CITATION: D.M.S. v. E.L.R., 2026 ONSC 3726

BRAMPTON COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00005955-0000

DATE: 20260625

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: D.M.S., Plaintiff

AND:

E.L.R. and D.G.E., Defendants

BEFORE: The Honourable Mr. Justice J.P.L. McDermot

COUNSEL: D.M.S., unrepresented

E.L.R., unrepresented

Robert G. Zochodne, for the Defendant, D.G.E.

HEARD: June 1, 2026

Endorsement

1This is but the latest chapter in a long litigation history between the Plaintiff, D.M.S., and the Defendant, E.L.R. Although this endorsement is part of the record in the civil proceedings commenced by a Statement of Claim issued by D.M.S., this matter really arises from the breakdown of the marriage between D.M.S. and E.L.R.

2D.M.S. and E.L.R. were husband and wife and were married on October 8, 2001. They separated on January 15, 2018. D.G.E. is the parties’ daughter who was born on October 10, 2006. She is now an adult but was 11 when the parties separated. She remained in the care of E.L.R. after separation and refused to further participate in parenting time with D.M.S. after January 7, 2019. The Office of the Children’s Lawyer appointed Deborah Stewart as counsel for D.G.E. in the matrimonial litigation and after hearing from her and the social worker assisting her at a conference, D.M.S. abandoned his parental claims in 2022.

3At some point in time prior to this, when D.G.E. was somewhere between 13 and 14 years old, she disclosed to a school official that D.M.S. had sexually abused her. Further disclosures were made to the local C.A.S. and the police. The police and the C.A.S. investigated. The police laid charges and D.M.S. was placed on the Ontario Child Abuse Registry as a result of this disclosure. D.G.E. testified at the Plaintiff’s criminal trial but the trial judge did not find her testimony credible. That judge commented that she had a reason to fabricate her evidence and that it was unknown as to whether D.G.E. even believed her own testimony. D.M.S. was acquitted of the charges. He remains on the child abuse registry.

4This litigation has been long and contentious. In the matrimonial proceedings, D.M.S.’s pleadings were struck by reason of his failure to provide disclosure. He was given every opportunity to make that disclosure and failed to do so. He was ordered to pay costs of an 18-day hearing, and those costs remain unpaid. D.M.S. appealed both decisions striking his pleadings, but the appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal. In a subsequent uncontested trial, D.M.S. was ordered, amongst other things, to pay child and spousal support as well as damages for intrusion upon seclusion. He is not paying child or spousal support and says that he cannot because he is off work on disability leave.

5In this context, D.M.S. has issued and served a Statement of Claim. He has named both E.L.R. and his daughter, D.G.E., as Defendants in that proceeding. He claims damages of more than $3,000,000 from both Defendants for malicious prosecution, defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and intentional infliction of mental suffering. I directed that this matter come before me for a hearing under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as being an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious on its face.

6Since the focused hearing, I have case managed this matter in Family Court. This is ostensibly a civil matter, and not a family matter. As a justice of the Superior Court of Justice, I have jurisdiction to address a matter in a civil proceeding, especially in light of the fact that this matter is closely related to a family proceeding, and may, in fact, be a collateral attack on the results of that family proceeding.

7In addition, the Plaintiff brought a motion for me to recuse myself for bias because of the negative findings made by me in the family proceedings. Before that motion could be argued, it was abandoned by D.M.S. prior to argument of this motion.

8To protect the parties’ anonymity, as in the family matter and in accordance with orders of the family court, the Court of Appeal and the criminal court, I have initialized the parties’ names in this endorsement.

9Since this claim was issued, a second lawsuit has been served by the Plaintiff’s partner, W.B., which is brought against E.L.R. and her former counsel, Joan Cushon. That mostly relates to them obtaining details of W.B.’s matrimonial proceedings with her own former spouse. That claim is not the subject matter of this motion.

Result

10For the reasons set out below, I have determined that the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process on its face. I have struck the claim pursuant to r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Analysis

11This is a motion under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule reads as follows:

The court may make an order staying or dismissing a proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

12The rule allows the court to address the dismissal motion summarily and permits the court to bring the issues forward rather than leaving it to the parties. Although this matter is in the family division, this court is part of the Superior Court and has jurisdiction to address the issues under r. 2.1.01. Both parties have filed extensive materials including written submissions and affidavits.

13This court is concerned about a lawsuit which effectively deals with some of the issues raised in the family litigation. That is especially so where the party bringing the lawsuit has exhausted all of his avenues in that family litigation. Any such lawsuit will often be characterized as a collateral attack on the other party. In this case, the Plaintiff’s appeals in the family law matter have been dismissed and the Plaintiff owes significant costs which may prove to be a barrier to any remedies which may be available in the family matter.

14The other aspect of this is the issue of weaponizing the civil proceedings to attack the Defendants. The danger of doing so is highlighted in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16, where Kasirer J. stated, at para. 194:

The risk is further heightened by the fact that abusers frequently utilize litigation as a tool “to continue to dominate and maintain contact and control following separation” and to deflect attention from their own role as the aggressor (Neilson (2004), at p. 419). Litigation abuse — where intimate partners utilize the legal system as a tool “to coerce, control, harass, undermine and dominate” their intimate partners — is a well-documented tactic frequently employed by abusers to control survivors (L. C. Neilson, Responding to Domestic Family Violence in Family Law, Civil Protection & Child Protection Cases (3rd ed. 2025), 2017 CanLIIDocs 2 (online), at para. 7.4.1; see C. Caro, Violence judiciaire: le contrôle post-séparation, November 13, 2025 (online); see, e.g., Droit de la famille-231579, 2023 QCCS 3557, at para. 40, aff'd 2023 QCCA 1547; F.S. v. M.B.T., 2023 ONCJ 102, 89 R.F.L. (8th) 442, at para. 142). As the intervener NAWL submits, and I agree, this Court must “minimiz[e] the risk that [the new tort] will be weaponized against victims of family violence” (I.F., at para. 5). In addressing litigation abuse, Chappel J. emphasized in Levely v. Levely, 2013 ONSC 1026, at para. 12, that judges must ensure legal proceedings “are not hijacked by a party and transformed into a process for further victimizing the other party”. Centring the inquiry on the deprivation of autonomy caused by coercive control allows courts to “identify false claims brought by the abuser” (I.F., NAWL, at para. 16).

15In my costs endorsement and my endorsement on the uncontested trial, I characterized the Plaintiff to be a querulous litigant, as defined by Thomas J. in Olumide v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), 2019 ABQB 186, at para. 56. This characterization reflects a litigant who does “not seek redress, but instead vengeance, public humiliation and punishment against those that oppose them”.

16All of these tend to indicate that this lawsuit could easily be found to be an abuse of process within the meaning of r. 2.1.01(1). However, r. 2.1.01 requires the court to make its finding from the pleading “on its face.” D.M.S. suggests that this means that I must make the finding from the Statement of Claim on its face, without regard to the context in which the lawsuit was commenced, and without regard to the orders and findings on the record concerning D.M.S. He says that if it is not an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious on the actual face of the pleading, everything must be addressed on the evidence at trial or by motion based on another rule such as r. 21.01(3).

17My review of the case law indicates that there is some merit to this assertion. In Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, application for leave denied, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 488, the Court of Appeal cited Myers J. in Raji v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801, who said that, “rule 2.1 is not for close calls.” Later, the Court of Appeal stated in Scaduto at para. 8:

[T]he court has recognized that the rule should be interpreted and applied robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. However, the use of the rule should be limited to the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process.

18However, as adopted by the Court of Appeal, Justice Myers noted in Raji that there is a two-step process:

a. The court must find that the frivolous, vexatious or abusive nature of the proceeding should be apparent on the face of the pleadings; and

b. There should be a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process of rule 2.1.

19As suggested by D.M.S., the parties are not permitted to file evidence on a motion under r. 2.1.01. In fact, they are also limited in their ability to file complex and lengthy submissions. In Covenoho v. Ceredian Canada, 2015 ONSC 2468, Myers J. noted, at para. 7:

A request under Rule 2.1.01(6) should be a one or two line request and nothing more. It may include or refer to a reported case between the parties. But if the judge is required to work his or her way through six cases to discern whether the plaintiff can be said to be re-litigating then the pleadings are not frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process on their faces and Rule 2.1 ought not to be invoked.

20This direction to “keep it simple” belies the lengthy submissions provided by both parties to this motion, which was at the request of the court. There can be some reference to reported decisions of the court in the proceeding or in related proceedings, but it cannot be overly extensive or complicated; in that case the motion should have been brought under another rule such as r. 21.

21Therefore, it is necessary to review the lengthy statement of claim to determine whether each claim by the Plaintiff offends r. 2.1.01 or not. However, the court is permitted to review previous endorsements between these parties on a summary basis to assist it in making its determination.

22I will now turn to a review of each cause of action alleged in the Statement of Claim on its face.

Malicious Prosecution

23As stated by Mr. Zochodne on behalf of D.G.E., malicious prosecution is difficult to make out. As D.M.S. acknowledged, there are four elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, which must be established on the balance of probabilities:

a. The prosecution must have been initiated by the Defendant(s);

b. It must have been terminated in favour of the Plaintiff;

c. It must have been undertaken without reasonable and probable cause; and

d. It must have been motivated by malice or a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect: see Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339, at para. 3.

24In his affidavit, D.M.S. describes the malicious prosecution claim as being the “the core of this claim and was initiated by the Primary Defendant [E.L.R.] by making a false report to the police that she received child pornography in an email from the plaintiff.”

25Unfortunately, the claim for malicious prosecution in the Statement of Claim is flawed in one major way. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants “initiated” the prosecution and states the facts in support of his claim for this in paras. 53 to 59 of the Statement of Claim. He says that the “Primary Defendant enticed, coerced and / or coached the Child to complain to the [Durham Regional Police Service (“DRPS”)] that the Plaintiff had sexually assaulted her.” Implicit in this statement and in the following paragraphs is that the charges were actually laid (and the prosecution actually initiated) by the DRPS.

26The issue with the Statement of Claim is that it was neither D.G.E. nor E.L.R. who “initiated” the charges; it was the local police service which is not a defendant in this lawsuit. The local police service initiated the charges after the report from the school official and after interviews of D.G.E. by both the police and child protection agencies. That the focus has to be on the police service and Crown that laid the charges is clear from the Miazga decision which explains the basis for the present day tort of malicious prosecution, at para. 4:

The four-part test for malicious prosecution is of long standing in the common law. It evolved in the 18th and 19th centuries at a time when prosecutions were conducted by private litigants and the Crown was wholly immune from civil liability. In Nelles v. Ontario, 1989 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.), this Court held that the Attorney General and Crown prosecutors no longer enjoy absolute immunity from a suit for malicious prosecution and set out the requisite standard for Crown liability under the pre-existing four-part test. The present appeal asks the Court to provide further guidance on the absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice requirements, in light of the unique role played by Crown prosecutors in our modern system of public prosecutions.

27Based upon the allegations contained in the Statement of Claim, it is clear that this was not a private prosecution but one instigated and initiated by the Durham police authorities. That police force and the Crown Prosecutor in Durham would have been the logical defendants in the Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution case. To sue both his ex-wife and daughter in this matter names the wrong defendants as neither of them instigated or preferred the charges in issue. D.G.E. was a complainant but her subsequent role in the prosecution was as a witness only. It was the Crown that had the discretion to lay charges in this matter, presumably after a full investigation. If the Crown failed to do due diligence, there might be a basis for the claim against the police and the Crown. Certainly, it cannot be said to be the Defendants in this Statement of Claim who initiated the claim. On its face, the claim for malicious prosecution fails to make out the first element of malicious prosecution as set out by the Supreme Court in Miazga.

28However, even if the prosecution could be seen to have been initiated by the Defendants, there are logical inconsistencies on the face of the claim. Firstly, the Plaintiff appears to blame E.L.R. for coaching D.M.S. in making the disclosures to the Durham C.A.S. and the police. He says that it was E.L.R., as an experienced family lawyer, who fit the disclosures into the criteria for sexual assaults that would be acted on by the police. If that is the case, then how can the Plaintiff allege that D.G.E. had the requisite malice necessary to make the claim against her actionable? The suggestion of coaching and coercion in the Statement of Claim is internally inconsistent with the allegation that D.G.E. acted with malice.

29As well, the suggestion that a child aged 12 or 13, again as alleged in the Statement of Claim, was able to form the requisite malice is concerning on its own.

30Finally, the Plaintiff is suggesting that D.G.E. relive and re-testify to what may have been traumatic events in her life. That on its own may be abusive even if D.G.E. is now an adult. Moreover, that raises the issue of whether the court should sanction a claim for damages because of a child’s disclosure of sexual abuse. That would, have a chilling effect on victims who decide to come forward to disclose abuse by an adult and would offend the victim’s interests under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which encourages persons to “express themselves on matters of public interest.” As noted in Emma Joyce Jansen et al v. J.T et al, 2026 ONSC 1304, at para. 61:

The subject matter of the expression, an allegation of sexual assault on a child by a person in a position of trust, relates to an issue of public interest and is plainly worthy of protection. Permitting the plaintiffs’ action to proceed against J.T. would have a chilling effect on victims of sexual assault and would fly in the face of changes in the law relating to the investigation and prosecution of sexually based offences.

31There is a question of the Plaintiff’s motivation in bringing this application. If it is for some reason other than obtaining legitimate compensation for a wrong done to the Plaintiff, it would support a finding that this claim is an abuse of process. There is some information from the record in the family file and the court need not look too far to find that answer. In my endorsement in the family law proceedings issued on July 26, 2024, I note [at para. 36] that D.M.S. had asked for a “stand-alone” finding of parental alienation even if it did not address the issues then before the court, namely the setting aside of certain agreements and the claim of E.L.R. and the Added Parties (E.L.R.’s parents) to strike the Plaintiff’s pleadings. He asked to re-open the evidence at the end of the 18-day focused hearing because of his acquittal. He said that he did this because of the acquittal in the criminal proceedings and because he “wants his daughter to eventually know the truth about the breakdown of his relationship with her”. His evidence was that D.G.E.’s testimony at the criminal trial was “based on coercion and influence on her by [E.L.R.].”¹

32This is remarkably similar to the allegation in the Statement of Claim that “the Primary Defendant enticed, coerced and/or coached the Child to complain to the DRPS that the Plaintiff had sexually assaulted her.”² He says that E.L.R. coerced D.G.E. into lying to the police.

33I ruled that the evidence would not be re-opened and that the Plaintiff’s abandonment of his parenting claims left him with no remedy in the family law proceedings which would permit him to prove parental alienation and lead evidence as to his acquittal in the family law proceedings:

If it is necessary to consider parental alienation concerning the setting aside of the agreements, it may then be addressed. But this court is not a forum for making findings where there is no remedy to be granted considering the age of the child (nearly 18) and considering D.M.S.’s abandonment of the child related issues. The court does not deal with hypotheticals or findings for the purpose of eventually demonstrating the “truth” to children or anyone else; the court instead deals with findings of fact relevant to the remedies sought in the proceeding. There is no jurisdiction for the court to make stand-alone findings simpliciter unless those findings are relevant to the issues in the focused hearing.³

34In my view, as D.M.S. was told that he had no remedy in the family law proceedings to pursue his acquittal, his allegations of parental alienation and his loss of his parental rights, he looked elsewhere to find another remedy. This Statement of Claim appears to be where he landed. However, to bring a multi-million dollar lawsuit against both Defendants, including his daughter who he purported to love dearly is as offensive, if not more offensive, to the purposes of the civil law compensation system that we operate under. As I have previously noted, he appears to want his daughter to relive the trauma of testifying against him concerning her allegations of sexual assault and the court must ask to what his intentions really are. As pointed out in Ahluwalia, this can be seen on the record as nothing other than the weaponization of the legal system directed at both Defendants in this proceeding. The malicious prosecution can be found to be, on the balance of probabilities, a clear abuse of process which cannot be condoned by the court.

35The Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution is therefore struck as being a frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the process of this court.

Defamation

36The Plaintiff claims damages for defamation as outlined in para. 74 of the Statement of Claim:

The Plaintiff states that the various allegations regarding the YouTube Incident, the Police Report/child pornography allegation and the ever-changing allegations of sexual assault (collective the "False Allegations") made by the Defendants to former Justice Perkins, Dr. Al Aswad, DCAS, the DRPS, family members, health care practitioners, Plaintiff's employer and others, were defamatory and libelous as the plain meaning and/or innuendo of the words used therein falsely and maliciously stated and/or implied that the Plaintiff had committed and/or was engaged in heinous conduct which was criminal and vile in nature and contrary to law and thereby falsely and maliciously impugned the character and integrity of the Plaintiff.

37To give proper notice of the defamation claim to the Defendants, the Plaintiff must set out the false statements in the pleadings.

38In particular, the Plaintiff has provided specifics of the following statements that he says were false:

a. In September, 2018, E.L.R. advised Arbitrator Perkins that the child had been showed an explicit dance video which constituted child pornography. In a later judicial interview with Arbitrator Perkins in the same month, that disclosure was made by the child, D.G.S., to the arbitrator.

b. According to para. 29 of the Statement of Claim, Dr. Al-Aswad, the child’s doctor, was told by the Defendants that the Plaintiff had shown D.G.E. a sexually explicit YouTube dance video. Dr. Al-Aswad reported this to the local C.A.S. and filed an affidavit in the arbitration outlining the disclosure.

c. On February 2, 2021, the Defendant E.L.R. reported an allegation of child pornography to the Durham Regional Police Service. The Plaintiff says that this was a false allegation.

d. According to paras. 44 and 45 of the Statement of Claim, at the same time, the Defendant E.L.R. told the investigating officer that the Plaintiff’s email address was used to hack her office and for infecting her computer with a virus. Moreover, D.M.S. says that the police officer was also told that the Arbitrator had made a report concerning the child being shown sexually explicit videos. The affidavit of Dr. Al-Aswad was provided to the police.

e. According to para. 50 of the Statement of Claim, when the child was 13 years of age, she told her secondary school principal that the Plaintiff had sexually assaulted her. The child was born on October 10, 2006 and accordingly turned 13 on October 10, 2019, and therefore, according to the Statement of Claim, the disclosure was made sometime during the following year.

f. According to para. 52, sometime prior to March 3, 2021, the Defendants met with a social worker from the Durham C.A.S. and made the allegations of sexual assault and interference, resulting in an investigation by the Society.

g. According to para. 55 of the Statement of Claim, the child was taken to the Durham Regional Police Service by E.L.R. on March 12, 2021, and complained to the police that the Plaintiff had sexually assaulted her. The Plaintiff says that the disclosures to the C.A.S. and the police resulted in the charges being laid by the police.

h. In December, 2023, D.G.E. gave evidence at the criminal trial about the allegations of sexual assault. That testimony was rejected by the trial judge who acquitted the Plaintiff of the charges in question.

39The basic limitation period is set in s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B. The time of discovery is dealt with in s. 5. Those sections read as follows:

Basic limitation period

4 Unless this Act provides otherwise, a proceeding shall not be commenced in respect of a claim after the second anniversary of the day on which the claim was discovered. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s. 4.

Discovery

5 (1) A claim is discovered on the earlier of,

(a) the day on which the person with the claim first knew,

(i) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,

(ii) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission,

(iii) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is made, and

(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it; and

(b) the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters referred to in clause (a). 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s. 5 (1).

Presumption

(2) A person with a claim shall be presumed to have known of the matters referred to in clause (1) (a) on the day the act or omission on which the claim is based took place, unless the contrary is proved. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s. 5 (2).

40Other than the testimony at trial, all of the statements that the Plaintiff complains of were made more than two years prior to the Statement of Claim being issued on October 28, 2025. These are statute-barred claims under the Limitations Act. The testimony at trial is subject to the doctrine of absolute privilege and the person making the statement as a witness cannot be held to be liable in defamation for statements made in the ordinary course as part of judicial proceedings: see Amato v. Welsh, 2013 ONCA 258, 362 D.L.R. (4th) 38, at para. 34.

41Regarding discoverability, the alleged losses suffered by the Plaintiff set out in the Statement of Claim, were also well known prior to the expiry of the limitation period. Those losses were set out in para. 90 of the Statement of Claim. Certainly, the Plaintiff abandoned his parenting rights in 2022, three years prior to the commencement of this action. The costs of the family law proceeding and criminal law proceeding were also well known early on. Finally, it is somewhat egregious for the Plaintiff to complain of losses when he has not yet paid his costs of the family proceeding or his support obligations or damages assessed at the uncontested trial.

42This is consistent with Kulyk v. Guastella, 2021 ONSC 584, which speaks to the “discoverability” of defamation during ongoing criminal proceedings. Myers J. clarified that the commencement of the limitation period is not deferred to when the charges are dismissed. The discoverability arises from when the allegedly “defamatory” statements are made, equivalent to when the Plaintiff learns of all of the elements of the cause of action. If the criminal charges do not result in a finding of guilt, they are largely irrelevant to the question of proof on a balance of probabilities of the truth of the Defendant’s statements in the defamation case. The cause of action was known and complete before criminal charges were decided.

43As a result, I find there is no actionable cause of action for defamation regarding the statements that the Plaintiff complains of. The claim is therefore frivolous and must be struck.

Intentional infliction of Mental and/or Emotional Distress

44The crux of this claim is contained in paras. 82 and 83 of the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiff says in para. 82 that “the conduct of the Defendants as described herein was Flagrant and outrageous and the Defendants knew that such conduct would cause severe and lasting mental and/or emotional distress to him by, among other things, causing irreparable harm to his relationship with the Child.” As well, in the subsequent paragraph in the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff says that “it was reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants that their conduct as described herein would cause severe and lasting mental and/or emotional distress to the Plaintiff.”

45In reviewing para. 82 of the Statement of Claim, it is difficult to understand how the conduct of D.G.E. could be held liable for damages for causing irreparable harm to her own relationship to her father. Children become estranged from parents in many instances without being liable for damages in favour of their parents. That allegation simply does not make sense.

46The Statement of Claim does not specify the conduct of the Defendants that cause the Plaintiff emotional distress. If the conduct of the child or E.L.R. constitutes the statements made to the police or the child protection agencies concerning the allegations of sexual assault, those statements are similarly statute-barred under the Limitations Act and are not actionable as a result.

47Moreover, if the Plaintiff is blaming E.L.R. for her conduct in coercing the child to make the statements to the authorities and others as noted above, this is effectively a complaint designed to place the issue of the alienation of the child before the court, the exact conduct that the Plaintiff was unsuccessful in placing before the court in the family law proceedings after the Plaintiff abandoned his parenting claims in 2022.

48I find this claim to be an abuse of process and frivolous. This claim is similarly statute-barred and a collateral attempt to place the alienation issues before the court which the Plaintiff was unable to effect in the family law proceedings.

Intentional Interference with Economic Relations

49The Plaintiff says that the “False Allegations and defamatory statements” were made to interfere with his employment and his relationship with his employers.

50Again, the statements were all made more than two years prior to the issuance of the Statement of Claim and are similarly statute-barred as discussed above.

Conclusion

51All of the claims made by the Plaintiff in his Statement of Claim are frivolous and an abuse of process within the meaning of rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff’s claim is therefore dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend.

52An excellent discussion on why leave to amend a claim should be denied was provided by Brown J. in 9383859 Canada Ltd. v. Saeed, 2020 ONSC 4883, at para. 54:

Where the claim has been struck as disclosing no reasonable cause of action or as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process, the plaintiff will be denied leave to amend that pleading where it contains a “radical defect” such that it could not be improved by an amendment: Roche v McLeod Law Firm, 2018 ONSC 2760. Further, leave to amend the claim should be denied where there is no reason to suppose that the party can improve their case by amendment, or if an entirely new cause of action would have to be set up by way of amendments that prejudiced the defendants: Dean v Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Counsel, 2020 ONSC 2486.

53The deficiencies in the claim are not technical; they constitute radical defects that cannot be improved by an amendment. I am of the view that no amendments can serve to resurrect the pleading.

Costs

54As the Defendants were the successful party, they are entitled to costs. Costs may be spoken to by way of written submissions by the Defendants and then the Plaintiff on a 10-day turnaround. Costs submissions to be no more than five pages in length excluding bills of costs and offers to settle. All costs submissions shall be served, filed, and a copy emailed to my judicial assistant at BarrieSCJJudAssistants@ontario.ca.

Footnotes

1. 1E.L.R. v. D.M.S., 2024 ONSC 3994, at para. 38.
2. 2Statement of Claim, D.M.S. v. E.L.R. et al., para. 55.
3. 3E.L.R. v. D.M.S., 2024 ONSC 3994, at para. 41.