OCA 2010

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasons and noting that she approached the appellant's evidence from a common sense perspective, ultimately finding parts of his story incredible.

The Court declined to revisit the trial judge's factual findings.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot in light of its disposition in a related appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide reasons for her decision.

The trial judge had given her decision with reasons to follow, but no reasons were delivered more than three years later.

The Court of Appeal held that the brief reasons provided did not meet the Sheppard test and did not permit appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period in section 4 of the Limitation Act.

They argued the motion judge conflated fraudulent concealment with discoverability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cause of action was discoverable when counsel received OHIP reports, and the appellants failed to investigate for 28 months before filing their claim.

Following an appeal, cross-appeal, and fresh evidence motion where the respondents were successful, the parties made submissions on costs.

The respondents claimed over $98,000 in total on a partial indemnity scale, while the appellants argued no costs should be awarded or, alternatively, a significantly reduced amount.

Applying the Boucher principles, the Court of Appeal fixed costs at $30,000 for the Receiver and $7,500 for the trust company, noting the appellants' alternative of not suing and the trust company's minor role in the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon against his estranged spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's post-offence demeanour, improperly rejected his evidence, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence that a mark on his finger was not a bite mark.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and that the fresh evidence, even if believed, could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result given the strength of the other evidence.

The appellant purchased goods from the respondents and resold them to a separate company, Global Sales Limited.

The trial judge found the respondents breached their contract and made negligent misrepresentations, but dismissed the action because the losses were sustained by Global, not the appellant.

The trial judge also denied the appellant's late motion to add Global as a plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, confirming that Global was an independent legal entity and that adding it as a party after the close of evidence would be irreparably prejudicial to the respondents.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order granting partial summary judgment to the respondent, which dismissed the appellant's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, an accounting, and redemption of shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that there was no fiduciary relationship in the commercial agreement, the claim for an accounting could not stand alone without the fiduciary duty claim, and the appellant had no right to redeem the shares.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and related offences following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued that urinalysis results obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter should have been excluded under section 24(2), that the jury charge was unfair, and that the Kienapple principle precluded convictions for both impaired and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was properly admitted under the Grant framework, the jury charge was balanced, and Kienapple did not apply because impaired driving and dangerous driving address different legal elements.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the four-year penitentiary term as fit given the paramount need for general deterrence.

The appellant appealed a quantum meruit damages award of $100,000 for architectural services, arguing the trial judge should have used a percentage of construction costs method rather than an honorarium method.

The respondents cross-appealed the award of prejudgment interest and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion given the lack of reliable evidence regarding the work done and expenses incurred.

The Court of Appeal previously allowed the defendant's appeal, reducing the plaintiff's damages for breach of contract from $1,935,500 to nominal damages of $1 due to a failure to mitigate.

In this costs endorsement, the court applied the cost consequences of Rule 49.10(2) because the plaintiff obtained a judgment less favourable than the defendant's pre-trial offer to settle for $100,000.

The defendant was awarded net partial indemnity costs of $400,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, in his treatment of the complainant's age and the mistake of age defence under s. 150.1(5) of the Criminal Code, and by misusing evidence of sexual overtures to another young girl.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's evidence, correctly concluded the appellant did not satisfy the test under s. 150.1(5), and did not misuse the impugned evidence as general propensity evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately convey his position and the pertinent evidence in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the charge was adequate when read fairly as a whole, noting that defence counsel had raised no objection at trial.

The Crown appealed a 7-year sentence imposed on the respondent.

The trial judge had felt constrained by the principle of parity to impose the same sentence as a co-participant, despite the co-participant having cooperated, pleaded guilty early, being younger, and having a lesser criminal record.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by ignoring these distinguishing features.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to 10 years, less credit for time served.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims against a bank and its legal counsel regarding the enforcement of two mortgages on properties in default.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no basis for a claim against the bank's counsel, one appellant lacked standing, and the other appellant's claims should have been raised in the underlying enforcement proceedings.

The appellant mortgagee appealed an order dismissing its motion to re-open a default judgment for foreclosure to request a reference on the mortgage covenant.

The default judgment had been obtained on consent 2.5 years prior.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master properly exercised his discretion to deny the relief given the unexplained delay, the finality of the judgment, and the prejudice to the mortgagors.

The appellant appealed an order granting an injunction to prevent him from developing land without a permit from the Conservation Authority.

The appellant had a history of developing land without a permit and explicitly stated his intention to continue doing so without seeking one.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Authority typically relies on penal provisions to ensure compliance, the injunction was justified in this case to protect the public interest in the wetland environment.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal on liability and partial success on the costs appeal, the respondents sought costs of the appeal totaling $675,880.87.

The appellant argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount due to divided success and duplication of counsel by the amalgamated municipal respondents.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents one set of costs, fixed at $125,000, reflecting the straightforward nature of the legal issues, the duplication of argument, and the appellant's partial success on the costs appeal.

The appellant franchisor appealed an order declaring that provisions in its standard franchise agreement requiring franchisees to release the franchisor from liability as a condition of renewal or transfer were void and unenforceable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that such releases violate sections 4 and 11 of the Arthur Wishart Act by forcing franchisees to waive statutory rights and interfering with their right to associate in a class proceeding.

The Court also upheld the application of Ontario law to franchisees operating outside the province due to the agreement's choice of law clause.

The parties made costs submissions following an appeal decision.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario maintained its view that success on the appeal was equally divided.

Consequently, the court ordered that there be no costs of the appeal.