Norm Keith

The defendant corporation brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of section 11(d) rights based on an alleged promise by a Ministry of Labour inspector not to prosecute.

The defendant claimed the inspector's assurance, followed by the laying of charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, constituted an abuse of process.

The court found that the defendant failed to establish a clear agreement or deal with the inspector, that the inspector's conduct did not rise to the level of abuse of process, and that no Charter breach occurred.

The motion was dismissed in its entirety.

The Corporation of the City of Guelph was charged with failing to ensure that a wall in a workplace was capable of supporting all loads to which it may be subjected, contrary to section 25(1)(e) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The charge arose from the collapse of a privacy wall in a women's washroom at a municipal park in 2009, which resulted in the death of a fourteen-year-old student.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt because the charging section incorporated the outdated concept of "allowable unit stresses," which had been superseded by limits states design methodology in 1997.

The court also found that even if the actus reus had been established, the City had exercised due diligence in issuing the building permit by reasonably relying on the professional stamps of the architect and engineer, and that the City was not required to conduct further investigation based on the engineer's involvement in a prior unrelated project.

A construction contractor was charged with two counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following an accident on October 28, 2009, where a worker was struck by a falling steel beam (soldier pile) that broke free from its tack weld during a vibratory hammer operation.

The first count alleged failure to ensure adequate bracing under Ontario Regulations 213/91.

The second count alleged failure to take every reasonable precaution for worker protection under section 25(2)(h) of the OHSA.

The court dismissed the first count but convicted on the second count, finding that while the multiple-pile welding method was lawful and industry-accepted, the employer failed to take reasonable precautions by positioning workers in a danger zone without proper risk assessment or safety measures.

The Meaford and District Fire Department was charged with three counts under section 25(2)(h) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act following injuries to two firefighters during a structure fire at Reeds Restaurant on September 9, 2009.

After a directed verdict motion, two charges were dismissed.

The remaining charge alleged the defendant failed to activate an accountability system to track firefighters entering the burning structure.

The court found that while the accountability system was not fully implemented according to the defendant's own Standard Operating Guidelines, an accountability system was in fact activated in various forms at the scene.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no accountability system was activated, as particularized in the charge.

The court dismissed the remaining charge and acquitted the defendant.

The defendants, Strabag Limited (constructor) and Ryszard Pietka (supervisor), were charged with four counts under section 23 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to prevent a worker from falling into operating machinery by ensuring appropriate guardrail systems or fall protection methods were in place, and for failing to ensure machinery was locked out while a worker was exposed to it.

The incident occurred on January 14, 2010, at the Niagara Tunnel Project when an apprentice electrician fell onto a conveyor belt system while repairing a camera.

The court found the defendants guilty on counts one and four (guardrail charges) but acquitted them on counts two and five (lockout charges).

The court imposed a fine of $30,000 on Strabag and $1,000 on Pietka.

The Ministry of Labour charged the City of Guelph with failing to ensure a workplace wall was safe under section 25(1)(e) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and charged an architect and engineer with providing negligent or incompetent advice under section 31(2) of the Act.

The charges arose from a concrete wall collapse in 2009 that killed a student, five years after the project's completion in 2004.

All defendants moved to dismiss the charges as statute-barred under section 69 of the Act, which provides a one-year limitation period from the last act or default.

The court distinguished between the charges: the architect and engineer's charges were dismissed as statute-barred because their negligent advice was provided years before the collapse, while the City's charge was permitted to proceed because the employer's duty to maintain a safe workplace is a continuing obligation that extends beyond the construction phase.

The Meaford and District Fire Department faced three charges under section 25(2)(h) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from injuries to two firefighters at a structure fire on September 9, 2009.

The charges alleged failures to: (1) activate an accountability system to track firefighters; (2) maintain effective supervision through a command post; and (3) establish a Rapid Intervention Team.

Following the Crown's case, the defendant brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The court granted the motion on counts 4 and 6, finding insufficient evidence on the particulars alleged, but dismissed the motion on count 1, finding evidence capable of supporting a conviction.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act against a general contractor and a subcontractor following a workplace fatality.

The trial judge had dismissed the counts on the basis that they were duplicitous and failed to disclose an offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge confused overlapping counts with duplicitous ones, and erred in collapsing the information.

A new trial was ordered on the dismissed counts.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions certifying it as the employer of union members and dismissing its request for reconsideration.

The applicant had failed to respond to the certification application within the two-day statutory limit, later claiming it was not the employer and had ignored the notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's decisions were subject to a reasonableness standard of review and that the Board reasonably exercised its discretion in refusing to reconsider the certification despite the applicant's claim that it was not the true employer.

The corporate defendant appealed its convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, arguing it was not the 'employer' of a common carrier's driver who was injured on its site.

The Crown appealed the provincial offences appeal judge's decision to remit the defendant's s. 11(b) Charter delay motion for a rehearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, finding it was an employer because it controlled the workplace.

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a corporate defendant cannot rely on presumed prejudice for s. 11(b) delay and must show actual prejudice to its fair trial rights, which it failed to do.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to decide a certiorari application regarding an interlocutory order for severance made by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that certiorari should not substitute for the lack of a statutory appeal from an interlocutory order.

The Court also found the anticipatory Charter breach claim premature, noting the trial judge is best positioned to decide severance.

The Crown appealed a decision dismissing its application for judicial review of a trial judge's orders.

The trial judge had ordered discovery, cross-examination, and costs as Charter remedies without actually finding a Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal held that delayed disclosure or failure to disclose irrelevant material does not necessarily constitute a Charter breach.

The Court also found that the trial judge committed jurisdictional errors by denying natural justice, specifically by ordering the disclosure of privileged evidence and awarding costs without allowing the Crown to make submissions.

Furthermore, the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction by ordering the Crown to create an affidavit for the defence.

The appeal was allowed, and the trial judge's orders were quashed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act following a summary conviction appeal court decision.

The appeal judge had overturned the trial judge's finding that delay caused irremediable prejudice to the applicant's fair trial rights due to missing inspector notes.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appeal judge that the finding of prejudice was speculative and not linked to the delay.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding whether their trial should be heard by a judge rather than a justice of the peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the statute recognizes complex cases may be heard by a judge, it does not require it, making the decision a matter of discretion.

The court found no reviewable error in the lower courts' decisions.

The respondents were charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Crown refused to disclose a Prosecution Approval Form, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

A justice of the peace found a Charter breach, ordered disclosure, and awarded costs against the Crown.

The Crown successfully applied to quash the costs order, arguing the provincial offences court was not a 'court of competent jurisdiction' under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a provincial offences court has the power to order costs against the Crown for a Charter breach based on a functional and structural approach to its jurisdiction.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee 26 months' salary for wrongful dismissal.

The sole issue on appeal was whether long-term disability benefits received by the respondent during the notice period should be deducted from the wrongful dismissal damages.

The Court of Appeal held that the benefits were not deductible because the respondent had indirectly contributed to the disability plan by accepting a lower salary in exchange for the benefits package.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a decision setting aside a directed verdict of acquittal on charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a fatal workplace accident.

The employee was killed by an unguarded moving part of a crown press.

The trial judge had acquitted the employer on the basis that the Crown failed to prove the employer knew of the hazard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that OHSA offences are strict liability offences and the Crown is not required to prove a mental element or knowledge of the hazard as part of the actus reus.

Lack of knowledge is only relevant to a due diligence defence.

The appellant appealed an inspector's order directing it to provide a Notice of Project as a constructor under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Canadian Institute of Public and Private Real Estate Companies (CIPPREC) brought a motion to intervene in the appeal.

The Board granted the motion, finding that CIPPREC demonstrated a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings, as the determination of whether the appellant was a constructor would have wide implications for the real estate development and construction industries.

The complainants, Kelly Parks and Holly MacIntyre, alleged that they were discriminated against on the basis of marital status when their employment at Christian Horizons group homes was terminated because they were living in common-law relationships.

The Board of Inquiry found that Christian Horizons directly discriminated against the complainants.

While Christian Horizons qualified as a religious organization serving the interests of persons identified by creed, it failed to establish that its lifestyle requirement was a bona fide occupational qualification under s. 23(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code.

The requirement was not applied consistently, and the hiring procedures did not clearly indicate that only those whose lifestyles were compatible with Evangelical Christian doctrinal principles were qualified for employment.

The complaints against the individual respondents were dismissed.

Following a finding that the respondent discriminated against the complainants based on marital status, the Board of Inquiry assessed remedies.

The Board awarded special damages for lost wages, finding both complainants reasonably mitigated their damages, and declined to deduct social assistance benefits from the awards.

General damages of $5,000 were awarded to each complainant for loss of dignity and self-respect.

The Board declined to order reinstatement, interest, or costs, considering the respondent's status as a non-profit charitable organization.