Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud, uttering forged documents, and breach of probation arising from the purchase of jewellery using fraudulent cheques.

On appeal, she sought to introduce a bank statement as fresh evidence to show she believed she had sufficient funds.

The Court of Appeal declined to admit the fresh evidence, finding it was not genuine based on a sworn statement from a bank investigator.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper analysis of the circumstantial evidence regarding her mental state, concluding the evidence of her fraudulent intent was overwhelming.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and robbery and appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her R. v. Grant analysis by characterizing the impact of a s. 10(b) Charter breach (unreasonable delay in access to counsel of choice) as "neutral," when it should have weighed in favour of exclusion.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that even if the impugned evidence (satchel and knife) had been excluded, the remaining overwhelming identification evidence would have inevitably led to the same convictions.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to lack of submissions.

The appellants, inmates at a medium-security penitentiary, appealed their convictions for assault, sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and robbery against another inmate.

One appellant also appealed his indeterminate sentence following a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, sufficient reasons for credibility findings, and no Charter breach from missing security footage.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community on a long-term supervision order.

The appellants, Derek Oppong and Akido Thomas, appealed their convictions and sentences for kidnapping-related offences with a firearm, committed for the benefit of a criminal organization.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence on gang activity, claiming it was unnecessary and biased, and in refusing to reconsider its admissibility after proposed factual admissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's discretion in admitting expert evidence for contextual understanding and finding no material change in circumstances that would warrant its exclusion.

The court also upheld Mr. Oppong's sentence, finding evidence supported his leadership role in the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import heroin and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 3.5 months.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal regarding conviction: (1) inadequate jury instruction on the limited use of a co-accused's out-of-court statement, and (2) failure to hold a jury inquiry due to alleged juror bias.

The appellant also appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give effect to rehabilitation and failed to consider the lower purity of the heroin as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no manifest unfitness in the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated December 21, 2016, which ordered his continued detention in maximum security at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant had previously been detained at Ontario Shores with community privileges.

He advanced two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board misapprehended evidence regarding when he decompensated after being moved to the minimum-security unit; and second, that the Board failed to address the impact of a medication change on his behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and confirming that the Board was aware of and properly considered the medication change in its decision.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import and importing heroin following a jury trial.

He received concurrent sentences of 16 years in penitentiary, less 4 months pre-disposition credit.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on six grounds, including issues relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators' exception, post-arrest statements, travel history evidence, and jury instructions regarding a Vetrovec witness.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and, while granting leave to appeal sentence, dismissed the sentence appeal as well.

The appellant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, and was sentenced to nine months in jail.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for the disparity between his sentence and the 90-day intermittent sentence imposed on his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit and the sentencing judge properly considered the parity principle, noting material differences between the offenders such as the co-accused making full restitution.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with a sleeping woman.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of consent, failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and admitting text messages into evidence.

He also appealed his 15-month sentence, introducing fresh evidence that he faced deportation as a permanent resident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence as the victim was asleep.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a sentence of less than six months to avoid deportation would be manifestly unfit for the offence.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that an unexplained 28-minute delay between the first and second breath samples meant the samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable' under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge correctly applied the law by looking at the whole chain of events and that the Crown is not required to provide a detailed explanation for every minute the accused is in custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his explanation for DNA evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of intoxicated witnesses, and misused evidence of vaginal bleeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and that she did not err in her treatment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 35 months (plus 61 months pre-trial custody credit) for aggravated assault and use of a firearm.

He had used a handgun to threaten a 12-year-old boy who provided information to police, firing the gun and severely injuring the boy via ricochet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the prevalence of witness intimidation and by failing to properly consider his youth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the facts of the offence spoke for themselves regarding intimidation, and the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's youth against his extensive record and the gravity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to fairly outline the position of the defence in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the charge was perfunctory, the failure to detail the evidence did not amount to reversible error.

The case turned entirely on credibility, as the evidence of the appellant and police officers were diametrically opposed, and the trial judge gave a proper W.D. instruction.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for arson.

She argued the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence expert's evidence and that the finding of exclusive opportunity to start the fire was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly evaluated the expert evidence and that there was ample evidence to support the finding that the fire started when the appellant was alone in the house.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not improperly use lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and the sentence fell within the acceptable range.

The appellant and two co-accused were jointly charged with sexual assault.

The jury convicted the appellant but acquitted the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdicts were unreasonably inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that independent confirmatory evidence against the appellant, including DNA evidence and after-the-fact conduct, provided a rational basis for the jury to distinguish his culpability from that of his co-accused.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to cross-examination on prior sexual history, the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and the admission of post-offence conduct.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed the ten-year driving prohibition imposed for impaired driving causing bodily harm, having already served the custodial portion of his sentence.

The appellant sought a four-year prohibition, while the Crown agreed that ten years was outside the range but submitted that five years was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown, granting leave to appeal, allowing the appeal, and reducing the driving prohibition from ten years to five years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to apply the W.(D.) framework properly and misapprehended material evidence regarding the appellant's driving and alleged motive for racing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed himself on the law and that his findings of fact were supported by the evidence, making the convictions reasonable.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed following guilty pleas to multiple historical sexual assaults against the respondent's daughters and nieces, together with assaults against family members.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge materially misapprehended the evidence by treating repeated sexual abuse counts as isolated incidents, thereby minimizing the seriousness of the offences and the prolonged breach of trust.

The court distinguished the authority relied on below and held that a conditional sentence could not satisfy denunciation and general deterrence for repeated child sexual abuse in a parental and familial context.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a total custodial sentence of 28 months with six months' credit, resulting in 22 months' imprisonment.

The appellant, a senior airport customs inspector, was convicted of importing cannabis and breach of trust after escorting two individuals carrying drugs through customs.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that the trial judge's jury instructions on the meaning of reasonable doubt were defective in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in R. v. Lifchus and R. v. Starr.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge, considered as a whole, did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the standard of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.