OCA 2016

The appellants appealed an application judge's finding of adverse possession, arguing the judge failed to consider relevant evidence, make a finding on the ownership of the fence, and find sufficient usage of the disputed strip of land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge correctly stated the elements of adverse possession and made findings of fact reasonably supported by the evidence, including that both parties treated the fence line as a boundary.

Costs of $5,600 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant father brought a second appeal regarding a trial judgment that awarded custody of a three-year-old child to the respondent mother and allowed her to relocate to England.

The first appeal judge upheld the trial judge's decisions on custody and relocation but remitted the final order back to the trial judge to correct errors and inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred in remitting the matter, as the trial judge had properly settled the order and was functus officio.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the remitted order and restore the original trial order.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference involving a child complainant.

At trial, the complainant's prior consistent statements were introduced to rehabilitate her credibility after cross-examination on inconsistencies.

The trial judge did not give a limiting instruction warning the jury not to use the prior consistent statements for their truth.

The Court of Appeal held that the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, as there was a real risk the jury would use the statements for an impermissible purpose to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant father brought a motion for interim access to his three-year-old child for a three-week block in Toronto, which was heard alongside his appeal of a custody and relocation order.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing it would interfere with the child's half-day nursery school attendance and conflict with a prior access order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that fostering a meaningful relationship with the non-custodial parent and his family outweighed the importance of nursery school attendance, and noting that the prior access order restricting access to one-week blocks was a nullity.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the agent of his paralegal entered a guilty plea against his instructions.

The Crown conceded that the plea was invalid.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, which was largely based on a confession obtained during a 'Mr. Big' undercover operation.

During the retrial, the Crown introduced highly prejudicial bad character evidence regarding a separate, severed murder charge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's charge to the jury was deficient, particularly regarding motive and confirmatory evidence, and failed to present the defence's position fairly.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The landlord appealed a summary judgment decision regarding its termination of a commercial lease.

The parties had orally agreed to extend the commencement date of the lease for at least one year.

The landlord later attempted to terminate the lease under a clause allowing termination if it could not deliver possession within six months of the commencement date.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination notice provided in December 2011 was out of time, as the commencement date remained April 1, 2011, and the landlord failed to exercise its termination right within the six-month window.

Judgment was granted in favour of the tenant for breach of contract.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, was convicted of domestic violence offences and sentenced to 8 years and 4 months.

The trial judge awarded pre-disposition custody credit at a ratio of 1.25:1.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, the appellant appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent, varying the pre-disposition custody credit to a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the effective sentence from 60 months to 52 months.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent possessory title over a portion of his beachfront property by way of adverse possession or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the finding of adverse possession because the respondent had not effectively excluded the appellant from the property.

The Court also varied the easement finding, limiting it to non-vehicular traffic on a specific path, as there was no continuous 20-year period of vehicular use.

The trial judge's costs orders, including an order against the appellant's counsel personally, were set aside.

The appellant, who had a 30-year history of predatory sexual offences against young males, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault with a weapon and designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed the designation, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding his voluntary use of anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence would not have affected the result and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility of controlling the appellant's risk in the community given the voluntary nature of the medication.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of assault causing bodily harm relating to his two-month-old infant, who suffered 12 rib fractures on two separate occasions.

The appellant argued the first verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge misapplied the W. (D.) principles, and that the second verdict involved an error in applying the test for implied consent during an attempt to administer CPR.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings reasonable, the W. (D.) principles properly applied, and that the force used during the alleged CPR was excessive, vitiating any defence of implied consent.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and breach of a court order.

He was unaware that his guilty plea to dangerous driving would result in an automatic, indefinite suspension of his driver's licence under the Highway Traffic Act due to his prior convictions.

The Court of Appeal held that the collateral consequence of an indefinite licence suspension was legally relevant and significant to the appellant, a truck driver.

Because he was uninformed of this consequence, his plea was invalid.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea and conviction for dangerous driving were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that charge.

An employee of the respondent perpetrated a large-scale fraud by requisitioning cheques payable to six entities and depositing them into accounts he controlled.

Two of the entities were invented, and four were customers not owed money.

The respondent sued the appellant banks for conversion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the banks' appeal, finding they had a valid defence under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court held that the two invented payees were non-existing, and all six payees were fictitious because the respondent's directing minds never formed an intention to pay them.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision allowing the respondent commercial tenant to exercise a lease renewal option despite being in arrears.

The tenant had purported to exercise the option, but the landlord argued the option was void for uncertainty and that the tenant was in default of rent-related covenants.

The Court of Appeal held that while the renewal option was not void for uncertainty, the tenant was in default of its obligation to pay additional rent when due.

As the tenant failed to meet the precondition of paying all rent when due, the purported exercise of the renewal option was invalid and unenforceable.

The appeal was allowed and the tenant was ordered to vacate the premises.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their third-party claim against their former lawyer for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The lawyer had acted for both the appellants and the vendors in a family share purchase transaction involving a promissory note and consulting agreements.

The lawyer failed to recognize the potential conflict of interest, did not advise the appellants to obtain independent legal advice, and failed to explain the full business risks and legal liabilities of the transaction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the lawyer breached his fiduciary duty and fell below the standard of care, and awarded the appellants damages for the amount they paid to settle the resulting action on the promissory note.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching in respect of a seven-year-old child.

The appellant argued the trial judge made three errors in assessing the child's credibility, including relying on stereotypical reasoning regarding a sex education book, speculating about the child's ability to operate a camera, and improperly assessing the child's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were grounded in the specific evidence and correctly applied a common sense approach to assessing the child's evidence without rigid stereotypes.

The appellant, a gas station operator, appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim against its former landlord and two former employees.

The employees had secretly negotiated a head lease for the gas station premises after the appellant's lease expired and it refused the landlord's terms.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and inducing breach of contract as statute-barred, finding the appellant knew of the employees' actions more than two years before filing the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings on discoverability and the lack of intent by the landlord to induce a breach of contract, dismissing the appeal.

The respondent on appeal brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 61.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying dispute involved a claim by the appellant that he had an ownership interest in a property purchased by his former mother-in-law.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's claim, finding his evidence not credible.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion for security for costs, finding good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal.

The appellant was ordered to post $15,000 as security.

The appellant, representative plaintiff in a proposed class action by unit holders of a real estate investment trust, appealed a motion judge's decision striking a knowing assistance claim against the respondents.

The claim alleged the respondents assisted a trustee in a breach of trust by concealing a conflict of interest in a property transaction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred by failing to generously construe the pleadings and by concluding that the respondents' alleged suppression of information and active participation could not amount to knowing assistance.

The claim was found to be legally plausible.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the intent for murder by including 'recklessness' as an alternative, and erred in his Vetrovec warnings.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his Aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no realistic possibility the jury convicted based on recklessness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the Gladue factors in setting the parole ineligibility period.