Property Tax Assessment - OCA

The appeal concerns who is liable for outstanding municipal taxes in a receiver's sale of assets with an approval and vesting order (AVO).

The motion judge found the purchaser liable because the taxes were not yet due at closing.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that under s. 307(3) of the Municipal Act, liability for the taxes arose on January 1 of the relevant taxation years, prior to closing.

Therefore, the liability remained with the vendor (the receiver) and was vested out of the purchased assets by the AVO.

The moving party sought a panel review of a single judge's order that dismissed her request for an extension of time to review a previous order denying leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in principle in the single judge's decision that the moving party failed to provide evidence of intention to review, lacked an explanation for the delay, and that the underlying proposed appeal lacked merit.

The appellant, a hookah lounge, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal smoking and vaping by-law.

The appellant argued that changes to Schedule A of the by-law, which lists set fines and short-form offence wording, after its enactment and municipal consent, invalidated the by-law.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's decision, holding that the changes to Schedule A were made by the Regional Senior Justice under the authority of the Provincial Offences Act to establish set fines, which is a judicial function, and did not alter the substance of the by-law's prohibitions.

The court found Schedule A was a placeholder and its changes did not invalidate the by-law.

The appellant appealed a permanent injunction that prevented the operation of his tavern, Paradise Night Club, without a municipal business license.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision.

The court found that the municipal Business Licensing By-law applied to the appellant's business and did not conflict with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario under the Liquor Licence and Control Act, 2019.

The court reiterated that a business can be required to hold multiple licenses and that an injunction to enforce a bylaw should only be refused in exceptional circumstances, which were not present in this case.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, appealed a judgment denying her application to set aside a municipal tax sale of a property previously owned by her deceased parents.

She argued the municipality failed to provide her with proper notice of the sale and acted in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the municipality strictly complied with the notice requirements under the Municipal Act, 2001 by sending registered letters to the assessed owners at their last known addresses.

The court held that the municipality owed no additional duty of good faith to notify the appellant, who had not registered her interest on title or updated the municipal tax rolls.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against the City of Toronto and its representative regarding property tax arrears.

The motion judge had found her claims were statute-barred and that the City was entitled to collect the arrears.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in his conclusions, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, and should not have granted summary judgment while her claim against her former solicitor remained outstanding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no risk of conflicting judgments.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the acquittal of the City of Greater Sudbury on charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a fatal construction accident involving heavy equipment backing up without a signaller.

The Crown argued that the courts below erred in their interpretation of the definitions of "constructor" and "employer" under the OHSA.

The motion judge granted leave to appeal on the narrow ground that the interpretation of "employer" in the OHSA engaged a question of law alone of public interest, specifically whether a municipality contracting out infrastructure work could fall within the definition of "employer" based on the degree of control it exercises over the project.

The appellants purchased two parcels of land in an unorganized township in the District of Parry Sound and sought a declaration that Trussler Road, which crossed respondents' private property, was a public highway.

The appellants claimed the road qualified as a public highway under section 261 of the Municipal Act based on colonization road status, statute labour, or dedication and acceptance.

The motion judge dismissed the claims on all grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants failed to establish dedication and acceptance on the evidence.

The court found the use of the road was consistent with neighbourly tolerance rather than public dedication.

The appellant, a property developer, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash an Interim Control By-Law (ICBL) enacted by the Township of Muskoka Lakes.

The ICBL restricted permitted uses within a designated area to those lawfully existing on the date of enactment and required such uses to be conducted entirely within existing buildings.

The appellant had obtained 11 building permits for a 43-unit condominium development with recreational amenities, had commenced construction, and had undertaken extensive site servicing work, all with Township approval.

The application judge dismissed the appeal, finding the property was not exempt under the Planning Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the development should be viewed as an integrated whole and that the issuance of 11 building permits for constituent elements of the development provided protection under section 34(9)(b) of the Planning Act.

The court found no genuine planning justification for the ICBL and noted it appeared designed to appease local opposition rather than serve legitimate planning purposes.

The appellants constructed a detached garage on their property pursuant to a building permit issued by the respondent municipality.

During construction, the appellants accessed an unopened road allowance (Ninth Street).

After completion, the respondent took the position that access via Ninth Street was not permitted and blocked the street with concrete barriers.

The appellants sued seeking removal of the barriers, an easement, or damages for breach of promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation, plus punitive damages.

The trial judge dismissed all claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding negligence, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, or punitive damages.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their negligence action arising from an injury sustained at a municipal winter festival.

The plaintiff was injured when she struck a piece of hardened ice protruding from a snow slide at the City of Barrie's Winterfest event.

The trial judge found that while the injury was caused by the ice, the municipality had not breached the standard of care in maintaining the slide.

The appellants raised three grounds of appeal challenging the characterization of the ice as "small," the trial judge's inference from hearsay evidence, and the standard of care analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment on all grounds, finding no palpable and overriding error.

On appeal from a Divisional Court decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) had jurisdiction to impose a 25 percent cap on the alternative parkland dedication requirement under section 42 of the Planning Act.

The Town of Richmond Hill had adopted an Official Plan policy allowing for parkland dedication at a rate of one hectare per 300 dwelling units.

Developers challenged this policy, and the OMB imposed a 25 percent cap on the amount of land required to be conveyed.

The Divisional Court set aside the cap, finding the OMB lacked authority to impose it.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the legislature has given municipalities exclusive authority to determine the rate under section 42(3), subject only to the requirement that an Official Plan contain specific policies dealing with parkland provision and the use of the alternative requirement.

The OMB's role is limited to reviewing whether such policies are appropriate and accord with provincial policies, not to set or cap the rate itself.

A tragic motor vehicle accident occurred on November 22, 2000, when a 20-year-old driver lost control of her vehicle on a snow-covered regional road during a winter storm and collided with an oncoming school bus, sustaining catastrophic injuries.

The plaintiff and her family sued the municipality for negligence, alleging failure to maintain the road in a reasonable state of repair under the Municipal Act.

At trial, the municipality was found 100% liable for approximately $12 million in damages.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the trial judge's findings regarding statutory defences under sections 284(1.2) and 284(1.3) of the Municipal Act and the trial judge's rejection of a contributory negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding that the municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of road refreezing and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the hazardous conditions that caused the accident.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice in which the trial judge determined that the site occupied by the appellant belonged to the City of Toronto and that the appellant was not authorized to place his property there.

The appellant raised substantially the same arguments on appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's determination regarding ownership of the site was a question of fact and that no palpable and overriding error had been committed.

The conclusion that the City had the authority to remove and destroy the appellant's property was well-founded.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded.

On appeal from a trial judgment finding the municipal defendants liable for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident on a rural road during winter conditions.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's interpretation and application of the Municipal Act, 2001 duty to clear roads of snow and ice.

The trial judge found the road in a state of non-repair and held the municipality failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or correct the condition.

The appellants argued the trial judge applied an unreasonably high standard of maintenance for a Class 4 rural road, erred in requiring the application of straight salt rather than sand/salt mixture, and excluded relevant evidence regarding financial costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, set aside the liability findings, and ordered a new trial on liability issues while upholding the damages assessment.

The respondent, who operated a body rub parlour licensed by the City of Vaughan, was charged with contravening a municipal by-law governing the hours of operation of body rub parlours.

He challenged the constitutionality of the by-law, arguing it was ultra vires the municipality because it constituted criminal law.

A justice of the peace and the Ontario Court of Justice agreed, finding the provisions were criminal in pith and substance and invaded federal authority.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the pith and substance of the hours of operation provision was business licensing, falling within provincial authority over property and civil rights and licensing.

The court found the lower courts erred by focusing exclusively on extrinsic evidence while ignoring intrinsic evidence, and by failing to recognize that municipalities may legislate to suppress conditions conducive to crime when anchored in a valid provincial head of power.

The appellant's property was sold in a municipal tax sale, resulting in a surplus of over $76,000 which was paid into court.

The appellant missed the one-year statutory deadline to apply for payment out of court by three weeks, resulting in a deemed forfeiture of the funds to the municipality under s. 380(6) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The application judge held he lacked jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act provides jurisdiction to grant relief from the deemed forfeiture, as the statutory scheme does not expressly or implicitly preclude it.

The court granted relief from forfeiture and ordered the surplus paid to the appellant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a property tax exemption for premises it leases in four buildings.

The appellant argued that section 10 of the YMCA Act, which exempts 'buildings, lands... of the said association', should be interpreted broadly to include leased premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a leasehold interest is not 'land' or 'property of' the association within the meaning of the Assessment Act and the YMCA Act.

The exemption requires an ownership interest, and the plain meaning of the statute does not extend to leased properties.

The appellant operated travel-related kiosks at a major airport and challenged municipal realty tax liability on the basis that its agreement with the airport authority created only a licence, not a tenancy, under the Assessment Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the issue was one of pure contractual interpretation and legal characterization, reviewable on a correctness standard, and that the agreement as a whole unambiguously created a landlord-tenant relationship.

The court further held that the appellant's leased premises did not qualify as "eligible property" under s. 331 of the Municipal Act, 2001 because the appellant could not bring the premises within any enumerated statutory category.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs.

The appellants challenged a Divisional Court decision that held development lands zoned for industrial and commercial use could not receive farm land assessment treatment because agricultural use was illegal under the zoning by-laws.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 19(3) of the Assessment Act focuses on actual use of the land as a factual matter, not on zoning legality, and that the ordinary meaning of the provision should govern absent compelling contrary indicators.

The court found no basis to read the word “lawfully” into the statute, noted the legislative scheme and policy favoured continued agricultural production, and concluded the Ontario Municipal Board reasonably found the lands were farm lands used only for farm purposes.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and the Board's order was restored.