the Property from [the Vendors]”;

(vii) In an effort to mitigate their losses, the Vendors “accepted [the subsequent purchaser’s offer], and the Property was sold on or about May 18, 2016”; and

(5) Reiter-Nemetz “acted in negligence in breaching the Agreement [unspecified]” when advising Saeed’s lawyer on May 6, 2016 that “they could close the transaction and provide vacant possession on May 16, 2016”.

[15] Ms. Reiter-Nemetz, in her statement of defence, delivered notwithstanding the Rule 21 motion, pleads that she owed no duty of care to 938 as she was not “acting on its behalf in the transaction”; that the action against her by a non-client, adverse in interest to her client who also had its own lawyer is frivolous and vexatious and that the action is statute-barred, as it was commenced more than two years after 938 discovered its alleged claim against her. 938 knew of the events giving rise to the claim in May 2016, but failed to commence its action until September 27, 2019.

The Allegations as against Ronald Lachmansingh

[16] As regards the failed real estate transaction, Ms. Saeed commenced an action against the sellers for specific performance of the APS, as indicated above. Ronald Lachmansingh acted as counsel for Ms. Saeed in the APS litigation.

[17] The plaintiff claims that Ronald Lachmansingh made a false statement in the pleadings filed in the APS litigation. This is the sole allegation against Ronald Lachmansingh.

[18] The statement of claim alleges solicitor’s negligence against Ronald Lachmansingh. The specific allegations against Mr. Lachmansingh are:

[1] i) i) The Assignee lawyer, Ronald Lachmansigh, in negligence made a false statement in Statement of Claim, per Court File No: CV-16-554750;

[27] The defendant, Ronald Lachmansingh as a litigation lawyer to the Assignee, Musab Saeed made a false statement in Paragraph 17 of statement of claim, per Court File No CV-16-554750, Paragraph 17 states as follows:

“17. The Assignment was subsequently extended by agreement between 9383859 Canada Ltd. and the Plaintiff and continues to bind the said parties”.

[35] d) The Defendant, the Assignee lawyer, Ronald Lachmansingh acted in negligence, per Court File No CV-16-554750, REPLY AND DEFENCE TO COUNTERCLAIM (BY RONALD LACHMANSINGH, JURIANZ & LI stamped by court dated May 26, 2017), Paragraph 6 states as follows “6. Neither the Assignor and the Sellers nor the Plaintiff and the Sellers have ever agreed to a postponement of the closing date of the sale of the property, and such date therefore remained at May 5, 2016”

[19] The APS litigation was commenced on June 14, 2016. The reply referred to in paragraph 35 of the statement of claim was filed on May 26, 2017.

Procedural History of this Action

[20] On October 9, 2019, Ronald Lachmansingh’s counsel wrote to the Registrar to have this action stayed pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On November 25, 2019, this Court determined that this was not one of the clearest cases where an order under Rule 2.1.01 should be made and denied the requisition.

Rule 21.01(1)(b) Motion to Strike

[21] Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move before a judge to strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, and the judge may make an order or grant judgment accordingly.

[22] The purpose of Rule 21.01(1)(b) is to enable a judge to strike from the pleadings, claims and defences that do not, in law, have a chance of succeeding. While a court will be reluctant to strike out a claim, the claim should be struck where it is clear and obvious that no cause of action is disclosed. The pleading should not be struck if there is a chance of success. In determining whether a claim should be struck, the court is required to give a generous reading to the pleadings. The issue is whether, assuming the alleged facts to be true, the action is nevertheless certain to fail. See 368230 Ontario Limited v. Feintuch Law, 2018 ONSC 3254.

[23] While evidence is generally inadmissible in a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b), where the claim incorporates, by reference, any document pleaded in the pleadings, the court is entitled to read and rely on the terms of such documents as if they were fully quoted in the pleadings.

[24] In a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion, the factual allegations in the amended statement of claim must be assumed to be true. The claim will only be dismissed where it is “clear and obvious” that it has no reasonable prospect of success. While the court must accept as true the material facts as pleaded, this obligation does not extend to bald conclusory statements of fact unsupported by material facts” Trillium Power Wind Corporation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 683 at para 31, citing: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959; R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Inc., 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45; Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General) 2012 ONCA 479. No evidence is admissible without leave on a motion brought pursuant to Rule 21.01(1)(b). However, documents which are referred to in the statement of claim are admissible under Rule 21.01(1)(b), as they are deemed to be incorporated by reference therein.: Trihar Holdings Ltd. v. Lambton (County), 2008 ONCA 360. A generous reading of the statement of claim must be accorded in considering a motion under Rule 21.01.

[25] The novelty of the cause of action will not militate against the party pleading. A novel claim of negligence should not be struck for absence of reasonable cause unless it can be established that the claim is clearly unsustainable.

The Law and Analysis

The Allegations against Adverse Party Lawyers

[26] The factual allegations in the amended statement of claim must be assumed to be true.

[27] As regards whether the defendant lawyers owe the opposing party a duty of care where the opposing party is represented by its own lawyers, Ontario jurisprudence holds that the general rule is that a lawyer owes no duty of care to the clients of opposing counsel in litigation or commercial matters. A lawyer acting in his or her professional capacity owes a duty of care to his or her client, not to the clients represented by opposing counsel: Diamond Contracting Ltd. v. McDermid, 2006 ONCA 600, para 3; and see Baypark Investments Inc. v. Royal Bank.

[28] In Boldt v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2010 ONSC 3890, Penny J. held as follows:

The allegations against Trenker and Wallace appear to be that Trenkler and Wallace acted on behalf of co-defendant Linda Labbe in the contempt proceedings and in a Small Claims Court action involving Labbe and Boldt. Amongst other things, Boldt alleges that the Small Claims Court action was improperly commenced against her. The statement of claim also alleges that Trenkler and Wallace breached duties alleged to be owed to Boldt and engaged in an abuse of process through the Law Society’s prosecution of Boldt.

The statement of claim asserts a claim against Trenkler and Wallace for an alleged breach of duty of care owed by Trenkler and Wallace to Boldt while Trenkler and Wallace were acting as counsel for parties adverse in interest to Boldt. Such claims have consistently been dismissed on the basis that lawyers do not hold duties to parties with whom there is no solicitor-client relationship. Such claims are not tenable in law, due to the absence of a duty of care and for reasons of public policy…

Trenkler and Wallace acted for Labbe, a party adverse in interest to Boldt, and therefore owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. In addition, based upon public policy considerations, lawyers are protected from claims by a client’s adversary in litigation for alleged negligence, breaches of ethical or professional standards and other matters related to the conduct of litigation. It is therefore plain and obvious that the claims in negligence against Trenkler and Wallace cannot succeed.

[29] Thus, opposing counsel do not, generally, owe a duty of care to the opposing party. Further, opposing counsel are precluded from directly communicating with an opposing party.

[30] None of the limited circumstances in which a lawyer may owe a duty to a non-client arises in this matter. As stated in 2116656 Ontario Inc. v. Grant and LLF Lawyers LLP, 2019 ONSC 114 at paras 32-37, the applicable principles are as follows:

[32] A lawyer generally owes a duty of care only to his or her own client, and not to persons other than his or her client.

[33] Indeed, where liability for purely economic loss is sought to be imposed on a solicitor vis-a-vis a party other than his or her client, “courts have trod carefully”, recognizing that imposition of such a duty greatly hampers the conduct of commercial and private businesses, and interferes fundamentally with the operation of that economic system.

[34] Moreover, courts recognize that imposition of such a duty raises numerous concerns, including the following:

i.) It makes a solicitor responsible to someone who neither retains nor pays him or her.

ii.) It is somewhat illogical to impose upon a solicitor, who is merely an agent for his or her own client, a duty to a third party which his or her client himself, herself or itself does not have.

iii.) It usually is not possible to disclaim or limit liability to such non-client third party.

iv.) Making a solicitor assume such a duty to a non-client third party may potentially or actually place the solicitor in conflict with the interests of the solicitor’s own client.

[35] It accordingly will only be under “narrow”, “exceptional”, “very limited” and “well-defined” circumstances that a lawyer can be held to owe a duty to a non-client third party to protect his, her or its economic interests.

[36] In particular, a solicitor who gives guidance to others may owe a duty of care not only to the client who employs him or her, but also to another party who the solicitor knows is relying on his or her skill to save that party from harm. However, having regard to all the circumstances, for such a duty to exist:

i.) The solicitor must know – from placing himself or herself in a position of sufficient proximity with the non-client third party – that the particular non-client third party is relying on his or her skill. Actual knowledge is a prerequisite for a finding of care.

ii.) The non-client third party must in fact rely on the solicitor’s guidance and skill. Reliance is the essence of the proposition.

iii.) The reliance must be reasonable.

[37] If no exceptional duty of care is found to exist between a lawyer and a non-client third party, the question of whether or not the lawyer’s conduct would have fallen below the standard required to fulfil such a duty, had it existed, is no longer relevant: 2116656 Ontario Inc. v. Grant and LLF Lawyers LLP, 2019 ONSC 114, at paras 32-37.

[31] Where a prima facie duty of care is established based on a special relationship, the court must consider whether there are policy considerations that militate against the recognition of such a duty. The court must consider whether recognizing a duty of care would raise concerns of indeterminate liability in an indeterminate amount to an indeterminate class.

[32] It has long been recognized that a lawyer owes an undivided duty to his or her own client and not to the opposing client. Otherwise, there would be a conflict of interest on all cases. The cases in which a lawyer may be found to owe a duty of care to an opposing party are very defined, narrow, circumspect circumstances which are not applicable here for the reasons above.

[33] In this case, I do not find there to be sufficient proximity between the defendant lawyers and 938. Based on all of the allegations, I do not find there to be any reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant lawyers or any reasonable foreseeability that such would arise, given that 938 had its own counsel in this transaction. I do not find, based on the pleadings, any basis upon which a duty of care by the opposing lawyers to the plaintiff could be founded.

[34] This is not a case where the plaintiff can be said to have reasonably placed reliance on counsel for the adverse parties for their counsel or advice, particularly since he had his own lawyer representing him in the transaction.

[35] In this case, where the plaintiff had its own lawyer representing it throughout, there is no allegation that the plaintiff placed any reliance on the opposing party lawyers, nor that the plaintiff’s lawyer placed reliance on the opposing party lawyers. The narrow circumstances which may found a claim against an opposing party counsel do not arise here.

[36] Thus, the very limited circumstances in which a lawyer may be found to owe a duty to a non-client are not present in this case in regard to any of the three lawyers.

[37] Claims such as this are not tenable in law, due to the absence of a duty of care and for reasons of public policy.

[38] Accordingly, I grant the motion of the defendant lawyers, Mr.Navaratnam, Ms.Reiter-Neimetz and Mr. Lachmansingh, and order that the plaintiff’s pleadings against them be struck, with costs.

Absolute Immunity

[39] As against Mr. Lachmansingh, the plaintiff claims that Mr. Lachmansingh made a false statement in the pleadings filed in the APS litigation, which is separate from this litigation, and acted in negligence to the detriment of the plaintiff. This is the sole allegation as against Mr. Lachmansingh.

[40] Mr. Lachmansingh was not retained by the plaintiff, he was retained by Ms. Saeed. At all material times, Mr. Lachmansingh owed a duty of care only to Ms. Saeed, as found above. An action against the lawyer of a party adverse in interest is not tenable, and particularly so where the plaintiff is represented by his own lawyer.

[41] The only allegation against Mr. Lachmansingh is that he made a false statement in the written pleadings filed in the APS litigation. This allegation is a violation of the doctrine of absolute immunity.

[42] The privilege extends to parties speaking to a matter before the court and documents properly used and regularly prepared in proceedings. Advocates are covered by this privilege.: Amato v. Walsh, 2013 ONCA 258, para 34. Here, the only allegation as against Mr. Lachmansingh is that he made a false statement in the pleadings filed in the APS litigation. The said statement is protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity since the statement of claim and reply are documents properly used and regularly prepared for use in proceedings.

[43] Thus, the claim as against Mr. Lachmansingh cannot succeed. Furthermore, it constitutes an abuse of process and is to be struck on that basis as well.

The Claim is Frivolous, Vexatious and an Abuse of Process

[44] Pursuant to Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim will be struck if it is frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process. Pursuant to this subrule, the court may consider evidence in determining a motion. The court also has the inherent power to invoke the doctrine of abuse of process. Further, pursuant to Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court has the power to strike out or expunge all or part of a pleading, with or without leave to amend, on the basis that it is scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court’s process: Tabrizi v. Borden Ladner Gervais, 2015 ONSC 1037 at para 40.

[45] A “frivolous claim” is “manifestly futile”. A vexatious claim is one “instituted without sufficient grounds for the purpose of causing trouble or alliance to the defendants”: Tabrizi v. Borden Ladner Gervais, 2015 ONSC 1037, at para 40. Vexatious proceedings include actions brought against lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings. Bastien v. Egalite, 2016 ONSC 7652 at para 13.

[46] The doctrine of abuse of process is an intangible principle that is used to bar proceedings that are inconsistent with the objectives of public policy.: Bastien v. Egalite, 2016 ONSC 7652, at para 13. It is invoked by the court to prevent a misuse of the court’s procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: ibid. A claim against lawyers brought by the opposing party is generally, absent the very limited circumstances discussed above, an abuse of process: Mikhail v Hickman, supra at 23; see also Heydary Hamilton PC v. Muhammad, 2013 ONSC 4938 at para 22, appeal dismissed as abandoned, 2014 ONCA 84.

[47] The actions in this case are an abuse of process, and to be struck on that basis as well.

The Action is Statute-Barred

[48] The three opposing counsel, Mr. Navaratnam, Ms. Reiter-Nemetz and Mr. Lachmansingh, all claim that, in the alternative, the plaintiff’s action is statute-barred, having been brought more than two years after the alleged events giving rise to the action.

[49] The limitation period begins the date the claim was discoverable pursuant to section 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, C. 24, Sched. B.

[50] As regards all of the claims against the opposing party lawyers, actions were commenced more than two years after they were initially discoverable. The Limitations Act creates a presumption that a claim is discovered within two years of the damage occurring unless there is evidence to the contrary. There is no such evidence to the contrary in this case. Thus, the claims as against the three opposing party lawyers are statute-barred and must be dismissed.

Motion Pursuant to Rule 2.1.01

[51] The prior request to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not a bar to this motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 21.01.

[52] In Posadas v. Khan, 2015 ONSC 4077 with respect to a court’s refusal to dismiss a proceeding under Rule 2.1.01 not prejudicing the defendant’s right to bring a Rule 21 motion, Myers J stated:

“Nothing herein should be taken to affect in any way the likely outcome of a proper motion to strike or to dismiss the counterclaims that may be brought under Rules 20, 21.01, and/or 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as appropriate. Posadas v. Khan, 2015 ONSC 4077, para 4.

[53] The test for dismissing an action pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 is significantly different from that for dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 21.

Whether Leave to Amend the Claim Should Be Granted

[54] Where the claim has been struck as disclosing no reasonable cause of action or as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process, the plaintiff will be denied leave to amend that pleading where it contains a “radical defect” such that it could not be improved by an amendment: Roche v. McLeod Law Firm, 2018 ONSC 2760. Further, leave to amend the claim should be denied where there is no reason to suppose that the party can improve their case by amendment, or if an entirely new cause of action would have to be set up by way of amendments that prejudiced the defendants: Dean v. Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Counsel, 2020 ONSC 2486.

[55] In this case, there is no basis on which Mr. Navaratnam, Ms. Reiter-Nemetz or Mr. Lachmansingh could be found to owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. Nor is there any basis upon which the plaintiff could claim reasonable reliance on the opposing lawyers or any of them.

[56] I am of the view that the claim as against the three opposing lawyers is radically defective and irremediably flawed. I find that the claim against the three lawyers, Mr. Navaratnam, Ms. Reiter-Nemetz and Mr. Lachmansingh should be dismissed without leave to amend.

[57] Again, based on all of the foregoing, I am satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action to be brought as against them in their roles as lawyers adverse in interest to the plaintiff, who did have his own lawyer for purposes of the transaction, and that there is no amendment that could be made to the statement of claim to amend the radical defect, namely, the fact that no cause of action lies as against the lawyers adverse in interest to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the claims and allegations in the statement of claim against the three defendant lawyers are struck without leave to amend.

[58] Based on all of the foregoing, the motion of the defendants, Kusbeskaran Navartnam, Marilyn Reiter-Nemetz and Ronald Lachmansingh, dismissing the claims in the plaintiff’s statement of claim as against them is granted.

[59] Upon the courthouse reopening to the public, each party shall file with the Civil Motions Office a copy of all the material he, she or it delivered electronically for this proceeding, with proof of service, and pay the appropriate fees therefore.

[60] Notwithstanding Rule 59.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Order is effective from the date it is made, and is enforceable without any need for entry or filing in accordance with Rules 77.07(6) and 1.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. No formal Order need be entered and filed unless an appeal or a motion for leave to appeal is brought to an appellate court. Any party to this Order may nonetheless submit a formal Order for original signing, entry and filing when the Court returns to regular operations.

Costs

[61] I would urge the parties to agree upon costs, failing which I would invite the parties to provide any costs submissions in writing, to be limited to three pages, including the costs outline. The submissions may be forwarded to my attention, through Judges’ Administration at 361 University Avenue, within thirty days of the release of this Endorsement.

Released: August 17, 2020