Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The applicant sought leave to appeal her convictions and sentences for driving without insurance and surrendering false evidence of insurance.

She had been convicted at an ex parte trial and fined $12,500, which she argued she could not afford.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal the convictions, finding no viable due diligence defence.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, noting the appeal judge failed to inquire into the applicant's financial circumstances or consider relief from the mandatory minimum fines under s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant was convicted of a multi-million dollar fraud arising from an investment scheme.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that a forensic accountant employed by the OSC should have been disqualified from testifying due to bias, and that his pre-trial Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was improperly dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's evidence was primarily factual tracing and his prior involvement did not automatically disqualify him.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the Rowbotham application, as the appellant had failed to be transparent about his financial resources.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding police had objectively reasonable grounds for his arrest and in failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police had received a tip and observed the appellant making a series of short stops over two days.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the pattern of conduct, combined with the tip, removed the possibility of innocent coincidence and provided a credibly based probability of drug trafficking.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's receipt being found in the complainant's stolen purse and the complainant's wallet being found near the appellant's residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational inference was the appellant's guilt.

The respondent pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling-house and committing sexual assault under s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge initially imposed a SOIRA order but later rescinded it, concluding that s. 348(1)(b) was not a designated offence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while s. 348(1)(b) is not listed as a designated offence, the respondent was sentenced under s. 348(1)(d), which is a designated offence.

Therefore, the SOIRA order was mandatory.

The appellant pled guilty to eight offences related to a large-scale ephedrine exportation business, including money laundering and tax evasion, and was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing a custodial sentence instead of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the custodial sentence was fit for a sophisticated, large-scale fraud enterprise.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of fraud over $5,000 after persuading victims to give him money to invest, which was never returned.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing his Charter application regarding alleged police misconduct without a voir dire, and by improperly assessing his father's defence evidence.

He also appealed his 12-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Kutynec threshold to the Charter application and made no error in assessing the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit for a large-scale fraud involving exploitation of relationships.

The appellant, a chiropractor, appealed his sexual assault conviction arising from an incident where he massaged a patient's back with a tool while surreptitiously masturbating.

The appellant argued the contact was purely therapeutic and non-sexual.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a reasonable observer would find the contact sexual in nature and that the complainant's sexual integrity had been violated without her consent.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 17 months and 14 days' custody, along with a forfeiture order for his van, cellular phone, and cash.

He appealed the sentence and the forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding it fit given the appellant's record and the fact he was on bail for the same offence.

However, the Court set aside the forfeiture order, concluding the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the van, phone, or cash were offence-related property, as there was no evidence linking them to the commission of the offence.

The Crown appealed a sentence where the trial judge set aside a notice of prior conviction under s. 255 of the Criminal Code, relying on a provincial appellate decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada subsequently reversed that decision, meaning the trial judge erred by failing to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 days.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and imposed the 120-day sentence, but stayed it because the respondent had already served a full 12-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence, resolving inconsistencies regarding the colour of his pants, and applying the burden of proof under W. (D.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the investigating officer's identification was corroborated by ample circumstantial evidence and that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and the dangers of uncorroborated identification evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider his evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge accepted the appellant's evidence about the ten-second episode but concluded that by deliberately showing off and squealing his tires, the appellant left himself too little time to correct his accidental acceleration.

The findings were open to the trial judge on the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding a prior altercation and by permitting cross-examination on his prior criminal record under a Corbett ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no realistic danger of propensity reasoning regarding the prior altercation, which the defence had relied upon.

The Court also deferred to the trial judge's Corbett ruling, noting that clear limiting instructions were given to the jury regarding the prior convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of administering a stupefying substance.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and the trial judge erred in relying on the complainants' conservative sexual nature to assess consent.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence, including expert toxicological testimony that the complainants' symptoms were not caused by alcohol alone.

The court concluded the complainants were drugged and rendered unconscious, making them incapable of consenting to sexual activity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued that a subsequent demand made by a breathalyzer technician without reasonable and probable grounds invalidated the initial valid roadside demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the initial demand was a continuing demand that remained in force until complied with, and the subsequent demand was merely a good faith attempt to give the appellant a further opportunity to comply.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including the adequacy of the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and after-the-fact conduct, the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's review of the evidence, and the handling of a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or handling of the trial.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, upholding the 14-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearm possession offences.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a sentence of time served (11 months).

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed an additional nine months of incarceration.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to explain why the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and by not affording counsel an opportunity to make further submissions.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to time served.

The Crown appealed an order quashing authorizations to take DNA samples from two respondents convicted of multiple murders.

The central issue was the interpretation of section 487.055(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which permits DNA sampling for offenders convicted of 'more than one murder committed at different times'.

The Court of Appeal rejected the application judge's 'transaction' analysis but affirmed the result, holding that 'different times' requires the murders to be distinguishable in nature or quality.

Because the murders committed by both respondents occurred in close proximity and were not distinguishable in nature or quality, the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his common-law wife.

At trial, the primary issue was whether the appellant had the requisite intent, given his intoxication and mental disorder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding his voir dire testimony, evidence of his violent disposition, and the issue of intention, and appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 14 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder in the hatchet killing of the victim.

He argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on consciousness of guilt, the admissibility of tattoo evidence, the Crown's theory of an attack on an unknown victim, and the charge on reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a 'no probative value' instruction for post-offence conduct was not required because the conduct was relevant to identifying the murderer.

The court also held that the pre-Lifchus jury charge on reasonable doubt substantially complied with the required standard.