Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his conviction on four counts of sexual assault of a complainant with an intellectual disability, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's evidence, including alleged inconsistencies, potential tainting by leading questions, and findings supported by inferences.

The court found no error in the trial judge's approach to credibility, emphasizing the deference owed to the trial judge's observations of the vulnerable witness.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal sentence as moot, as the sentence had been served.

The appellants, Conroy and Kharla Rose, appealed their convictions for possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals from conviction and ordered a new trial on two main grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing an additional juror without random selection, thereby improperly constituting the jury, and erred in admitting evidence of Conroy's prior convictions in the form of judicial reasons without proper balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect and inadequate jury instructions.

Kharla Rose's separate appeal regarding unreasonable trial delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter was dismissed, as the delay was deemed reasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework.

The appellant, O'Neil Thompson, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge erred in not finding an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter when police boxed in the appellant's car without reasonable grounds.

The Court also confirmed a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to a systemic issue within the Peel Regional Police regarding the immediate provision of the right to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the Court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter breaches, particularly the arbitrary detention and the systemic delay in advising of the right to counsel, outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal directed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and public mischief arising from a staged two-vehicle collision.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and in his assessment of witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the delay was justified by the complexity of the case and caused no serious prejudice.

The Court also held that the trial judge was entitled to accept or reject parts of the evidence and was not required to give himself a Vetrovec warning in a judge-alone trial.

The appellant, a licensed motorized ice cream vendor, was convicted and fined $2,000 for selling ice cream from his truck parked inside a school parking lot, contrary to a municipal by-law prohibiting sales within 30 metres of a school entrance.

On appeal, he argued the by-law only applied to the area outside the entrance and did not apply on private property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation to find that 'within' creates a boundary that includes the area inside the entrance, and noting that the by-law regulates the vendor's licence conditions rather than the property itself.

The appellant appealed a 25-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to two years less a day, less pre-trial custody, taking into account immigration ramifications that were not before the trial judge.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud and defrauding the Government of Canada of over $3 million.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that his silence at trial could not be used against him.

The trial judge had relied on Supreme Court of Canada obiter dicta suggesting s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibited such an instruction.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCC obiter was non-binding and conflicted with earlier binding SCC ratio, meaning the instruction could have been given.

However, the court found the jury instructions as a whole were adequate and the delay was reasonable given the complexity of the proceedings.

The appeal from conviction and the three-year sentence were dismissed.

The respondent was charged with stunt driving by speeding 50 kph or more over the limit under s. 172 of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, she was convicted, but on appeal, the judge found the offence to be one of absolute liability and unconstitutional under s. 7 of the Charter due to the potential for imprisonment.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the offence is one of strict liability, not absolute liability, and therefore does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

A new trial was ordered to allow the respondent to raise a due diligence defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and other offences, as well as his 18-month sentence.

He had fled from police, run over an officer's leg, and resisted arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding his actions were intentional.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence and failed to adequately consider the appellant's youth, first-offender status, significant rehabilitation prospects, and aboriginal status.

The sentence was varied to three months of time served followed by a 12-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that the Authority to Proceed met statutory requirements and a prima facie case was established.

The Court also dismissed the judicial review application, concluding that the Minister reasonably considered the appellant's concerns regarding potential sexual assault in Texas prisons, delay, and his personal circumstances in Canada.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge erred in principle with respect to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that the trial judge effectively applied the required test and correctly concluded that the proposed sentence, including three years of probation, would be insufficient to protect the public interest given the appellant's history of breaching probation orders on at least six other occasions.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of failing to comply with a breath demand.

The Crown successfully appealed to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, which ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge found the appellant had feigned compliance, which is tantamount to a refusal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge's findings amounted to a feigned attempt to blow and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years and four days for sexual touching and three counts of breach of recognizance.

The offences involved touching a young boy over his clothes, committed while the appellant was subject to an order prohibiting him from being alone with children.

The trial judge had considered a medical report indicating a likelihood of future abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that while a significant sentence was necessary for public protection, the total sentence was excessive given the low gravity of the specific offence and the fact that the medical report was not filed as an exhibit.

The court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence for sexual touching from three years to two years.

The appellant appealed her conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding of impairment, including testimony from the appellant's son and a police officer regarding her intoxication, disorientation, and odour of alcohol.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence arising from a 'criminal swarm' assault.

The Court of Appeal applied the Kienapple principle to stay two counts on the indictment to prevent multiple convictions for the same delict.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found an unjustified disparity between the appellant's five-year sentence and the significantly shorter sentences imposed on older co-accused with more serious records who had pleaded guilty.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 24 months' imprisonment, in addition to pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the sentence should be reduced because the conviction that formed the basis for the suspension was later set aside, meaning the appellant's record for similar offences was less than what was known to the trial court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the fine to $2,000, and dismissed the conviction appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for driving offences arising from a serious collision.

He argued issues related to bolus drinking, a discrepancy in the time of the collision, and a violation of his right to be present under s. 650 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly addressed bolus drinking and that the appellant's absence when written reasons were delivered did not violate s. 650.

Leave to appeal the sentence was refused due to the appellant's serious driving record and the severity of the collision.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly used similar fact evidence to bolster the complainants' credibility and erred in departing from the 2:1 guideline for pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the similar fact evidence to confirm the representations were made.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge provided reasons for departing from the pre-trial custody credit guideline, and the lengthy penitentiary sentence was fit given the appellant's record and commission of offences while serving a previous sentence.

The Crown appealed an order quashing authorizations to take DNA samples from two respondents convicted of multiple murders.

The central issue was the interpretation of section 487.055(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which permits DNA sampling for offenders convicted of 'more than one murder committed at different times'.

The Court of Appeal rejected the application judge's 'transaction' analysis but affirmed the result, holding that 'different times' requires the murders to be distinguishable in nature or quality.

Because the murders committed by both respondents occurred in close proximity and were not distinguishable in nature or quality, the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking following a police search of an apartment and a vehicle.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the validity of the search warrant, jury instructions on the burden of proof (the W.(D.) instruction), and the reasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the first appellant, finding the jury instructions adequate and the verdict reasonable based on the evidence found in his vehicle.

However, the Court allowed the appeal of the second appellant, concluding that the verdict was unreasonable as there was insufficient evidence connecting him to the drugs found in the apartment, especially given his acquittal on the trafficking charge.