33 total
Joint account survivorship stood because the resulting trust presumption was rebutted.
The applicant sought a declaration that funds in jointly held bank accounts formed part of the deceased's estate under a resulting trust.
Applying the presumption governing gratuitous transfers to independent adult children, the court held the respondents rebutted the presumption on a balance of probabilities through objective and documentary evidence showing a longstanding intention to benefit the respondent daughter by survivorship.
The court declined to strike challenged affidavit evidence, but accorded it little weight.
The application was dismissed.
Previously imputed income stands absent proof of material change.
The responding parent brought a motion to change a prior final support order after one child began residing primarily with that parent while attending university.
The court considered whether previously imputed income to the other parent could be revisited on a temporary motion without evidence of a material change in circumstances.
The court held that where income had been specifically imputed in a prior order, there is a presumption the imputation remains correct unless evidence demonstrates a material change.
As no such evidence was provided, the previously imputed income figure continued to apply for purposes of the temporary variation.
Temporary support was ordered reflecting that each parent had primary care of one child, with the motion to change adjourned for a later oral hearing on a final determination.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge's findings on net family property deductions, imputed income, and spousal support upheld.
The appellant appealed the trial judge's findings regarding net family property deductions, imputed income for child support, and spousal support.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the appellant failed to discharge the onus of proving his date of marriage deductions due to a lack of documentation.
The court also found no error in the trial judge's imputation of income, including capital gains, for child support purposes, nor in the modest spousal support award granted to the respondent.
Bad faith and disclosure failures justified substantial family law costs and adjusted prejudgment interest.
Following a lengthy family law trial involving equalization, child support, and spousal support, the court determined outstanding issues of costs and pre‑judgment interest.
The court exercised its discretion under ss. 128 and 130 of the Courts of Justice Act to set a prejudgment interest rate of 2.6% on the equalization payment, starting from the date of separation and adjusted for advance payments.
In determining costs under the Family Law Rules, the court found both parties had engaged in bad faith conduct, but the respondent’s conduct—particularly repeated failures to provide financial disclosure and breaches of court orders—had significantly prolonged the litigation.
The court therefore awarded full recovery costs for the early phase of the litigation while reducing recovery for issues affected by the applicant’s own bad faith conduct.
Costs were fixed globally with a portion designated as a support order enforceable under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996.
Court sets cross-border income method for child support and orders retroactive support.
In a contentious family proceeding concerning a child born in 2010, the court determined the payor parent's income for child support purposes where the payor resided and earned income in the United States.
Applying s. 20 of the Child Support Guidelines, the court calculated annual income using U.S. wage statements, rental income, allowable deductions, and an average annual exchange rate to convert U.S. earnings to Canadian dollars.
Retroactive child support was ordered to the date the claim was made, with arrears payable over time.
The court also determined the parties’ respective proportional contributions to section 7 childcare expenses after accounting for tax deductions and benefits.
Motions for contempt and for security for costs were dismissed.
Summary judgment to enforce settlement agreement denied; trial required to determine respondent's capacity to contract.
The applicant moved for summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules to enforce a handwritten settlement agreement signed by the parties.
The respondent opposed the motion and sought to set aside the agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, arguing that his severe medical conditions and medications impaired his capacity to understand the agreement.
The court dismissed the applicant's motion for summary judgment, finding that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.
The court held that the expanded fact-finding powers available under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, and even if they did, the conflicting evidence regarding the respondent's capacity required a full trial to achieve a full appreciation of the issues.
Court recalculates equalization and retroactive support after extensive financial disclosure disputes.
Following the parties’ divorce after a lengthy marriage, the court determined outstanding corollary relief issues including equalization of net family property, retroactive and ongoing child support, spousal support, and post‑secondary education expenses.
Numerous disputes arose regarding valuation of assets, alleged undisclosed property, rental income, and the payor spouse’s income for support purposes.
The court rejected several claims of hidden assets and imputed income in certain years where financial disclosure was unreliable.
Equalization was recalculated with various adjustments, and retroactive child support was ordered based on actual annual income including capital gains for child support purposes but not for spousal support.
Ongoing spousal support was reduced after the recipient spouse’s remarriage and imputed earning capacity.
Insurer not required to produce reserve information, but must produce adjusting file up to mediation application.
The insurer appealed a pre-hearing arbitrator's order requiring it to produce its first-party adjusting file up to the date of the application for mediation, including reserve information.
The Director's Delegate allowed the appeal in part, finding that reserve information is generally irrelevant to the adjusting of a file and is protected by a zone of privacy, and therefore need not be produced.
However, the Director's Delegate upheld the order requiring production of the file up to the date of the application for mediation, as the insurer failed to establish that the dominant purpose of the documents created before that date was litigation.
Appeal dismissed; settlement agreement binding as appellant failed to rescind within the statutory cooling off period.
The appellant was injured in two motor vehicle accidents and claimed statutory accident benefits from the respondent insurer.
The parties entered into a settlement agreement, which the appellant subsequently attempted to rescind, then reconfirmed, and then attempted to rescind again after the two-day cooling off period had expired.
The arbitrator found that the settlement was binding because the appellant failed to rescind it within the statutory cooling off period.
On appeal, the Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the settlement was binding and that there was no undue influence or coercion.
Insurer ordered to produce adjusting file up to the date of mediation; litigation privilege not established.
The applicant sought production of the insurer's complete adjusting file, including reserve information, in a dispute over statutory accident benefits.
The insurer objected, claiming litigation privilege over documents created after it denied benefits.
The arbitrator ordered the insurer to produce all documents in its first-party adjusting file created on or before the commencement of mediation, finding that the insurer failed to establish that the dominant purpose of the documents created after the denial was for litigation rather than ongoing claims assessment.
Appeal allowed; interest on death benefits accrues from the date benefits become overdue, not the date of death.
The insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision awarding interest on death and funeral benefits calculated from the date of the insured's death.
The Director's Delegate allowed the appeal, finding that under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, interest only accrues from the date the benefit becomes overdue, which is 30 days after the insurer receives the application, not the date of death.
The matter was remitted to the arbitrator to determine the actual benefits due date, as the record was insufficient to make that determination on appeal.
Death benefit awarded where motor vehicle accident materially contributed to death by accelerating underlying cancer.
The applicant's husband, who had previously survived pancreatic cancer, was involved in a severe motor vehicle accident that left him continuously disabled.
He died six months later from sepsis.
The insurer denied the death benefit, arguing the death was caused by a recurrence of cancer.
The arbitrator found that while cancer likely played a role, the trauma and stress of the accident materially contributed to the death by weakening the deceased's immune system and significantly accelerating his decline.
The applicant was awarded the death benefit and funeral expenses, but her claim for a special award was dismissed because the insurer's initial denial was reasonable given the complex medical evidence.
Applicant precluded from arbitration after confirming settlement acceptance within the statutory cooling-off period.
The applicant was injured in two motor vehicle accidents and claimed statutory accident benefits from the insurer.
The parties engaged in settlement discussions prior to an arbitration hearing and reached an agreement.
The applicant signed a release and settlement disclosure notice but later attempted to rescind the settlement within the two-day cooling-off period.
However, she subsequently withdrew her rescission within the same period, confirming her acceptance of the settlement.
After the cooling-off period expired, she again attempted to reopen her claim.
The arbitrator held that the applicant had entered into a binding, full and final settlement and was therefore precluded from proceeding to arbitration.