J.A. v. S.M., 2026 ONCJ 259

J.A. v. S.M., 2026 ONCJ 259

CITATION: J.A. v. S.M., 2026 ONCJ 259

DATE: May 6, 2026

COURT FILE NO. D45749/24

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

J.A.

ACTING IN PERSON

APPLICANT

• and –

S.M.

ARON DAVID for the RESPONDENT

RESPONDENT

HEARD: APRIL 13-15 and May 4, 2026

JUSTICE S.B. SHERR

REASONS FOR DECISION

Part One – Introduction

1This trial was about the parenting and child support arrangements for the parties’ 2-year-old daughter (the child).

2The applicant (the father) seeks joint decision-making responsibility for the child and incidents of parenting, including terms of communication, travel and government documentation for the child. He seeks a graduated parenting-time schedule that leads to a shared parenting arrangement by November 1, 2026.

3The respondent (the mother) seeks sole decision-making responsibility for the child. She seeks incidents of parenting, including terms of communication, the right to obtain or renew government documentation for the child, and the ability to travel with the child outside of Canada without the father’s consent. She seeks specified day parenting time for the father, with parenting exchanges to be conducted by a professional parenting time supervisor. She proposes that parenting time can be reviewed in September 2028.

4The mother also sought child support from the father, starting on May 1, 2026, based on his 2025 income of $42,243.¹

5In his closing submissions, the father agreed to pay ongoing child support based on his 2025 income of $42,243. However, he asked that no support be ordered starting on November 1, 2026, when he proposes that a shared parenting arrangement start.

6The trial was held from April 13 to 15, 2026. Closing submissions were made on April 15, 2026, and the decision was reserved. On April 17, 2026, the mother filed a Form 14B motion seeking directions. Both parties had proposed at trial that mid-week parenting exchanges take place at the child’s daycare (the daycare). On April 17, 2026, the daycare had advised the father he could no longer physically attend the daycare site or contact daycare staff. The father filed his own Form 14B motion on April 20, 2026, seeking directions and other relief.

7The parties spoke to the matter on May 4, 2026. The court gave oral reasons, re-opened the trial, and admitted additional uncontested evidence about the daycare issue. The parties were given the choice of a short adjournment to make additional closing submissions or to make their submissions that day. Both parties chose to make submissions that day and to complete the trial.

8Both parties testified and were cross-examined. No other witnesses were called.

9The issues for the court to determine are as follows:

a) What parenting orders are in the child’s best interests? In particular:

(i) What decision-making responsibility orders are in the child’s best interests?

(ii) What parenting time orders are in the child’s best interests?

(iii) What incidents of parenting and terms of communication are in the child’s best interests?

b) Should child support be payable by either party starting on November 1, 2026, and if so, how much?

Part Two – Background facts and court history

10The father is 46 years old and lives on his own in Toronto. He is divorced and has a 29-year-old daughter from that relationship.² He is employed as a lead hand at a pallet company.

11The mother is 36 years old and lives in Toronto with the child and two of her children from other relationships, a 20-year-old daughter and a 12-year-old son. She is employed as an office administrator at an accounting firm.

12The parties started dating in 2020. The child was born in February 2024. Starting in March 2024, the parties cohabited. They separated on April 24, 2024. The child has lived with the mother since they separated.

13On April 24, 2024, the father was charged with four counts of assault, two counts of uttering threats of death or bodily harm and one count of forcible confinement, all related to the mother. His bail conditions prohibited direct or indirect contact with the mother, except through a mutually agreed upon third party or a family court order for parenting time or child-related matters. He was also prohibited from being within 100 metres of the mother, except for court appearances.

14The parties continued to have contact with each other until December 2024, despite the father’s bail terms.

15The father issued his application on December 20, 2024.

16The mother filed her answer/claim on February 3, 2025.

17On February 3, 2025, the parties agreed to a temporary without prejudice order granting the father parenting time with the child twice weekly for two hours, in a public location, supervised by the child’s maternal grandmother (the maternal grandmother). These visits did not take place because the maternal grandmother was unwilling to supervise the visits.

18On March 12, 2025, the parties agreed to change the temporary order. They agreed that the father’s sister would supervise his parenting time. It would take place for two hours in one week and three hours in the next week. They also agreed that the father would pay temporary child support to the mother of $447 each month, starting on March 1, 2025.

19This parenting arrangement did not work as the father’s sister was not available to supervise the father’s parenting time.

20On March 31, 2025, the father brought a Form 14B motion to change his parenting time. On April 3, 2025, Justice Jennifer Daudlin dismissed his motion.

21In mid-April 2025, the parties agreed to have Renew Supervision Services (Renew) supervise the father’s visits. The father confirmed he would attend two visits. However, he did not attend them. Renew ended its services.

22On May 16, 2025, Renew contacted the mother and told her that the father was willing to use its services. The mother agreed. They arranged for visits to take place based on the schedule set out in the March 12, 2025 court order. Three visits took place.

23On June 13, 2025, the parties agreed to a temporary parenting order. It remains the operative order for the father’s parenting time. The order includes the following terms:

a) Parenting time shall take place on Thursdays for two and a half hours, every other Saturday for four hours and every Sunday for four hours. Exchange arrangements were set out.

b) The parties may communicate through the AppClose app (AppClose). Communication shall be limited to important updates with respect to the child and for the purpose of discussing scheduled parenting time.

c) Both parties shall have the right to consult with and obtain information directly from the teachers, doctors and other professionals involved with the child.

24On July 25, 2025, the father was charged with eleven more offences related to the mother, including four counts of failing to comply with a release order, failing to attend court, two counts of mischief under $5,000, assault with a weapon, and three counts of extortion.

25The father deposed he was in jail for 10 days. His bail conditions were further restricted, prohibiting all contact or communication with the mother except through a mutually agreed third party for childcare purposes, and requiring him to remain at least 100 metres away from her except through a mutually agreed upon third party. The earlier exception permitting contact pursuant to a family court order no longer applied.

26On August 21, 2025, Justice Daudlin changed her March 12, 2025 child support order by requiring the father to pay temporary child support to the mother of $518 each month, starting on September 1, 2025, based on his 2024 income of $56,093.

27On November 17, 2025, the father obtained a bail variation. It allowed him to contact the mother through a mutually agreeable party for the purposes of childcare or in accordance with a valid family court order.

28On November 18, 2025, Justice Daudlin released written reasons for decision arising from motions she heard on November 5, 2025. She made several temporary parenting orders. She granted decision-making responsibility for the child to the mother. She also set out strict protocols for communication. She limited the father to sending the mother one AppClose message on Mondays and gave the mother until Thursdays to provide her response. She also ordered that the mother should inform the father of any significant decision regarding the child and seek his input where practicable. She was to provide him with this information on Thursdays, unless the matter was urgent. She made the communication orders subject to any criminal release orders.

29On December 5, 2025, Justice Daudlin ordered the father to pay the mother $3,000 for the costs of the temporary motions. She allowed him to pay the costs at $250 each month, starting on January 1, 2026. The father has not made any of these payments.

30On February 27, 2026, Justice Daudlin set filing timelines for this trial. The father did not meet them. This meant that the mother served her trial material first. The father was granted a filing extension to March 6, 2026. He did not meet that deadline. He did not file his trial material until April 7, 2026.

31Until April 16, 2026, the father exchanged the child at the daycare for his Thursday visits. The parties retained Renew to supervise the parenting exchanges on Saturdays and Sundays. They shared Renew’s costs equally.

32The trial took place from April 13 to 15, 2026.

33On May 4, 2026, the parties agreed that the court should consider the following uncontested evidence:³

a) On April 14, 2026, the father emailed the daycare seeking information about who the child was released to on April 13 and 14, 2026.

b) On April 15, 2026, the daycare responded that the mother had decision-making responsibility for the child, refused to provide the father with the requested information, alleged inappropriate communication and issued a formal written warning to the father.

c) On April 15, 2026, after receiving the daycare’s email, the father had a 53-minute call with the daycare supervisor about the response, seeking clarification. He found the daycare’s response alarming. He asked to speak to her superior and she refused.

d) On April 16, 2026, the father picked up the child from the daycare for his regular Thursday parenting time.

e) On April 17, 2026, the daycare notified the father at 3:45 p.m., while he was at work, that he was no longer permitted to participate in pick up or drop off, have contact with staff, or attend the daycare property, and warned him of possible police involvement if he attended.

f) Since April 16, 2026, the father has had his Thursday parenting time supervised by Renew. The mother has paid Renew’s costs for these visits.

34The mother deposed that the father is $1,626 in arrears of child support. The father deposed he recently completed his 2025 taxes, and the arrears have been or will soon be brought into good standing. He provided no evidence that this has happened.

35The father told the court that no trial dates have been set for his criminal matters.

Part Three – Legal considerations – best interests

36Subsection 24 (2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act (the Act) sets out the primary consideration for determining a child’s best interests as follows:

Primary consideration

24 (2) In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

37Subsection 24 (3) of the Act sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors related to the child’s circumstances that the court must consider in determining best interests. It reads as follows:

Factors

(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

38Section 28 of the Act sets out the types of parenting orders the court can make. Subsection 28 (1) of the Act reads as follows:

28 (1) The court to which an application is made under section 21,

(a) may by order grant,

(i) decision-making responsibility with respect to a child to one or more persons, in the case of an application under clause 21 (1) (a) or subsection 21 (2),

(ii) parenting time with respect to a child to one or more parents of the child, in the case of an application under clause 21 (1) (b), or

(iii) contact with respect to a child to one or more persons other than a parent of the child, in the case of an application under subsection 21 (3);

(b) may by order determine any aspect of the incidents of the right to decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, as the case may be, with respect to a child; and

(c) may make any additional order the court considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order,

(i) limiting the duration, frequency, manner or location of contact or communication between any of the parties, or between a party and the child,

(ii) prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child,

(iii) prohibiting a party from changing the child’s residence, school or day care facility without the consent of another party or an order of the court,

(iv) prohibiting a party from removing the child from Ontario without the consent of another party or an order of the court,

(v) requiring the delivery, to the court or to a person or body specified by the court, of the child’s passport, the child’s health card within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act or any other document relating to the child that the court may specify,

(vi) requiring a party to give information or to consent to the release of information respecting the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, to another party or other person specified by the court, or

(vii) requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party or other person specified by the court in a manner that is appropriate for the child.

39Subsection 28 (8) of the Act addresses a person’s right to ask for and receive information. It reads as follows:

Right to ask for and receive information

(8) Unless a court orders otherwise, a person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to a child under a parenting order is entitled to ask for and, subject to any applicable laws, receive information about the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, from,

(a) any other person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to the child under a parenting order; and

(b) any other person who is likely to have such information.

40Subsection 33.1 (2) of the Act states that any party to a proceeding shall, to the best of their ability, protect any child from conflict arising from the proceeding.

41The list of best interests considerations in the Act is not exhaustive. See: White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41; Pereira v. Ramos, 2021 ONSC 1736. It is also not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather, it calls for the court to take a holistic look at the child, his or her needs and the persons around the child. See: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480.

42The court must ascertain a child’s best interests from the perspective of the child rather than that of the parents. See: Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC). Adult preferences or “rights” do not form part of the analysis except insofar as they are relevant to the determination of the best interests of the child. See: Young v. Young 1993 34 (SCC); E.M.B. v. M.F.B., 2021 ONSC 4264; Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510.

43In considering a child’s best interests it will often be important to determine if a parent will follow the terms of a court order. See: Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201; Seyad v. Pathan, 2022 ONCJ 501; Mulik v. McFarlane, 2023 ONCJ 148.

44A party's failure to protect a child from conflict may be an important consideration in granting primary residence or decision-making responsibility to the other parent. See: Dayboll v. Binag, supra; I.A. v. I.G., 2023 ONCJ 523.

45In deciding on the appropriate parenting regime, the court is required to consider all possible frameworks, and not simply those proposed by the parties. See: Chomos v. Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 5208 (S.C.J.); Koliniati v. Manolessos, 2025 ONSC 3274.

Part Four – Legal considerations – best interests and family violence

4.1 Family violence – statutory provisions

46Subsections 18 (1) and (2) of the Act define family violence as follows:

(1)“family violence” means any conduct by a family member towards another family member that is violent or threatening, that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, or that causes the other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person, and, in the case of a child, includes direct or indirect exposure to such conduct; (“violence familiale”)

“Family violence”

(2) For the purposes of the definition of “family violence” in subsection (1), the conduct need not constitute a criminal offence, and includes,

(a) physical abuse, including forced confinement but excluding the use of reasonable force to protect oneself or another person;

(b) sexual abuse;

(c) threats to kill or cause bodily harm to any person;

(d) harassment, including stalking;

(e) the failure to provide the necessaries of life;

(f) psychological abuse;

(g) financial abuse;

(h) threats to kill or harm an animal or damage property; and

(i) the killing or harming of an animal or the damaging of property.

47Subsection 24 (4) of the Act sets out factors related to family violence. It reads as follows:

Factors relating to family violence

24 (4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

4.2 Family Violence – case law

48The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunis, 2022 SCC 22 made the following observations about family violence:

1. The recent amendments to the Divorce Act recognize that findings of family violence are a critical consideration in the best interests analysis (par. 146).

2. The suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability is untenable. Research indicates that children who are exposed to family violence are at risk of emotional and behavioural problems throughout their lives: Department of Justice, Risk Factors for Children in Situations of Family Violence in the Context of Separation and Divorce (February 2014), at p. 12. Harm can result from direct or indirect exposure to domestic conflicts, for example, by observing the incident, experiencing its aftermath, or hearing about it: S. Artz et al., “A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on the Impact of Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence for Children and Youth” (2014), 5 I.J.C.Y.F.S. 493, at p. 497. (par. 145).

3. Domestic violence allegations are notoriously difficult to prove. Family violence often takes place behind closed doors and may lack corroborating evidence. Thus, proof of even one incident may raise safety concerns for the victim or may overlap with and enhance the significance of other factors, such as the need for limited contact or support (par. 145).

49Family violence includes direct and indirect exposure to the violence. Children can be the direct victims of the violence, be exposed directly to the family violence towards another family member or be indirectly exposed and victimized by the family violence. See: M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207.

50Harm can be done to children, directly or indirectly, “if the victimized parent's physical, emotional and psychological well-being are compromised, since these consequences in turn often negatively impact their ability to meet the child's physical and emotional needs.” See: McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 1, at para. 85. See: Jurrius v. Rasulli, 2024 ONSC 1197.

51A court must not limit its analysis to alleged violence against the child. It must consider alleged violence against a parent and how that impacts the other parent’s ability to care for the child. See: K.M.N. v. S.Z.M. (2024) 98 R.F.L. (8th) 275 (BCCA).

52In S.V.G. v. V.G., 2023 ONSC 3206, the court wrote that children may suffer family violence in the following ways:

a) The child may be the direct victim of family violence if the abusive conduct is inflicted specifically towards them.

b) The child may also be victimized by direct exposure to family violence towards another family member, if they observe the violence or are close by when it occurs and are able to see or hear what is happening.

c) The child may also be indirectly exposed to and victimized by family violence towards other family members in many ways. For instance, they may experience the aftermath of the violence. This can include observing the family member’s physical injuries or emotional distress following the violence, hearing about the violence after it has occurred, seeing changes in the victim’s behaviour due to the violence, and becoming embroiled in a police or child protection investigation relating to the violence. Where the directly victimized family member is a parent, the child can also suffer indirect consequences of the violence if the parent’s physical, emotional and psychological well-being are compromised, since these consequences in turn often negatively impact their ability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs.

53A starting point to assess a child’s best interests when making a parenting order is to ensure that the child will be physically and emotionally safe. It is also in a child's best interests when making an access order that his or her caregiver be physically and emotionally safe. See: I.A. v. M.Z., 2016 ONCJ 615. Also see: Armstrong v. Coupland, 2023 ONSC 5451; J.N. v. A.S., 2020 ONSC 5292; N.D. v. R.K., 2020 ONCJ 266; K.M. v. J.R., 2022 ONSC 111.

54In cases of family violence, particularly spousal violence, it is crucial that the court consider whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate. A victim of family violence might be unable to co-parent due to the trauma they have experienced or ongoing fear of the perpetrator. In addition, co-operative arrangements may lead to opportunities for further family violence. See: Bell v. Reinhardt, 2021 ONSC 3353.

55Failure to speak out earlier and inconsistent evidence is common for victims of domestic violence. See: A.E. v. A.B., 2021 ONSC 7302; N.M. v. S.M., 2022 ONCJ 482.

56The court is very aware that family violence is sometimes difficult for the victim to prove. It is often not reported. There may be many reasons for this. There will often be no medical, police or Children’s Aid Society reports to corroborate allegations of family violence. Victims sometimes minimize and rationalize the abuse. The family violence can take place in private so that there are no witnesses. Control and coercion can be subtle and only evident to the victim. See: Wiafe v. Aboakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201.

57Violence need not be physical. Emotional and psychological abuse can have a devastating impact on a child. See: Dayboll v. Binag, supra; El Khatib v. Noun, 2023 ONSC 1667.

58Recording the other spouse, insults, unwarranted criticism about parenting and demanding to know whereabouts can constitute psychological abuse. See: K.M. v. J.R., 2024 ONSC 1338.

59The concept of “coercive and controlling behaviour” is distinct from other forms of family violence in that it can consist of many different types of acts occurring over time which, in isolation, do not seem abusive or significant, but which paint a picture of a very destructive relationship when viewed in their totality. Accordingly, the significance of the individual incidents can only be truly understood when viewed from the perspective of the larger picture. In addition, a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour is particularly concerning because it is easier to inflict in its various forms post-separation than other types of family violence. See: J.M.M. v. C.R.M., 2025 ONSC 3067, where the court at paragraphs 298 and 299, set out indicia of coercive control, both before and after separation.

60Impulse control and self-regulation are important parenting qualities. Children learn by observing their parents. If a parent is unregulated, there is a strong possibility that is what the child will learn. See: D.E.S.A. v. N.B., 2025 ONCJ 279; J.A. v. S.M., 2025 ONCJ 606.

Part Five – Summary of the parties’ positions and narratives

5.1 The father

61The father’s parenting requests included the following:⁴

a) Joint decision-making responsibility for the child. This includes equal access to information about the child.

b) Graduated parenting time with the child. He proposed four phases of parenting time. The first phase has three visits each week from 2:30 to 6:30 p.m.,⁵ alternate Saturdays for the full day and each Sunday for the full day. The second phase adds a single overnight visit each weekend. The third phase increases the weekend visits to two overnights on alternate weekends, and the fourth phase moves to an equal-time parenting schedule, with mid-week overnight visits. The father asked to implement each phase after two months.

c) Equal holiday parenting time.

d) During mid-week parenting time, he will exchange the child at a public library.⁶ During weekend exchanges, he will drop the child off at a public location midway between the parties.

e) Reasonable telephone and virtual parenting time.

f) Make-up parenting time when parenting time is cancelled.

g) A right of first refusal for parenting time.

h) Renew should no longer be ordered to supervise parenting time exchanges.

i) Neither party shall obtain government documents for the child or travel with the child internationally without the consent of the other party or a court order.

j) Neither party shall remove the child from Ontario without the written consent of the other party or a court order.

k) Neither party shall change the child’s name without the written consent of the other party or a court order.

62The father requested several terms about communication between the parties, including a term that they communicate respectfully through the AppClose parenting app.

63The court summarizes the father’s narrative about parenting issues as follows:

a) He was equally involved in raising the child when the parties briefly cohabited after the child’s birth.

b) He has always asked to be actively involved in the child’s life.

c) The mother agreed that he should have joint decision-making responsibility for the child until she obtained her counsel and amended her answer/claim.

d) The mother has unreasonably restricted his relationship with the child. He feels there are elements of parental alienation.

e) The mother makes unilateral decisions about the child without his consent. She enrolled the child in daycare without advising him. She added her family members as emergency contacts and as people who could pick up the child without his consent.

f) The child’s daycare has unreasonably prevented him from attending their site. He believes it has colluded with the mother to frustrate his relationship with the child. He submits that the daycare’s refusal to give him information about the child reinforces the need for a joint decision-making responsibility order to ensure he is equally involved in the child’s education.

g) He has developed a close bond with the child in the limited parenting time he has had with her. He should have equal responsibility for her.

h) He is a loving, capable and committed parent. He is totally committed to the child’s development, care and well-being. He has taken multiple parenting courses. He has researched her developmental needs. He has obtained her entire daycare and medical files. He is knowledgeable about the child’s needs. He has paid attention to her growth and language. He wants to be the best father he can be.

i) He takes the child to church every Sunday and the child enjoys this. He is Christian Pentecostal and teaches the child his religious practices. His mother was born in Guyana, and his father was born in India. He teaches the child about her heritage.

j) His daughter is his life. There isn’t anything he wouldn’t do for her. He is child-focused and does not want to engage in finger-pointing.

k) The child has developed a close relationship with her paternal family members.

l) He does not want to control the mother. He only wants to be an equal part of the child’s life. The child will be better off if this happens.

m) He respects the mother. He feels they have effectively co-parented the child despite the barriers placed on their communication.

n) The communication between him and the mother has improved.

o) He feels that the mother and he can effectively communicate with a clear and structured court order, with defined responsibilities.

p) He has followed all court orders to the best of his ability.

q) The mother’s allegations of family violence, including coercive control, are all false.

r) He poses no risk to the child or the mother. There is no need for supervised parenting exchanges. It is very expensive, and he cannot afford it.

5.2 The mother

64The mother’s parenting requests include the following:

a) Sole decision-making responsibility for the child, including the right to select professionals, schools, daycares and doctors.

b) The father shall have parenting time on alternate Saturdays and Sundays for six hours each day and on each Thursday from 4 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., with all parenting exchanges conducted by Renew.

c) The father shall have holiday parenting time in her discretion.

d) The parties shall equally pay Renew’s costs for the father’s weekend parenting time and the father shall pay Renew’s costs for any other parenting time.

e) Makeup parenting time if the child is too sick to attend a visit.

f) The right to apply for or renew government documentation for the child and to travel with the child outside of Canada, for vacation purposes, without the father’s consent. The mother included specific travel terms in her draft order.

g) The right to hold all government documentation for the child.

h) Clarity regarding the father’s ability to communicate with the child’s daycare, school, doctors or other service providers.

65The mother proposed detailed terms of communication. She wants to keep the terms Justice Daudlin’s November 18, 2025 temporary parenting order that the father only communicate with her on Mondays through AppClose and that she only communicate with the father through AppClose on Thursdays. She wants to continue this arrangement even if the father’s criminal release terms change or expires.

66The court summarizes the mother’s narrative about parenting issues as follows:

a) She has always been the child’s primary caregiver.

b) She has responsibly met all the child’s physical, emotional and developmental needs. The child is thriving in her care. She is a happy and well-adjusted child.

c) The child has a close relationship with her other children.

d) She has been the victim of significant family violence by the father. The violence has been physical, emotional and psychological.

e) The father has harassed and abused her through AppClose communications.

f) The father has and continues to exert coercive control over her. He bombarded her with messages and demanded immediate answers. He tries to control who the child sees. He makes repeated jealous accusations. He threatens to report her to authorities or take her to court.

g) The father is emotionally unpredictable and volatile. He vacillates from being loving and solicitous to being angry, violent and controlling. He will apologize to her and then repeat this behaviour.

h) The father is insistent and demanding. He becomes highly agitated when he does not get his own way or when she does not respond quickly to him.

i) The father has unreasonably contacted the police and the Children’s Aid Society when he is upset with her.

j) The child was exposed to the father’s family violence.

k) The father has shown no insight into the family violence: the impact it has had on her and the risks it poses to the child. He minimizes or denies his family violence.

l) She fears and is intimidated by the father. She wants to continue to use Renew for parenting exchanges. She is willing to pay half of Renew’s fees for Saturday and Sunday visits. She asks that the father pay Renew’s expenses for any other parenting time ordered.

m) She was willing to use the child’s daycare for Thursday parenting exchanges. However, this is no longer an option because the daycare refuses to deal any longer with the father.

n) She has tried to appease the father, so he does not become escalated and upset with her. She feels she is always “walking on eggshells around him”. She thought that if she agreed to joint decision-making responsibility this would satisfy the father. It didn’t. She obtained professional advice and now better understands the dynamics of family violence.

o) The father makes unilateral decisions about the child. He asked for her consent so he could apply for and receive the Canada Child Benefit, although the child was living with her. He unilaterally tried to change the child’s doctor. He has taken the child to different doctors without her consent. He renewed the child’s Health Card, and had it sent to his address, although the child was living with her.

p) The father has often ignored court orders.

q) She is afraid of the child’s exposure to the father’s anger and unpredictable conduct. The child is too young to express verbally if there are problems.

r) The child is often clingy when she returns home from visits. She resists bathing and playing and just wants to be held by her.

s) She feels that increases in parenting time should be very gradual to ensure the child’s positive adjustment and to monitor the father’s conduct.

t) She has facilitated the father’s parenting time despite the family violence. She makes the visits positive for the child. She wants them to have a good relationship.

u) She worries that the father’s aggressive assertion of his rights might impair the child’s relationships with daycares, schools, doctors and other service providers.

Part Six – Justice Daudlin’s reasons for decision dated November 18, 2025

67Justice Daudlin heard the temporary parenting motions on November 5, 2025. She released her reasons for decision on November 18, 2025.

68Justice Daudlin wrote the following at paragraphs 58 to 61 of her reasons for decision:

[59] The concern is not only the tone of the father’s messages but their relentless frequency. The volume of communication is excessive and disproportionate to the circumstances, creating pressure rather than cooperation. This barrage of messages overwhelms the mother, escalates conflict, and leaves little room for constructive dialogue. The persistent pattern of high volume communication contributes to an atmosphere of control and intimidation, which the court considers a factor in its finding of family violence. It also weighs heavily in the best interests analysis because it destabilizes the mother’s ability to focus on the child’s needs and exposes the child to ongoing parental discord.

[60] This pattern undermines cooperative decision making, erodes trust, and turns routine matters into disputes. It places the mother in a defensive posture and diverts attention from the child’s day to day needs. The foreseeable effect on the child is increased instability and exposure to parental conflict—outcomes contrary to the child’s best interests.

[61] The father also demonstrates a lack of insight into the impact of his communication style and frequency on the mother and, by extension, on the child. His explanations—framed as necessary to assert his rights or ensure compliance—are not sufficient. They fail to acknowledge that accusatory, repetitive, and urgent messaging entrenches conflict rather than advancing cooperative parenting. This escalating pattern is evident throughout the record and shows no sign of self correction. Without stricter court intervention, meaningful change is unlikely. His inability to recognize how his approach undermines the child’s stability and the mother’s capacity to focus on the child reinforces the need to limit communication and confer temporary decision making responsibility on the mother.

69Justice Daudlin set out a roadmap for the father to move forward at paragraphs 73 to 75 of her decision as follows:

[73] The court’s orders are intended to address these risks and provide the child with stability. However, these measures alone will not resolve the underlying issues. Meaningful change requires the father to take concrete steps, including:

(1) Demonstrating compliance with all court orders promptly, consistently, and without resistance or attempts to circumvent their intent.

(2) Gaining insight into the impact of his conduct, recognizing how his approach to communication, decision-making, and cooperation has affected and can affect the child and the mother, and taking responsibility for making necessary changes.

(3) Prioritizing the child’s needs over personal grievances or perceived injustices, focusing on what is best for the child, rather than on adult entitlements or disputes.

(4) Reducing conflict and respecting boundaries, limiting communication to essential, child-related matters, and refraining from excessive, repetitive, or accusatory messaging.

[74] The court expects the father to reflect honestly on these issues and to begin making meaningful and sustained progress. Compliance with these expectations is not optional; it is essential to the child’s well-being and to any future consideration of expanded decision-making or access.

[75] Failure to comply with the court’s orders, or to demonstrate genuine insight and change, may result in further restrictions or adverse orders.

Part Seven – Assessment of the evidence

7.1 Findings of family violence

70The evidence and the parties’ presentations at trial reinforced Justice Daudlin’s findings in her reasons for decision, as set out in Part 6 above.

71The evidence informed the court that:

a) The father has perpetrated significant family violence against the mother.

b) The family violence has been physical, psychological and emotional.

c) The family violence involves extensive coercive control.

d) The family violence has been persistent and ongoing.

e) The family violence has taken place in the presence of the child.

f) The father often does not follow court orders he does not agree with.

g) The father perpetuates conflict and does not protect the child from conflict.

h) The father is quick to anger and lacks effective emotional regulation.

i) The father lacks good judgment.

j) The father has a relentless personality. He is demanding and rarely satisfied. It was easy for the court to see how exhausting and stressful it is for the mother to deal with him.

k) The father lacks insight into the impact his conduct has had on the mother and the child.

l) The father believes he is the aggrieved party in this case. He is hyper-focused on equally parenting the child and does not recognize his role in why this is not happening.

m) The father has not been able to follow the roadmap set out by Justice Daudlin. He has not made meaningful changes.

n) The mother and child are at serious risk of emotional harm from the father if strict boundaries are not set for him.

72The family violence has been so serious that it is the dominant best interests factor in this case, because of its impact on the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. It informs the court about what decisions it must make in the child’s best interests.

73The court’s analysis of the evidence supporting these findings is set out below.

7.2 Assessment of the father’s evidence

74The father was not a reliable or a credible witness.

75The father deposed in his trial affidavit that he has consistently communicated in a child-focused, respectful, and appropriate manner. In cross-examination, he initially denied that his behaviour or communication had ever been erratic, harassing or unpredictable.

76That narrative quickly fell apart.

77On June 13, 2025, Justice Daudlin ordered that the parties could communicate through AppClose. She ordered that communication was to be limited to important updates with respect to the child and for the purpose of discussing scheduled parenting time. The parties had not communicated with each other for several months. This was an opportunity for the father to show that he could responsibly co-parent with the mother.

78The parties started communicating through AppClose on June 15, 2025. The father abused this opportunity. The communications on AppClose lasted less than one month. The mother filed the entirety of the messages at the trial. 191 single-spaced pages were filed. The vast majority of the messages were sent by the father.

79The messages sent by the father were persistently hostile, demanding and abusive. The father completely disregarded the limitations on communications ordered by Justice Daudlin.

80The father sent messages to the mother early in the morning and late at night. He would send multiple messages at a time. He demanded immediate responses. He sent many messages while caring for the child and while the mother was caring for the child. The mother would try to pacify the father, but he would not stop.

81The father often demanded to know the whereabouts of the child. He warned the mother not to expose the child to anyone without his consent. He constantly accused the mother of abusing the child and alienating the child against him. He often accused her of cheating on him. He often threatened to report her to the police and press charges against her. He threatened to report that she was abusing the child to the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto. He often threatened her with court action. He told her that he had recorded her on video more than 5,000 times and threatened to use the videos against her.⁷

82The father was very controlling in his messages. He demanded that the mother’s adult daughter and the maternal grandmother be removed as emergency contacts and people able to pick up the child from daycare. This was unreasonable. The mother works during the day and is not always available to pick up and drop off the child at daycare. The mother’s daughter and the maternal grandmother live in the same building as the mother. It is only five minutes from the daycare. They are both responsible parenting support for the mother and she trusts them.

83The messages sent by the father were often irrational in relation to the mother’s responses. He quickly escalated in his communications.

84The father minimized his conduct. He acted coyly when cross-examined about these messages. When asked if he had ever accused the mother of cheating on him, he would answer, “you will have to take me to the message”. Only when confronted with a statement would he say that it was inappropriate or said, “that’s what the notes say”. He did this with each category of message described above. He knew he had sent these messages – they were central to Justice Daudlin’s decision.

85The father rationalized his conduct by saying it was the first time in a long time that he had been allowed to communicate with the mother. He said, “I was a little furious we were on the app. I felt I was getting a limited amount of parenting information”. To think that this was a legitimate reason for his conduct showed a tremendous lack of insight and judgment. He should have been on his absolute best behaviour with this opportunity. Instead, he chose to bully and intimidate the mother. The messages and his responses at trial about these messages were strong evidence of his coercive control of the mother.

86The parties stopped using AppClose when the father was charged with further criminal offences on July 25, 2025.

87The father submitted that any inappropriate conduct by him was limited to one month in 2025. The evidence did not support this.

88The father made several unnecessary calls to the Toronto Police Service. He called them on August 6, 2025, soon after he was released from jail, because he felt he was being denied parenting time. He called the police on October 2, 2025, because a visit did not take place when the child was sick. The police attended the mother’s home at 9 p.m. for a wellness check. The mother had told the father about the child’s illness in advance. He called the police again on November 23, 2025, just 5 days after the release of Justice Daudlin’s decision, because of a missed visit when the child was taken to the emergency department of a hospital. Again, the police came to the mother’s home at 9 p.m. and saw that the child was fine. The father called the police again on December 23, 2025, because the child was absent from daycare for a medical appointment. The mother had advised the father of the child’s appointment in advance.

89The father also twice called the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto about the mother. It conducted a quick investigation and closed its file.

90The court finds that these calls were malicious and indicative of coercive control. They were done to intimidate and humiliate the mother. They were destabilizing for her and the child. She described her embarrassment of having her neighbours constantly see the police coming to her home. She is anxious that the father will continue to do this.

91The parties resumed using AppClose in January 2026. Their communication improved for a while. However, on April 8, 2026, the father reverted to his earlier pattern of sending the mother many demanding messages. The messages were inappropriate and breached the terms of Justice Daudlin’s November 18, 2025 court order, that limited his communication with the mother on AppClose to one message on Mondays.

92This was not the only breach of court orders by the father. He has breached prior court orders as follows:

a) He directly communicated with the mother from April 25, 2024, to December 2024, in violation of his bail terms. To be fair, the mother was aware of those conditions and facilitated his breaches.

b) He repeatedly breached the June 13, 2025 order of Justice Daudlin that states his communication with the mother through AppClose is to be limited to important updates for the child and for the purpose of discussing scheduled parenting time.

c) He has not paid anything towards the costs order against him.

d) The child support order is in arrears.

e) He did not follow two court orders for filing his trial material.

93The evidence showed that the father has made or has tried to make unilateral decisions for the child, without any authority to do so. This includes:

a) He is still holding most of the child’s documentation.

b) On June 22, 2025, he told the mother that he had applied for the Canada Child Benefit for the child and asked her to sign paperwork so he could receive the benefits. The child was living with the mother. The mother confirmed she is now receiving these benefits.

c) On June 30, 2025, the father told the mother that he had spoken to the daycare and had tried to remove her family members from the emergency contact list and to prohibit them from picking up and dropping off the child. He told her that he was going to change the child’s daycare. On April 16 and 17, 2026, he again pressured the daycare to remove her family members from the emergency contact list and to prohibit them from picking up and dropping off the child.

d) The father took the child during his visits to doctors other than the child’s doctor.

e) The father wrote the mother’s counsel on November 4, 2025, that he had secured a different doctor for the child and had set up an appointment.

f) On January 29, 2026, the mother asked the father for the name of the doctor the father had taken the child to see. He did not provide the name of the doctor – only the name of a clinic.

g) In March 2026, the child’s family doctor notified the mother that the father had asked to transfer the child’s medical file to another doctor. The mother was the parent with temporary sole decision-making responsibility for the child.

h) The mother deposed that when she went to renew the child’s health card in February 2026, she was advised that it had already been renewed by the father on January 5, 2026.⁸

94The father chose to only baldly deny the mother’s detailed allegations of physical and emotional abuse set out in her trial affidavit. He served his trial affidavit well after receiving the mother’s trial affidavit. He had sufficient notice of her allegations to properly respond to them.

95The court gave the father several opportunities to respond to the mother’s allegations. It explained to him that family violence is an important best interests factor that the court must consider. When the father said he would not mix the criminal court proceeding with the family court proceeding, the court explained about section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, subsection 9 (2) of the Ontario Evidence Act⁹ and subsection 5 (2) of the Canada Evidence Act that set out that evidence in a family proceeding cannot be used against a person other than to impeach future testimony. See: M.R.W. v. S.A.W., 2026 ONSC 666. The father said he did not want to risk a perjury charge and gave no further evidence about the mother’s abuse allegations.

96Given the father’s significant credibility and reliability problems outlined above in this Part, it would have been an uphill battle for him to refute the mother’s allegations of family violence, even if he had chosen to do more than baldly deny them.

97It is also very concerning that right after the trial originally ended the father became involved in a dispute with the daycare that led to him being banned from its premises. This means the daycare is no longer an option for supervised parenting exchanges. The father demonstrated very poor judgment by getting embroiled in this dispute, especially with a trial decision pending.

98The father’s presentation at trial was strong corroboration of the mother’s evidence about how challenging he is to deal with. The court observed the following about him:

a) He is a very angry man. He would quickly change from being relaxed and friendly to being angry and vigilant when he felt challenged. His voice would get louder. He would pace about and wave papers in the air. He would often apologize and relax again.

b) He spent a lot of time at trial lecturing and making speeches.

c) He tried to parse the meaning of words when asked simple questions. It sometimes took considerable questioning to get him to admit obvious facts.

d) He tried to control the mother’s counsel’s cross-examination of him, objecting to relevant, but difficult questions about his AppClose messages and calls to authorities.

e) He felt justified in making reports about the mother to the Children’s Aid Society and the police. He did not see why this was a concern.

99The father discussed that he lost his employment in 2022 because he had an emotional breakdown. He did not deny the mother’s evidence that he was dismissed because he became involved in two different altercations at work. He said he briefly saw a therapist. He is not presently attending counseling or receiving mental health assistance.

7.3 Assessment of the mother’s evidence

100The court found the mother to be a reliable and credible witness. She answered questions directly and to the best of her ability. She provided considerable detail to the court about incidents between the parties. She did not exaggerate her evidence.

101The court was struck with the mother’s generosity towards the father after what she has gone through with him. This enhanced her credibility.

102The mother has been financially generous with the father. For instance:

a) After the parties separated, she often gave him money. She explained she wanted to make sure he had enough money to live on and to also look after the child.

b) She lent the father her car in March 2024. She did not ask for the car back after they separated. She said she wanted him to have transportation to come and see the child. The father subsequently was involved in a motor vehicle accident, and the car was a write-off.

c) She could have sought retroactive support and special and extraordinary expenses from him. She decided not to pursue this.

d) She could have sought to impute income to the father. He earned $120,000 in 2022 and over $92,000 in 2023. She said the father told her he was dismissed because of two altercations at work. The father earned $56,093 in 2024. She agreed to ongoing support based on the father’s 2025 income of $42,243. The father said his income had gone down in 2025 because he was coming to court so much.

e) She has proposed paying 50% of Renew’s costs for the father’s weekend parenting time. This is a significant amount – between $400 and $500 monthly. This is more than the child support she will receive from the father. She feels this will ensure that she and the child are safe, the child is protected from conflict, and the child has the opportunity to have a relationship with the father.

103The evidence informed the court that the mother has worked very hard to facilitate the child’s relationship with the father as follows:

a) She gave him a car and money to facilitate his parenting time.

b) She packs food, clothing and items for the child for her visits with him. She includes photos of him in her family albums and shows them to the child.

c) She has consented to gradual increases in parenting time.

d) She provided him with holiday parenting time in addition to the parenting time set out in the temporary parenting order.

e) She consented to him obtaining all information about the child from service providers and responds promptly to his requests for information.

f) A review of the AppClose messages shows that she works hard to inform him about the child and that she tries to de-escalate him when he is upset.

104There is no evidence of parental alienation, as alleged by the father. The court also rejects the father’s submission that the mother colluded with the daycare to prevent him from attending there.

105The trial was very difficult for the mother. She often became overwhelmed emotionally watching the father getting agitated while testifying or giving his submissions. The court took breaks or allowed her to leave the court when she was upset. After watching the parties together for three days, the court finds that the mother is afraid of engaging in any way with the father. She has justifiable reasons for these fears. He is a destabilizing person in her life and risks being a destabilizing person in the child’s life.

106The mother has been a victim of family violence. She has often responded to this violence by trying to appease the father. For instance:

a) She had difficulty ending her relationship with him.

b) She continued to see him after they separated in violation of his bail conditions. She explained he made her feel guilty for the criminal charges. He told her she was destroying their family. She wanted him to have a relationship with the child. She said that at times he was loving and wonderful to her. He would apologize for his behaviour and promise to change. She wanted to believe him. She wanted the child to have a father in her life.

c) She financially supported him at times, when he should have been financially supporting her and the child.

d) She initially sought a joint decision-making responsibility order in this case in her Answer/Claim. She was self-represented. She was hoping this would mollify him.

107The mother has obtained legal and professional support. She showed an understanding of the dynamics of family violence at trial and has taken steps to protect herself and the child.

108The court preferred the mother’s evidence and narrative over the father’s evidence and narrative where it conflicted.

109This leads to the mother’s evidence of physical and emotional abuse by the father. This is set out in detail in paragraphs 27 to 55 of her trial affidavit. The court accepts this evidence on a balance of probabilities.¹⁰ The court will only summarize this evidence here as follows:

a) In April 2020, the father assaulted the mother for the first time. He took and smashed her phone, grabbed her head and smashed it against the fridge several times. After a break, he cried and apologized to her.

b) When upset, the father would call the mother incessantly – at work and at home. He would constantly email her.

c) In February 2024, the mother brought food to the father because he said he was ill. Her children were in the car. The father became upset when she refused to rub his back. He swore at her. He then grabbed her head and punched her repeatedly. He threatened to kill her if she tried to leave him and take the child. He threatened to rip out the stitches from her C-section. He took her keys and phone and blocked the door to prevent her from leaving. Later that night, the father persistently called her.

d) The physical abuse escalated in March and April 2024. On March 17, 2024, the father punched the mother in the nose while she was holding the child. She was bleeding all over the child. The father took her phone and keys from her. He picked up the bible and suggested they pray. The mother agreed and this calmed him down.

e) On March 29, 2024, the father accused the mother of cheating on him. He started recording her with his phone and sent the video to the maternal grandmother. He would not let the mother sleep. He threatened to open her head with a can opener. He told her to get down on her knees and apologize. She did this. He was not satisfied and made her apologize repeatedly. He spat on her while she was holding the child. He threatened to kill her. When she said she was leaving, he began crying and begged her not to leave him.

f) On both Mother’s Day of 2024 and in late June 2024, the father smashed her phone. On one occasion he swung at her with the lanyard of his car keys hitting her in the nose while she was holding the child.

g) When she tried to stop seeing the father in 2024, he would respond by contacting her landlord, showing up at her residence and contacting her family alleging she was abusing the child. On one occasion, he attended a bar her former partner works at. He began sharing intimate photos of the mother and was asked to leave.

Part Eight – Decision-making responsibility

8.1 Legal considerations

110The court has considered the best interest factors set out in Parts 3 and 4 above in determining the issue of decision-making responsibility.

111In Kaplanis v. Kaplanis 2005 1625 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 275 (OCA), the court set out the following principles in determining whether a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate:

1. There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.

2. It can’t be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication.

3. Just because both parents are fit does not mean that joint custody should be ordered.

4. The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint custody.

5. No matter how detailed the custody order there will always be gaps and unexpected situations, and when they arise they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis.

6. The younger the child, the more important communication is.

112Courts do not expect communication between separated parties to be easy or comfortable, or free of conflict. A standard of perfection is not required and is obviously not achievable. See: Griffiths v. Griffiths 2005 ONCJ 235, 2005 CarswellOnt 3209 (OCJ). The issue is whether a reasonable measure of communication and cooperation is in place, and is achievable in the future, so that the best interests of the child can be ensured on an ongoing basis. See: Warcop v. Warcop, 2009 6423 (ON S.C.).

113Mutual trust and respect are basic elements for a joint decision-making responsibility order to work effectively. See: G.T.C. v. S.M.G., 2020 ONCJ 511; Shokoufimogiman v. Bozorgi, 2022 ONSC 5057; El Khatib v. Noun, 2023 ONSC 1667.

114Families that require constant intervention by Children’s Aid Societies and the police due to high conflict are poor candidates for joint decision-making responsibility or parallel parenting orders. See: S.A. v. Y.M., 2020 ONCJ 147; Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510.

115In J.A. v. S.M., 2025 ONCJ 606, Justice Daudlin set out the following factors militating against making a joint decision-making responsibility order - many of which are applicable here:

i) Using an accusatory and confrontational tone rather than a problem-solving one.

ii) Focusing on blame, fault, and past grievances instead of the child’s current needs.

iii) Demanding immediate responses.

iv) Creating unilateral deadlines.

v) Issuing directives to the other parent.

vi) Threatening litigation and consequences instead of practical solutions.

116In paragraph 504 of Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 6451, 2011 CarswellOnt 12097 (SCJ), the court writes:

In the wrong family circumstances, a joint custody order can perpetuate hostilities, indecision, and power struggles. Children- particularly children already exposed to the upset of family breakdown- look to their parents for love, guidance, stability, protection, and consistency. They need to have confidence that adult decisions will be made quickly, properly and uneventfully.

117In S.S. v. S.K., 2013 ONCJ 432, (Ont. C.J.) this court wrote that courts should assess the dynamics of a family when determining if a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate. Particularly, the court should examine:

a) if such an order is more or less likely to de-escalate or inflame the parents' conflict;

b) if such an order is more, or less likely to expose the child to parental conflict; and,

c) whether a parent is seeking the order as a mechanism to inappropriately control the other parent. Parents who seek such orders for the purpose of asserting control over their former spouse and children tend to be rights-based, overly litigious, unbending and the best interests of their children can be secondary considerations. For such parents, a joint custody order can be a recipe for disaster. It can become a springboard for that parent to assert control and make the lives of their former partner and children much more difficult.

8.2 Discussion

118It is in the child’s best interests that the mother has primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility for her. The evidence supports making orders that limit the mother’s obligation to engage with the father. The evidence does not support an order for joint decision-making responsibility for the child or for any allocation of decision-making responsibility to the father, with an exception for culture and religion. The court makes these findings for the following reasons:

a) The mother has been the victim of significant family violence. She should not be required to engage with her abuser. A joint decision-making responsibility order would expose her and the child to further family violence. This would risk destabilizing her and the child.

b) There is a considerable power imbalance between the parties. The father would likely use any element of joint decision-making responsibility to try and control the mother. The father is relentless and very difficult to deal with when he doesn’t get his own way.

c) There is not effective communication between the parties. This is more important with a young child. The poor communication is almost entirely attributable to the father.

d) The mother is the party who has tried to protect the child from conflict. The father is the party who perpetuates conflict. He has tried to undermine the mother by calling the police and the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto. He has abused her. He humiliates and embarrasses her.

e) The father acts unilaterally. He tried to change the child’s doctors and threatened to change the child’s daycare. He has controlled or tried to control documentation for the child.

f) The court has far more confidence in the mother’s judgment. She has made responsible and child-focused decisions for the child. The father often shows poor judgment and insight and makes decisions in an inappropriately reactive manner.

g) The mother is the parent who is far more likely to work cooperatively with the child’s daycare, school, doctors and service providers. The father will react with hostility when he does not get his own way. This pattern repeated itself with his recent dispute with the child’s daycare.

h) The child has thrived in the mother’s care. She was described in glowing terms by both parties. She is happy, healthy and meeting her developmental milestones. She is inquisitive, intelligent and loving. There is no basis to change the stable routine established by the mother.

i) The child’s closest relationship is with the mother.

j) The child has developed close relationships with the mother’s other children and with the maternal grandmother.

119The mother will not be required to consult with the father prior to making any major decision for the child. To require this would only expose her to harassment and abuse from him.

120The parties are both free to teach the child their culture and religion when the child is in their care.

121To assist the mother and the child’s daycares, schools, doctors and other service providers, the order will make clear that the mother is responsible for making all decisions about the child.

122Pursuant to subsection 28 (8) of the Act, the order will also make it clear to the father and the child’s daycares, schools, doctors and other service providers, that they have no obligation to communicate with the father or to provide him with information about the child. This means that the father will need to treat these people respectfully if he hopes to directly obtain information from them.

123The incidents of parenting sought by the mother are also in the child’s best interests. It is in the child’s best interests that the mother be able to obtain or renew government documentation for her and travel with her outside of Canada without obstruction. The father has already shown he will obstruct this. The court has no confidence he will reasonably cooperate in the future. His consent will be dispensed with.

124The travel terms sought by the mother are reasonable and will be ordered.

125The court will order that the mother shall hold all documentation for the child. She can provide the father with copies. See: Hachani v. Mauger, 2024 ONSC 3912; Botros v. Botros, 2022 ONSC 5911.

126The father sought an order that the child’s name cannot be changed without his consent or prior court order. He did not plead this relief. This relief was not sought in his original draft order for trial. He only raised the issue in his revised draft order in closing submissions. No evidence was called on the issue. The court will not make this order.

127The court finds the terms of communication sought by the mother in her draft order are in the child’s bests interests. She believes the communication regime established by Justice Daudlin have worked and is prepared to continue them. The order will provide that the mother shall provide a brief weekly update to the father about any information affecting the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, if the father is unable to obtain this information directly from the child’s daycares, schools, doctors or other service providers.

128The court will add some further communication terms to protect the mother and the child pursuant to section 28 of the Act. The father will be prohibited from coming within 100 meters of the mother, her home and her place of employment, with limited exceptions that will be set out in the order. The court is making this order to protect the mother and the child in case the father’s criminal release terms expire or change.

129The father’s inappropriate messages must stop. The court will give the mother sole discretion to stop using AppClose and close the account, if in her opinion, the father is violating the communication terms in this order.

130The court finds that the balance of the relief sought by the father not referred to in this decision is not in the child’s best interests. Those claims will be dismissed.

Part Nine – Parenting time

9.1 Legal considerations

131In determining the father’s parenting time, the court must consider the relevant best interests considerations set out in Parts 3 and 4 above.

132Subsection 24 (6) of the Act states that in allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

133The court’s unrelenting focus on the best interests of each particular child means that there can be no presumption in favour of any one type of parenting order. All things being equal, each child deserves to have a meaningful and consistent relationship with both parents. See: E.M.B. v. M.F.B. 2021 ONSC 4264; Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510.

134The most appropriate allocation of time in any given situation will depend on many factors including the child's age; temperament; stage of development; the relevant schedules and commitments of the child and each parent; and any other considerations relevant to the determination of the child's best interests. The parenting schedule must accord with the child's life - throughout the child’s schedule - including school-related matters, extra-curricular activities, and other events. See: Kaur v. Singh, 2025 ONSC 4122, S.K. v. D.P., 2022 ONSC 2359; B.M. v. D.M. ,2023 ONSC 2068.

135The party who seeks to reduce normal parenting time will usually be required to provide a justification for taking such a position. The greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. See: M.A. v. J.D. 2003 52807 (ON CJ), [2003] O.J. No. 2946 (OCJ); Dayboll v. Biyag, supra.

136In Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273 (Div. Ct.), the court wrote that while the AFCC-Ontario Parenting Guide (the Guide) is not binding law, Ontario courts have accepted the social science behind the Guide when making parenting orders in the best interests of young children. The Guide summarizes basic social science knowledge about the effects of parental separation on children, provides suggestions and guidance to help improve communication and cooperation between separated parents, and offer guidance about formulating parenting arrangements that meet the needs of children.

137The court in Tremblay-Chartier found that if a judge departs from the established and widely accepted social science research set out in the Guide, reasons are needed to depart from same.

138The Guide has a section titled, “Limits to Co-Parenting: Violence and Serious Wellness Issues.” It highlights the following:¹¹

While co-operation between parents and voluntary agreements are usually best for children, in cases where there are on-going family violence concerns, or one parent has serious mental health or substance abuse issues, voluntary arrangements may not be appropriate. In such cases, the protection afforded by the legal process and a Court Order may be essential to address the risk of harm to children. Further, it will only be possible to have a jointly made parenting plan if both parents are willing and able to communicate, co-operate and make child-focused plans.

139The Guide also includes a section entitled “Special Considerations in Making a Parenting Plan” which includes a heading “Family Violence”.¹² Excerpts of that section are as follows:

Family Violence

In some families, there has been violence between the parents. Violence between the spouses, even if not seen or heard by the child, exposes a child to emotional risk, and parents who are violent towards their partners may also abuse their children. Parenting plans in these families should include provisions to protect the child, including transitions in neutral places and limited contact between the parents. In some cases, contact with a violent or abusive parent may need to be supervised or suspended. Additionally, such parenting plans should include a counselling or treatment plan for the child to address the adverse effects of the family violence on the children.

In some situations where one parent is perpetrating coercive, controlling violence over the other parent, dominating their partner or instilling fear, the parents should not be developing their own plan. Rather, parenting plans should be court-mandated, and the court should consider including provisions for support services for the victim and child, interventions for the perpetrator, conditions to be met regarding perpetrator’s contact with the child, and consequences for violating orders.

9.2 Discussion

140This case falls within the Family Violence section described in the Guide because of the extensive family violence perpetrated by the father and the risks he poses to the mother and the child. The parenting schedules proposed in the Guide for cases without this special consideration are not in the child’s best interests. Here, it is in the child’s best interests that the court mandate the parenting time plan to protect the mother and the child. As recommended in the Guide, the court will include supervised parenting exchanges in neutral places and limit contact between the parties. It will limit the father’s parenting time until he can show for a sustained period that he can act in a responsible manner and not destabilize the mother and the child.

141The parenting time plan sought by the father is not in the child’s best interests. He has not demonstrated that he can consistently parent the child in a manner that protects the child from conflict. He has not come close to following the roadmap set out by Justice Daudlin in her November 18, 2025 decision.

142The court accepts the mother’s evidence that the child often returns from visits clingy and it takes her some time to re-establish the child’s routines. The court agrees with the mother that any increases in parenting time should be very gradual to monitor the child’s adjustment and the father’s conduct. The mother’s parenting time plan is child focused.

143The court is also concerned that the father would use extended parenting time as an instrument to control the mother and the child. His history informs the court that he would use that time to come up with further reasons to call the police, the Children’s Aid Society and make unwarranted abuse allegations against her. Another concern is that he would use additional parenting time to take the child to different doctors, as he has already been doing.

144The court’s only hesitation in ordering the parenting time plan proposed by the mother is that it might be too expansive given the father’s conduct. However, the court will order the mother’s parenting time plan with a few modifications for the following reasons:

a) This is the plan the mother believes is in the child’s best interests. The mother has given the court good reasons to trust her.

b) It gradually increases the length of the father’s parenting time on Saturdays and Sundays in a manner sensitive to the child’s developmental needs. It preserves the father’s Thursday parenting time that the child is used to, even though he can no longer attend at the daycare site.

c) The supervised parenting exchanges protect the mother and the child from being exposed to conflict and family violence. The court will add a term that the parenting time exchanges shall take place at a location designated by the mother.

d) Despite the court’s criticism of the father, he has parenting strengths including:

i) He has developed a close bond with the child.

ii) The child enjoys her visits with him.

iii) The Renew observation notes for the supervised visits and the supervised exchanges regarding the child’s interactions with the father were positive.

iv) The father comes to each visit. He is prepared to engage the child with activities at the visits. He reads with her and counts numbers with her.

v) The father takes the child to church each Sunday and the child enjoys this.

vi) The father teaches the child about her culture and religion.

e) The child has the opportunity during parenting time to develop relationships with members of the paternal family.

f) There has been some improvement in the father’s use of AppClose since the parties started using it again in January 2026.

145The court finds that cautiously extending the length of the weekend visits and making them every other week, as proposed by the mother, is in the child’s best interests. The extended time will allow the father and the child to particpate in more activities together. The visits won’t be as rushed.

146The alternate weekend schedule will reduce the pressure on the mother of having to constantly engage with the father. This should help her function better as a parent and is in the child’s best interests. It will reduce the potential of the child being exposed to adult conflict. Further, it is important for parents to have full uninterrupted weekends with their children. Weekends are precious time for families, particularly if the children and both parents have fairly rigid weekday commitments. See: H.P. v. L.V., 2020 ONSC 6023; Oriaku v. Ransome, 2021 ONCJ 660. Many activities for children are only open on weekends. Children should be able to enjoy this time with both parents. See: A.R. v. M.C., 2021 ONCJ 525; Donovan Bonnay v. Hines, 2022 ONSC 1747.

147The father’s alternate weekend parenting time will start on May 16, 2026. The father will not have parenting time on May 9 or May 10, 2026. The father’s Thursday parenting time will start on May 14, 2026. He will have no parenting time on May 7, 2026. There is not enough lead time to coordinate this visit.

148The father seeks specified holiday parenting time. Given the court’s significant concerns with his conduct, it will not make this order. The mother was open to giving the father extra parenting time on holidays and special occassions. She did this voluntarily in 2025. It will leave the amount of holiday parenting time in her discretion. It trusts her to act reasonably.

149The court dismisses the father’s request to have a right of first refusal to parent the child if the mother is unable to parent the child for more than over four hours. This is overly intrusive, controlling, and not in the child’s best interests.

150The court will order that all parenting exchanges shall take place through Renew or any other professional parenting time supervisor approved by the mother.¹³ It is not safe for the mother or the child to have direct parenting exchanges with the father.

151If Renew, or any other professional parenting time supervisor approved by the mother is not available to supervise any visit, that visit shall not take place.

152The court will not make an order for a non-professional to conduct the parenting exchanges. This did work when tried in case management. The father is very difficult to work with. The court wants a professional parenting time supervisor present to control the exchanges and keep written records of the exchanges. The court will add a term that the parties can use a different professional parenting time supervisor than Renew to provide them with some flexibility. However, this agency must be approved of by the mother.

153The mother proposal to pay 50% of Renew’s fees for the father’s weekend parenting time is very generous. The father does not appear to appreciate how unusual and generous this proposal is. The court understands that private supervision is expensive for the parties. However, supervised exchanges are required because of the father’s conduct. The father will be required to pay 50% of Renew’s fees for his weekend parenting time and all of Renew’s fees for any of his other parenting time, including Thursday and holiday parenting time. This fee arrangement shall also apply if the parties use a different professional parenting time supervisor.

154The father will be required to notify the mother in his Monday WhatsApp message if he will be exercising his Thursday and weekend parenting time (on the weeks he has weekend parenting time). If he fails to do so, parenting time will not take place.

155The court also will not order virtual and telephone parenting time, as requested by the father. This would force the mother to engage directly with him. Understandably, she finds engagement with him traumatic. The father has caused her to feel this way. There are consequences for his actions. Further, the court finds that there is too high a risk that the child will be exposed to abusive behaviour by the father to the mother if virutal and telephone parenting time is ordered.

Part Ten – Other parenting issues and the requirement for leave to return to court

156The father requested 151 terms in his closing submissions on April 15, 2026. Many were not pleaded or discussed during the trial. His draft order for trial only had 28 parenting terms. In short, his parenting proposals were “too much”, and not in the child’s best interests. With a few exceptions, as set out in the court’s orders, his claims are dismissed.

157The mother seeks an order that this case cannot be reviewed until September 2028. The court agrees with her that it is in the child’s best interests that this litigation end. Without boundaries, the father is likely to return the matter to court very soon based on a perceived slight or complaint.

158The Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction to impose a term requiring leave to bring a motion to change. The jurisdiction is under subrule 1 (6) and rule 2 of the Family Law Rules, and by importing 37.16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure through subrule 1 (7) of the Family Law Rules. See: Tiveron v Collins, 2017 O.J. No. 2989 (OCA); Guma v. Nedelcu, 2019 ONSC 3429; Watson v. Watson, 2023 ONCJ 435, per: Justice Carole Curtis; Obitulata-Ugwu v. Ugwu, 2024 ONCJ 586. Courts may order this relief when, as there is here, an unpaid costs order. See: W.H.C. v. W.C.M.C., 2024 ONCJ 327.

159The court will require the father to obtain leave of the court before he can bring any future proceeding in this court. This does not stop him from returning to court if he can provide a good reason for doing so. He should bring any such motion by Form 14B on notice to the mother. It is highly unlikely that leave will be granted in the next 18 months absent a significant change in circumstances. The child needs some peace and stability. The father will need to show the court a sustained period where:

a) He is treating the mother in a consistently respectful manner.

b) His communications with the mother are respectful and child focused.

c) He is not calling the police or the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto about the mother and the child.

d) He is not undermining the mother’s decisions. This means that he should not be taking the child to different professionals without the mother’s consent or causing disruption with the child’s daycare or school.

e) He is exercising consistent and positive parenting time.

f) He is following this court order.

g) His child support and costs payments are in good standing.

160The court also strongly suggests that the father see a mental health professional for an assessment. He needs professional help so he can develop some insight into his conduct and to develop strategies to manage his anger and self-regulation.

Part Eleven – Child support

161This was identified as an issue for trial, and the parties gave evidence about it. However, this issue was resolved in closing submissions.

162The mother proposed and the father agreed that the father will pay ongoing child support of $356 each month, starting on May 1, 2026, based on his 2025 income of $42,243. This is the Child Support Guidelines (the guidelines) table amount for one child.

163A shared parenting child support analysis starting on November 1, 2026, as requested by the father, is unnecessary because shared parenting is not being ordered.

Part Twelve – Conclusion

164A final order shall go on the following terms:

Primary residence and decision-making responsibility

a) The child shall have her primary residence with the mother.

b) The mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility for the child.

c) The mother shall be solely responsible for choosing the child’s daycare, school, medical providers and service providers.

d) The father has the right to ask for information about the child from any of the child’s daycares, schools, doctors and other service providers. However, they have no obligation to provide him with information about the child or to communicate with him. His right to ask for and receive information about the child is subject to this limitation.

e) If any of the child’s daycares, schools, doctors or other service providers are unwilling to provide the father with information about the child, the mother shall provide a brief update regarding important information about the child’s welfare, health and education to the father in her Thursday WhatsApp message.

f) The father has no authority to provide any of the child’s daycares, schools, doctors or service providers with any direction or instruction about the child.

g) Unless the child has a medical emergency, the father shall not take the child to see any doctor or health practitioner without the written consent of the mother. He shall immediately notify the mother if there is a medical emergency, or if the child becomes ill.

h) The father is not entitled to attend any medical appointment for the child without the written consent of the mother, except if the child has a medical emergency.

i) The mother may designate any person she chooses as an emergency contact, or as a person authorized to pick up and drop off the child from daycare or school, without the father’s consent.

j) Both parties have the right to instruct and teach the child about their culture and religion while the child is in their care.

k) The mother may obtain and renew all government documentation for the child, including passports, birth certificates and health cards, without the father’s consent.

l) The mother shall hold all government documentation for the child. She shall provide copies for the father. The father shall not apply for or renew any government documentation for the child.

m) The mother may travel internationally with the child for vacation purposes for up to 14 days, without the father’s consent. She shall provide the father with a detailed itinerary, including travel dates, flight information, and a contact number in the event of an emergency, at least 21 days before the proposed trip. She shall provide the father with make-up parenting time in the event the travel interferes with his scheduled parenting time.

n) The father shall not remove the child from the Province of Ontario without the mother’s prior written consent.

Parenting time

o) The father shall have parenting time with the child as follows:

i) Starting on May 16, 2026, every other Saturday and Sunday, on the same weekend, from 10:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m., on each day. There will be no parenting time on the weekend of May 9 and 10, 2026.

ii) Starting on May 14, 2026, every Thursday from 4 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. There will be no parenting time on Thursday May 7, 2026.

iii) If Mother’s Day falls on the father’s parenting time, the father will not have parenting time that day.

iv) If Father’s Day falls on the mother’s parenting time, the father shall have parenting time that day from 10:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.

v) Such further and other day parenting time, including day holiday parenting time, that the mother agrees to.

vi) Renew, or any other professional parenting time supervisor approved of by the mother, shall conduct all parenting exchanges at a location designated by the mother. If Renew, or another other professional parenting time supervisor chosen by the parties is unavailable to supervise any visit, that visit will not take place.

vii) The parties shall each pay 50% of Renew’s costs for the father’s weekend parenting time. The father shall pay all Renew’s costs for any of his other parenting time. This includes his Thursday and holiday parenting time. This fee arrangement shall also apply to the use of any other professional parenting time supervisor used by the parties.

viii) The father shall notify the mother by Monday each week in his AppClose message whether he will be exercising his Thursday parenting time that week. He shall also notify her in his AppClose message by Monday in each week that he is scheduled to have weekend parenting time whether he will be exercising that parenting time. If he fails to do so, the visits shall not take place.

ix) In the event the child is too sick to attend a visit, the mother shall notify the father as soon as possible and arrange a make-up visit.

Communication

p) All contact and communication terms are subject to any criminal release terms pertaining to the father.

q) The parties shall communicate in writing only through AppClose.

r) The communications between the parties should be limited to essential, child-related matters. The communication must be respectful. They shall not discuss adult relationship issues.

s) Except to notify the other of any unforeseen changes to parenting exchanges (for example lateness or the child’s illness), or to advise of and acknowledge receipt of tasks that must occur during the father’s parenting time (for instance, the administration of medication), the father’s communication shall be limited to one message to the mother by AppClose on Mondays. The mother shall communicate any response to the father by Thursdays.

t) The mother may stop using AppClose and close the account, if in her opinion, the father is violating the communication terms in this order.

u) Pursuant to section 28 of the Act, the father shall not contact or communicate with the mother, except in accordance with the terms of this order. Except for conducting parenting exchanges through Renew, or another professional parenting time supervisor, a medical emergency for the child, and for attendance at court, he shall not come within 100 meters of the mother, her home or her place of employment.

v) The parties shall keep each other informed as to their current contact information, including their telephone number, email address and residential address.

w) Neither party shall make negative comments about the other party in the presence of the child.

Child support

x) The father shall pay child support to the mother of $356 each month, starting on May 1, 2026. This is the guidelines table amount for one child, based on an annual income of $42,243. The temporary support orders previously made will end as of April 30, 2026.

y) The father shall provide the mother, by June 30th each year, with complete copies of his income tax returns, including all schedules and attachments, and copies of his notices of assessment.

z) A support deduction order shall issue.

Other orders

aa) The father shall not bring any future proceeding in this court without prior leave of the court. If he seeks leave, he is to serve and file a Form 14B motion, together with an affidavit not exceeding five pages.

bb) If either party seeks costs, they shall serve and file their written costs submissions by May 20, 2026. The other party will then have until June 3, 2026, to serve and file their written response (not make their own submissions). The submissions shall be no more than 3 pages, double-spaced and in minimum 12-point font, not including any bill of costs or offer to settle. The submissions may be delivered to the trial coordinator’s office on the second floor of the courthouse or emailed to the trial coordinator at:

47Sheppard.OCJ.Family.Trialcoordinator@ontario.ca

cc) All other claims by the parties not dealt with above are dismissed.

dd) This order terminates all temporary orders.

ee) The mother’s counsel shall promptly have this order issued. The father’s approval of the order as to form and content is dispensed with.

165The father should consider himself fortunate that the mother took what the court views as generous positions about parenting and child support. If the mother had sought further parenting restrictions for him, the court would have seriously considered ordering them. If she had sought retroactive child support and an imputation of his income, there is a good chance this would have been ordered.

166It is time for the father to look inward, stop blaming others, take responsibility for this situation and make meaningful changes in his life. He should obtain professional help to do this.

167The court encourages the mother to promptly return to court if she believes the father is breaching the terms of this order. If the father’s conduct described in this decision repeats itself, there is a very good chance that further restrictions will be placed on him. He is strongly cautioned that these restrictions may include supervision of his parenting time, a reduction in his parenting time, or even a suspension of his parenting time. The court hopes that these steps will not be necessary.

Released: May 6, 2026

Justice Stanley B. Sherr

Witness not excused from answering questions tending to criminate

9 (1) A witness shall not be excused from answering any question upon the ground that the answer may tend to criminate the witness or may tend to establish his or her liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of any person or to a prosecution under any Act of the Legislature. 

Answer not to be used in evidence against witness

(2) If, with respect to a question, a witness objects to answer upon any of the grounds mentioned in subsection (1) and if, but for this section or any Act of the Parliament of Canada, he or she would therefore be excused from answering such question, then, although the witness is by reason of this section or by reason of any Act of the Parliament of Canada compelled to answer, the answer so given shall not be used or receivable in evidence against him or her in any civil proceeding or in any proceeding under any Act of the Legislature. 

Footnotes

1. 1The mother initially sought child support from the father retroactive to May 1, 2024, based on an imputed annual income to him of $56,093. She also sought a contribution to the child’s special and extraordinary expenses. In closing submissions, she advised the court she was no longer seeking these additional support orders.
2. 2The father deposed he was in a prior ceremonial marriage. He said it was not a legal marriage.
3. 3Most of this evidence came from the father’s affidavit, sworn on April 20, 2026, in support of his Form 14B motion.
4. 4Justice Daudlin instructed the parties to prepare draft orders for the trial. They did this. The father included 28 terms in his draft order. In closing argument, the father submitted a new draft order with 151 terms. The court will only summarize his requests for relief in this decision. Many of the terms were not pleaded. The court considered these terms in making this decision but will not address each of them individually.
5. 5On May 4, 2026, the father revised his request to two mid-week visits each week from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m.
6. 6The father initially asked that the child be picked up at the daycare for mid-week parenting exchanges. However, since the daycare is no longer an option, the father requested on May 4, 2026, that the parenting exchanges take place at a public library near his home.
7. 7The mother provided a chart of these messages in Exhibit C of her affidavit.
8. 8The father claims the Ministry just sent him the renewed health card – he did not apply for it. Given his poor credibility and reliability, the court is not willing to accept his evidence in the absence of corroborating documentation.
9. 9Section 9 of the Ontario Evidence Act reads as follows:
10. 10It will be up to the criminal court to determine if the charges are proved beyond any reasonable doubt and if the father will be convicted of any of the charges. The family court applies a much lower standard of proof.
11. 11See page 6 of the Guide.
12. 12See page 46 of the Guide
13. 13The mother had proposed that if Renew is unavailable she will directly exchange the child with the father in her apartment lobby. The court will not order this because of safety concerns.