OCA 2016

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision that found the respondents successfully exercised a Put-Right option in an asset purchase agreement.

The option allowed the respondents to compel the appellants to purchase their shares for $3.00 a share.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions that the option was part of a bilateral contract, that the respondents substantially complied with notice provisions, and that the failure to provide section 116 Income Tax Act certificates was not a precondition to exercising the option.

The remedy of $600,000 and specific performance was upheld.

The appellant, a former gym teacher and basketball coach, appealed his conviction for historical sexual assault against a former student.

The trial judge's decision rested entirely on a credibility assessment of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made material errors by misapprehending the appellant's evidence regarding his post-practice monitoring routine and by placing undue weight on the appellant's demeanour while testifying.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs for a motion to dismiss the appeal, which became moot after the appellant abandoned the appeal.

The appellant argued he should be awarded costs because the respondent improperly brought the motion before a single judge rather than a panel.

The Court of Appeal ordered no costs, noting the procedural error by the respondent and the abandonment of the appeal by the appellant.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughter arising from long-term abuse allegations spanning childhood to late adolescence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing improper speculation about the family’s prior housing arrangements and improper rejection of defence evidence from close family members.

The Court of Appeal held that any error concerning the housing-scam comment was peripheral, given the many unchallenged reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence.

It further held that the trial judge did not reject the younger siblings’ evidence solely because of relationship, but because the evidence supported a finding that they remained under parental influence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties cohabited for over thirteen years and jointly operated motel properties.

Following their separation, the trial judge awarded the respondent a half interest in the properties based on a joint family venture and unjust enrichment, as well as compensation for unaccounted joint account withdrawals.

The appellant appealed, arguing the properties were held on a resulting trust and disputing the financial contributions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions regarding the joint family venture, equal contributions, and the accounting of joint funds.

The parties separated after a seven-year unmarried relationship.

The trial judge found the respondent had established an unjust enrichment claim regarding the home owned by the appellant, concluding there was a joint family venture, and awarded him $86,500.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her retroactive child support claim and in finding a joint family venture.

The child support ground was abandoned during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the constructive trust claim, finding the trial judge's conclusions on unjust enrichment, joint family venture, and the proportionate damages award were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and sought leave to appeal his sentence, arguing he was not accorded proper credit for pre-disposition custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the conviction was not unreasonable and the municipal address was not an essential element of the offence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the court applied a 1.5:1 credit ratio for pre-disposition custody, reducing the sentence by a further 300 days.

The appellant company appealed a trial decision finding that two kitchen cabinet installers were dependent contractors entitled to 26 months' reasonable notice upon termination.

The appellants argued the workers were independent contractors because they had performed some work for a competitor in the two years prior to termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that exclusivity must be assessed over the full history of the relationship, during which the workers had served the company almost exclusively for over 25 years.

The Court also upheld the 26-month notice period, finding that the workers' age, length of service, and economic dependence constituted exceptional circumstances justifying an award beyond the usual 24-month cap.

The respondents sought partial indemnity costs of $7,500 following an appeal.

The appellants argued no costs should be awarded due to divided success on the appeal's two issues.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents their requested costs, finding that they succeeded on the more significant issue regarding restrictions on the sale of shares to a third party.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation against her former solicitor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the 'but for' test for causation applied and that the conduct of the solicitor retained after the respondent effectively broke the chain of causation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that they were engaged in a joint venture involving repeated and dangerous violations of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly instructed herself on the law of joint venture tort liability and that her finding was reasonable on the evidence.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the respondent insurer.

The offender was convicted of tax evasion and failing to remit GST after earning approximately $3,000,000 over four years without filing tax returns.

He was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $687,000 with ten years to pay.

The offender appealed his convictions, arguing the jury charge failed to distinguish between tax evasion and tax avoidance.

The Crown appealed the sentence, seeking a penitentiary term and a shorter time to pay the fines.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge accurate.

The Court upheld the custodial sentence but allowed the Crown's appeal regarding the fines, reducing the time to pay from ten years to two years.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment and granting the respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment, which declared the respondents entitled to statutory rescission of their franchise agreement.

The respondents had rescinded the agreement due to the appellants' failure to provide disclosure under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellants were not exempt from disclosure requirements, as they had required a new franchise agreement and a $10,000 transfer fee.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing personal guarantees she signed for corporate loans.

She argued the motion judge erred procedurally by proceeding despite allegations that she lacked mental capacity, and substantively by rejecting her defenses of non est factum, undue influence, and material change to the loan arrangement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cogent medical evidence of incapacity and upholding the motion judge's findings that the appellant understood the continuing all accounts guarantees she signed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Law Society of Upper Canada after his statement of claim was struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged a long history of unfair treatment, including administrative suspensions, disciplinary proceedings, and bankruptcy opposition.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the individual acts did not give rise to viable causes of action as pleaded and that many claims were settled by prior releases.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend the pleading to properly allege the tort of misfeasance in public office based on a cumulative pattern of bad faith conduct.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant leave to file a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The appellant was intercepted at an airport with over $100,000 in U.S. currency concealed in his luggage and on his person.

The respondent successfully applied for civil forfeiture of the funds under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge erred in finding the funds were proceeds of unlawful activity and in denying relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the appellant was acting as a cash courier and was not an innocent owner entitled to relief.

The appellant was injured while working as a go-kart race director.

He had signed a waiver releasing the respondents from liability.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action based on the waiver.

On appeal, the court found that the appellant was an employee covered under Part X of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The court held that it is contrary to public policy to allow individuals to contract out of the protections of Part X of the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with pre-sentence custody credited on a 1:1 basis.

The sentencing judge denied enhanced credit on the mistaken belief that the appellant's bail had been revoked.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found this was a material factual misunderstanding.

Applying the principles from Summers, the Court held the appellant was entitled to enhanced credit of 1.5:1, as there was no evidence to rebut the inference that he had lost eligibility for early release.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced accordingly.

In a CCAA restructuring proceeding, stakeholders sought disclosure of a settlement agreement between U.S. Steel, its Canadian subsidiary, and the Attorney General of Canada regarding undertakings under the Investment Canada Act.

The CCAA judge held that the agreement was entirely privileged under s. 36 of the ICA.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while s. 36(5) protects the Crown from being compelled to disclose the agreement, this protection does not extend to the private corporations.

The appeal was allowed, and the issue of whether common law settlement privilege barred disclosure was remitted to the CCAA judge.

Following an appeal decision that recalculated child and spousal support, the parties made further written submissions on calculation corrections and costs.

The Court of Appeal accepted both parties' submissions to correct the child support calculations based on clarified living arrangements and section 7 expenses.

On the issue of costs, the court affirmed the trial judge's costs award of $22,000 to the respondent, finding that the respondent's pre-trial offer remained considerably more generous than the final result obtained by the appellant.