Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, a pharmacist, was convicted of trafficking in fentanyl, fraud, and public mischief, and sentenced to 14 years' incarceration.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's Charter rulings (s. 11(b), s. 7, s. 8) or assessment of evidence, including the handling of a Vetrovec witness.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to sufficiently apply the principle of restraint for a first-time offender with health issues.

The sentence was reduced from 14 years to 12 years imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking offences after police found cocaine during a search incident to arrest.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no section 10(b) Charter breach when police delayed his access to counsel for 3.5 hours while preparing a search warrant for his residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified by officer and public safety concerns due to credible information that the appellant possessed a long firearm.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, assault, and choking following a judge-alone trial.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility by finding he structured his testimony to meet the allegations and by misapprehending his evidence regarding the choking allegation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by turning the appellant's constitutional right to be present at his trial into an evidentiary trap.

The court also found the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's evidence by concluding he testified to having no memory of choking the complainant, when he had consistently denied the act.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision ordering his continued detention at the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible for reasons of mental disorder in 2008 and 2011.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on three grounds: (1) the Board improperly used the appellant's request for discharge as evidence of lack of insight; (2) the Board's analysis on whether the appellant would pose a significant risk to public safety was insufficient and conflated risk of mental health relapse with risk to public safety; and (3) the Board improperly included a finding that the appellant had sexually assaulted a minor when he had been acquitted of that charge.

The appellant was entitled to a new hearing before the Board.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The appeal was granted on consent.

The court imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $321,945.79 and increased the restitution order to the same amount.

The court further ordered that if the fine is not paid within ten years of the respondent's release from serving all current sentences, the respondent will be subject to a term of imprisonment of three years.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and breach of probation.

On appeal, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on two grounds: (1) an admission in an agreed statement of facts regarding his mother's presence in the house was made without his knowledge or agreement, and (2) the admissibility of his video statement to police was conceded without his concurrence and without full investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if counsel's performance was deficient, a substantial body of evidence independent of the disputed admissions would have supported the same convictions.

An appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for criminal harassment appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that he constituted a significant threat to public safety and should be transferred between secure forensic units.

The appellant had been detained in the mental health system for over ten years.

Fresh evidence from the appellant's treating psychiatrist and a clinical forensic psychologist using a stalking-specific risk assessment tool concluded the appellant no longer posed a significant threat and was entitled to an absolute discharge.

The majority allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Board for fresh determination.

The dissenting judge would have granted an absolute discharge directly, finding the fresh evidence uncontradicted and unequivocal.

The appellant appealed her conviction on multiple counts including fraud over $5,000, personating a police officer, transferring proceeds of crime, and criminal organization offences.

She also appealed her sentence of 32 months' imprisonment plus a fine of $225,400 or three years' imprisonment in lieu.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of expert evidence regarding proceeds of crime and money laundering, no error in the jury charge on circumstantial evidence, and no error in principle in the sentencing.

The trial judge properly extrapolated the amount of fraud from a four-day monitoring period.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention on a General Forensic Unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with the ability to live in community accommodation approved by the person in charge of CAMH.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that an absolute discharge was not appropriate given clear evidence that the appellant would stop taking medication, decompensate quickly, and engage in threatening and aggressive behaviour.

The court also rejected the argument that a conditional discharge was the least restrictive appropriate order, finding that the detention order with community living possibilities was reasonable given the appellant's homelessness and ongoing risk of harm.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and making and possessing child pornography in relation to his nieces.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, improperly used similar fact evidence, reversed the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate, the similar fact evidence properly admitted, and no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that his videotaped confession was involuntary and obtained in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights, and that the Crown's failure to disclose police background checks of prospective jurors caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in admitting the confession, as the police reasonably believed the appellant had spoken to counsel and the statements were voluntary.

Furthermore, applying the Yumnu test, the Court held that although the Crown improperly failed to disclose the jury vetting results, there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have been differently constituted.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges and also sought judicial review of the Minister’s surrender order.

The court rejected the evidentiary and procedural challenges to committal, holding that the proposed credibility evidence was properly excluded and that no error arose from the alleged reliance on an earlier factum.

On the judicial review, the court held that, in the exceptional circumstances, the self-represented applicant should be given an opportunity to make further submissions to the Minister regarding the birth of her child.

The committal appeal was dismissed, the judicial review was adjourned, and bail was continued pending the return of the matter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his alleged sexual assault on the victim's best friend and the victim's ante mortem statements expressing hostility toward him.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a witness's relationship with an alternate suspect.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's admission of the bad character and hearsay evidence, concluding the probative value outweighed any prejudicial impact.

The application to admit fresh evidence was denied as it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender to the United States for prosecution.

The applicant argued that the surrender unjustifiably infringed his section 6 Charter rights, that the Crown's conduct regarding plea bargains and stayed charges constituted an abuse of process under section 7, and that the Minister failed to properly consider extenuating family circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision reasonable and no abuse of process by the Crown.

The accused was charged with wilfully promoting hatred after police seized CDs containing hate-promoting lyrics from a table he was manning at a skinhead party.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding insufficient evidence that he sold the CDs.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the acquittal.

The Court held that while there was evidence of intent, there was no evidence the accused actually communicated the statements in the lyrics.

Furthermore, the Crown could not rely on a new theory on appeal that the CD covers themselves promoted hatred, as this would offend the rule against double jeopardy.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the sexual assault of his stepdaughter.

At trial, the Crown called a clinical and forensic psychologist to address frailties in the complainant's evidence, including delayed disclosure and memory issues.

The trial judge relied heavily on this expert opinion to find the complainant credible.

However, the tape of the expert's cross-examination was lost before it could be transcribed.

The Court of Appeal held that the missing transcript prevented a proper assessment of whether the trial judge erred in her use of the expert evidence, raising serious concerns about the safety of the verdict.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

Due to recent developments, the appeal became moot.

The Crown abandoned the appeal, and it was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board unreasonably found him to be a significant risk to the public and misapplied the least restrictive alternative test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that psychiatric evidence supported the significant threat finding and that a detention order with permission to live in the community satisfied the least restrictive alternative standard, particularly given the appellant's history of substance abuse linked to his mental illness.

The appellant, a former lawyer, was convicted of six counts of fraud and one count of theft related to the misappropriation of client funds in a land development scheme.

He appealed his convictions and his sentence of 20 months' imprisonment and $164,000 in restitution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's Charter motion for unreasonable delay, and concluding that the verdicts were reasonable and the jury instructions were adequate.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because his DNA on a Coke bottle found at the scene did not prove he was present, and that the trial judge improperly used his failure to testify to convict him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences from the DNA evidence were logical and not speculative, and that the trial judge only noted the appellant's silence after already concluding the Crown had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.