Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge engaged in prohibited propensity reasoning.

The trial judge had used the appellant's admitted infidelity to infer that he would disregard the complainant's rule requiring condom use during intercourse.

The Court of Appeal agreed this was prohibited propensity reasoning and noted the appellant had no notice that his infidelity would be used for this purpose, rendering the trial procedurally unfair.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his stepdaughter and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: improper reliance on the absence of exaggeration, improper use of prior consistent statements, and improper reliance on neutral aspects of evidence to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also challenged the s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order as overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's reasoning on credibility or confirmatory evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing the s. 161(1)(c) order, as it was not retroactively applicable to an offence committed prior to its amendment in August 2012.

The appellant, G.M.C., appealed his convictions for assault and compliance charges, following a 12-day trial.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged improper judicial notice of "memory science," uneven scrutiny of evidence (including credibility assessment, demeanour, and use of bad character evidence), and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge's observations on memory were common sense, that there was no reversible error in the credibility assessments or application of different standards, and that the isolated incidents did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court affirmed the convictions.

Mr. Ojaghi appealed a detention order issued by the Ontario Review Board, arguing it was unreasonable and seeking a conditional discharge.

He also challenged the Board's removal of a travel provision from his previous disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it reasonable and necessary for public safety given the applicant's non-compliance with medication.

However, the court found that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by removing the travel provision without notice or inviting submissions, and therefore reinstated that provision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and wearing a disguise with intent, and his four-year sentence.

The primary issue was the reliability of identification evidence provided by the appellant's sister, who recognized him from surveillance videos.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the identification evidence, noting the judge's careful analysis and caution regarding frailties.

The court also rejected the admission of fresh evidence and found the sentence to be fit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from convictions for break and enter with intent and assault.

The trial judge found the applicant broke into his former wife's home and assaulted her while bound by a recognizance.

The applicant was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment.

Applying the test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, the court found the appeal not frivolous but with slim prospects of success.

The court was satisfied the applicant would surrender but determined that his detention was necessary in the public interest due to a pattern of domestic violence, breach of prior orders, and inadequate proposed sureties.

The motion for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple historical sexual offences against the daughter of his former common law partner, alleged to have occurred between the complainant’s ages of five and sixteen.

The appeal argued that the trial judge committed three errors in assessing the appellant’s evidence: drawing a negative inference from his lack of recollection of a potential CAS investigation, improperly relying on demeanour when evaluating his denials, and criticizing his failure to address specific allegations.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s concerns about the appellant’s explanations were logical and permissible and that his treatment of the denials was consistent with the framework in R. v. W.(D.).

The court further held that the trial judge ultimately based the convictions on a reasoned acceptance of the complainant’s credible and reliable testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence and that the predicate offences did not form a pattern with his prior sexual assault convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found a clear pattern of the appellant using violence to achieve sexual objectives and an inability to control his impulses.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime prohibition order under s. 161(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following convictions for serious sexual offences against young persons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order appropriate given the appellant's history, psychological reports, and failure to obey court orders.

The Court noted the appellant could apply to vary the order in the future under s. 161(3) if his circumstances changed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, assault with a weapon, and use of an imitation firearm while committing robbery.

At trial, the judge did not leave the defence of self-defence with the jury, concluding there was no air of reality to the defence based on a pre-emptive strike.

The Court of Appeal found that, taking the appellant's evidence at its highest, there was a basis for leaving self-defence with the jury under s. 37 of the Criminal Code, given the complainant's history of bullying and aggression towards the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The young person appealed their conviction for assault and robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the evidence of a tainted witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself in accordance with Vetrovec and reasonably relied on independent confirmatory evidence, even though it did not directly implicate the appellant.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

The trial judge had found that the accused's threat to 'assault' his former probation officer did not necessarily include bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the surrounding circumstances, which included the accused's violent history, mental instability, and anger towards the victim.

A reasonable person would conclude the threat was to cause bodily harm.

The acquittal was set aside, a conviction entered, and a concurrent sentence of 349 days was imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, firearms offences, and drug trafficking, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's videotaped statement under the KGB framework and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer agreed to an Agreed Statement of Facts that undermined his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the videotaped statement was properly admitted and there was no miscarriage of justice regarding counsel's conduct.

The sentence appeal was allowed to the extent of setting aside the probation order, as a subsequent sentence made the total a penitentiary sentence.

The appellant appealed a six-year sentence imposed following convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats against his separated spouse.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by denying credit for strict pre-trial bail, improperly using a victim impact statement, rejecting remorse as a mitigating factor, and imposing a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and concluding the sentence was fit given the egregious and horrific circumstances of the domestic assault.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for possession of and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

They argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing their Charter application to exclude evidence obtained through wiretaps and search warrants, claiming the affidavit supporting the authorization contained misstatements and failed to establish investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the errors were minor and made in good faith, and that investigative necessity was established given the broad objectives of the investigation.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after attacking a young woman in her bed at night, causing severe injuries.

He was sentenced to two years and three months in the penitentiary.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's emphasis on denunciation and general deterrence, and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range given the serious circumstances of the attack and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant appealed his sentence for firearms offences and possession of a candlestick holder.

The Court of Appeal found the one-year sentence for the firearms offences was within an acceptable range, but the trial judge erred by imposing a consecutive ten-month sentence for possession of the candlestick holder, which merited only one month.

Taking into account pre-trial custody on a two-for-one basis, the Court varied the total sentence to time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in principle in the sentence imposed.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine.

During the trial, hearsay evidence regarding the seizure of buy money from the appellant was admitted in anticipation of a Crown witness who was ultimately not called.

The trial judge refused a mistrial application and instructed the jury that there was no evidence of buy money being found on the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued a mistrial should have been declared and that the jury charge was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no tactical prejudice and concluding that the jury charge adequately addressed the issue and was arguably generous to the appellant.

The appellant challenged criminal convictions and argued, among other things, that there had been a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal rejected the delay argument but held that the trial judge erred in refusing a brief adjournment after defence counsel was removed from the record on the trial date.

The court found the assumption that any new lawyer would face the same difficulties was unwarranted on the record.

The interests of justice required a short adjournment to permit the accused to retain counsel or prepare to proceed on his own.

Leave to appeal was granted, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.