Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellants laid a private Information against an organization for allegedly recruiting volunteers for a foreign armed force.

The Crown intervened and withdrew the charge, citing no reasonable prospect of conviction.

The appellants applied for certiorari, alleging abuse of process.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding a lack of standing and jurisdiction, and alternatively, that the appellants failed to meet the evidentiary threshold for abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Superior Court does have jurisdiction and private informants do have standing to seek certiorari in these circumstances, the application judge correctly concluded that the appellants failed to meet the high evidentiary threshold to show abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call rebuttal evidence, failing to apply the W.(D.) framework to defence evidence, and admitting unauthenticated Snapchat screenshots.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to admit the rebuttal evidence as it responded to a new issue raised by the defence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof or the admission of the electronic evidence, which met the low threshold for authentication.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with pre-sentence custody credited on a 1:1 basis.

The sentencing judge denied enhanced credit on the mistaken belief that the appellant's bail had been revoked.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found this was a material factual misunderstanding.

Applying the principles from Summers, the Court held the appellant was entitled to enhanced credit of 1.5:1, as there was no evidence to rebut the inference that he had lost eligibility for early release.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced accordingly.

The appellant was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on several firearm offences due to insufficient evidence of constructive possession.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari and mandamus, and the application judge quashed the discharge and committed the appellant for trial.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in her consideration of the evidence as a whole, and that any error in assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence was not jurisdictional and therefore not reviewable on certiorari.

The appellants were convicted of aggravated assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a stay based on unreasonable delay, allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of a key witness who was out of the country to be read in under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and providing incomplete written instructions to the jury during deliberations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay analysis but held the trial judge erred in admitting the preliminary hearing evidence without considering technological alternatives like videoconferencing.

The Court also found the trial judge's written jury instructions were unbalanced and compromised trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant of the most serious offences due to grave doubts about the complainant's credibility, but convicted him of sexual assault based entirely on a statement made to a police officer.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by focusing solely on whether the statement was made, without determining whether it was truthful, especially since the complainant's evidence did not correspond to the act described in the statement.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury regarding the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant admitted to causing the victim's death but claimed he lacked the intent for murder due to intoxication and the minimal force used.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to link the 'common sense inference' of intent to the specific manner of death (venal asphyxiation) and by improperly applying the thin skull principle to the issue of intent rather than causation.

These errors compromised the defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately address conflicting expert evidence on the effects of crack cocaine and the complainant's capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was alive to the dispute between the experts and that it was open to him to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the appellant's account.

The court further held that, even if the treatment of the expert evidence was inadequate, the conviction remained supported by the accepted evidence that the complainant was unable to move, speak, or think clearly and did not consent.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation arising from allegations by a child family member, arguing that the trial judge conflated credibility with reliability, misapprehended material parts of the defence evidence, and applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge expressly considered both credibility and reliability, properly applied the criminal burden of proof, and was entitled to assess the child's evidence in light of her age.

The court further held that no material misapprehension tainted the rejection of the appellant's denial and that the trial judge did not impose a harsher standard on the defence evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing it was inconsistent with the parity principle compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge had a basis to conclude the appellant's culpability was greater, as his identification was found in a bag containing weapons, drugs, and cash.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of sexual abuse, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar fact evidence, excluding a decision of the College of Physicians and Surgeons, and permitting cross-examination on prior complaints.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the test for concoction regarding the similar fact evidence, properly exercised his discretion to exclude the College decision due to prejudicial effect, and appropriately instructed the jury on the use of prior complaints for assessing credibility.

The appellant's conviction for first degree murder was previously substituted with a conviction for second degree murder by the Court of Appeal.

The parties agreed the Court should fix the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the appellant sought 12 years.

The Court considered the aggravating circumstances of the cold-blooded shooting over a drug debt, balanced against the appellant's significant rehabilitation during eight years in custody.

The Court fixed the period of parole ineligibility at 12 years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for mischief and break and enter.

The Crown conceded that fresh evidence should be admitted and that, in light of this evidence, the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial on both charges.

The appellants were investigated by Revenue Canada for claiming fraudulent limited partnership losses related to software valuation.

Search warrants were issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on an outside consultant's opinion, which the deponent incorrectly described as a 'valuation report'.

The appellants applied to quash the warrants, arguing the ITO was deceptive and improperly relied on hearsay.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no deliberate deception and that the remaining information was sufficient to issue the warrants.

The appellants appealed.

The Crown moved to quash the appeal as moot because the seized items had been returned and no charges laid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

On the merits, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the mischaracterization was not deliberate and that the deponent was entitled to rely on hearsay from other Revenue Canada employees and hired consultants.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was not obliged to articulate a Vetrovec warning and adequately cautioned himself regarding a witness's evidence.

However, the Crown conceded the sentence was illegal.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the probation period from two years to one year and varying the assault sentence to one year concurrent to correct the illegality.

The Crown appealed a costs order made against it by a bail review judge.

The bail review judge had awarded costs due to the Crown and police's failure to bring a victim's statement to court, which was characterized as sloppy conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, finding no Charter breach and that the conduct did not reach the level warranting costs against the Crown, as the respondent suffered no prejudice.

Armstrong J.A. dissented, finding the police conduct went beyond mere sloppiness and justified the costs order.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding stolen vehicles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that information retrieved by a U.S. customs officer from a computer system was not gathered in Canada merely because it referred to Canadian auto thefts.

The Court also found ample evidence of identification and that the vehicles were stolen, noting the appellant had placed false VIN numbers over the original ones.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial because it could not be certain from the trial judge's reasons that the defences of reflex response or self-defence were properly addressed.

The appellant, who acted as the getaway driver in two robberies, appealed his sentence of 18 months' incarceration.

He argued for a conditional sentence or a shorter reformatory term, citing his youth, lack of criminal record, and the lesser sentences of his accomplices.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence but found the 18-month term failed to adequately reflect the disparity between the appellant's role and that of his accomplices, as well as his mitigating factors.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was reduced to 12 months' incarceration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud arising from the operation of a food bank.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended accomplice evidence, failed to apply a Vetrovec warning, and erred in drawing inferences from fraudulent non-profit receipts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, sufficient caution applied to the accomplice's testimony, and that the trial judge's inferences regarding the receipts were reasonably supported by the record.