Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The victim of an assault sought leave to intervene in a Crown appeal of a disposition by the Ontario Review Board regarding the accused, who had been found not criminally responsible.

The victim sought to argue for a geographic boundary restriction, an issue the Crown had raised unsuccessfully at the board but did not appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that permitting the victim to intervene would unfairly prejudice the accused by raising an issue not raised by the parties.

The court noted that the victim's concerns had been articulated by the Crown, whose responsibility it is to speak for the community regarding public safety.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that a 13-minute delay in obtaining an alcohol screening device violated his right to counsel and that the failure to use a N.I.S.T. thermometer raised a reasonable doubt about the breath test results.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were case-specific, did not raise questions of general importance to the administration of justice, and lacked strong merit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as his 18-month consecutive sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant deposited a shank in a fellow inmate's pocket at a detention centre.

The sole ground of the conviction appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and rejecting the appellant's claims that counsel coerced him not to testify or failed to pursue evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 18-month consecutive sentence fit given the appellant's horrendous criminal record, even when considering the totality principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for ten offences, including attempted aggravated assault and discharge of a firearm, arising from an incident at an auto repair shop.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, the presumption of possession for a driver, and attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the identification charge adequate, applying the curative proviso to a minor error regarding possession, and upholding the attempted murder instruction based on the appellant's conduct.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his application to re-open a sending order made under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA).

The application judge had treated the application as a Wilson application and dismissed it, finding no material non-disclosure in the original ex parte proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held that it had no jurisdiction under s. 35 of the MLACMA to hear an appeal from a Wilson order, as such an order is made pursuant to the court's inherent jurisdiction, not under the Act.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code.

Based on fresh evidence, the Crown conceded the conviction could not stand, but the appellant agreed he was guilty of the lesser included offence of unauthorized possession of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for the lesser included offence and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the original sentence remained fit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5000 for his role in a massive investment scheme.

At sentencing, while unrepresented, he disputed many facts but the trial judge refused to strike the plea and sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment and ordered $35.6 million in restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and that the undisputed facts satisfied the elements of fraud.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the restitution order to $20 million to better reflect the appellant's degree of criminal responsibility and the funds he retained control over.

The appellant was convicted ex parte of driving while his licence was suspended and sentenced to 10 days in jail and a $7,500 fine.

He appealed, arguing that the ex parte trial provisions of the Provincial Offences Act violated his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 11(d).

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the ex parte trial provisions, finding that they merely provide a mechanism for proceeding when a defendant fails to appear.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the appellant offered no valid explanation for his non-attendance.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the fine was reduced to the statutory minimum of $5,000 because the trial judge provided no reasons for exceeding the minimum requested by the prosecutor.

The applicant, who was on full parole after being convicted of child pornography offences, sought bail pending appeal to modify a parole condition restricting his access to computers.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under s. 679 of the Criminal Code because a person on full parole is not in 'custody'.

The Court of Appeal held that full parole is a form of custody sufficient to engage the court's jurisdiction under s. 679.

The court granted bail pending appeal and modified the conditions to allow the applicant to use computers and the internet for employment purposes.

The respondent was convicted by a jury of fraudulently obtaining GST refunds.

Prior to sentencing, the trial judge declared a mistrial, finding that the Crown's failure to preserve the respondent's employment records amounted to an abuse of process and a breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after the jury's verdict had been recorded.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal for first and second-degree murder.

The respondents had been convicted of manslaughter and forcible confinement after participating in the beating and confinement of the victim, who was left bound in a remote cabin and subsequently died.

The trial judge ruled there was no evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge impermissibly weighed the evidence and usurped the jury's function.

The Court held there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent, planning, and deliberation to leave the murder charges to the jury, and ordered a new trial on first-degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a narcotics offence, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the totality of the evidence supported the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the only occupant with knowledge of the narcotics.

The court concluded that the verdict was one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug offence, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to rely on surveillance evidence of probable drug transactions and the appellant's presence near a barbecue to infer he was aware of and in control of the cocaine hidden inside it.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon following an attack at a bus station.

The sole issue at trial was identification.

The appellant appealed the convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the pre-trial identification procedures were flawed and prejudicial, and the eyewitness descriptions of the assailant did not match the appellant's physical characteristics.

The Court concluded the identification evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The appellant appealed the dispositions of the Ontario Review Board and the verdict of unfit to stand trial made by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that the fitness hearing should have been conducted by a judge and jury under s. 672.26 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict of unfit to stand trial, declaring the proceeding a nullity, and referred the matter back to the trial court for a fitness hearing before a judge and jury.

The Ontario Review Board's determination was also set aside.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis, including clear expert opinion on continuing danger, risk assessment, and the appellant's ability to manage his behaviour, to support the Board's decision.

The appellant, arrested for extradition to the United States on charges relating to a fraudulent loan scheme, appealed multiple rulings including habeas corpus dismissals, a committal order, and the dismissal of a release application under s. 69 of the Extradition Act.

He also sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and the application for judicial review, finding that the Minister's surrender order was valid, the superseding indictment did not invalidate the proceedings, and there was no abuse of process or procedural unfairness.

The respondent, a bingo hall manager on a First Nation reserve, was acquitted of keeping a common gaming house after continuing operations despite the revocation of a provincial gaming licence.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that criminal law could not be used to enforce compliance with a provincial regulatory scheme.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to recognize that the prohibition of gambling except as provincially regulated is valid criminal law.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought to challenge a single judge's denial of leave to appeal from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal.

The court held that no statutory right of appeal or review exists from a decision granting or denying leave under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

It further held that neither the Criminal Appeal Rules nor the Rules of Civil Procedure can create such a substantive right by incorporation, and that s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act does not apply because s. 7(3) expressly excludes motions for leave to appeal from the category of motions reviewable under that provision.

The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Joint criminal appeal from murder and attempted murder convictions arising out of a multiple-victim shooting in which both appellants admitted firing guns but relied principally on self-defence.

The court held that the trial judge committed multiple evidentiary and jury-charge errors, including admitting weak and highly prejudicial peaceful-disposition evidence from parents of deceased victims, admitting one witness's unsworn videotaped statement for its truth under the principled hearsay exception despite insufficient reliability safeguards, and improperly limiting the jury's use of translation evidence concerning another witness's adopted prior words.

The court further found errors in the treatment of after-the-fact conduct, co-accused bad character evidence, provocation, and the reopening issue.

Considering the cumulative effect of the errors, the curative proviso could not be applied.

A new trial was ordered on all charges.