Michael H. Tweyman

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking the appointment of an assessor under s. 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act to assess the needs of the children and the parents' ability to meet those needs.

She argued the father's behaviour was escalating and cited inappropriate communications.

The father opposed the motion, arguing it was unnecessary, intrusive, and sought for control.

The court applied the criteria from Glick v. Cale and found that the mother failed to demonstrate that an assessment was reasonably necessary, noting the parents had previously made major decisions without court intervention and the children were not exhibiting issues requiring expert evidence.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant mother sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following her successful application to declare the respondent father a vexatious litigant and his unsuccessful motion to extend the time to perfect an appeal.

The mother argued that the father's bad conduct in previous proceedings justified an elevated scale of costs.

The court rejected this argument, holding that conduct in prior proceedings cannot be used to punish a party in the current proceeding.

Costs were awarded to the mother on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $15,181.07, based on the principles of proportionality and reasonableness.

The applicant sought temporary spousal support, and the respondent sought an order for the sale of two co-owned properties located in Quebec.

The court found the applicant entitled to support and imputed an income of $138,265 to the respondent based on a three-year average of his corporate earnings.

Temporary spousal support was ordered at $3,000 per month, factoring in the applicant's exclusive possession of one Quebec property and imputed rental income from the other.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion to sell the Quebec properties, finding it lacked jurisdiction to order the sale of extra-provincial lands under the Partition Act or Family Law Act, and that the Catania test for in personam jurisdiction was not met.

In a bifurcated family law trial, the court determined the issue of decision-making responsibility for the parties' two children.

The applicant father sought sole decision-making authority, while the respondent mother sought split decision-making authority.

The court found the parents to be highly conflicted, with the mother exhibiting medical hypervigilance and the father showing aloofness regarding educational needs.

Applying the newly amended Children's Law Reform Act factors, the court concluded that a split order was unworkable and awarded final decision-making responsibility to the applicant father, subject to a structured consultation process.

The moving party (father) brought a motion to set aside an uncontested trial judgment that ordered him to pay significant retroactive and ongoing child support based on imputed income.

The moving party had failed to attend the first day of trial because he chose to attend his first day of a new job, relying on incorrect advice from a paralegal that an agent could secure an adjournment.

The court found this was a satisfactory reason under Rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules.

Applying the principles for self-represented litigants and the primary objective of the rules, the court set aside the judgment in its entirety to allow the issues of income and retroactive support to be determined on their merits.

The moving party, the cousin of the respondent husband in a family law equalization proceeding, sought leave to appeal an order adding him as a third party.

The wife alleged that the husband transferred significant funds to the moving party to shelter them from equalization.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as adding the moving party was necessary to determine the extent to which he held family assets.

The applicant sought to enforce an alleged settlement by accepting an offer contained in the respondent’s settlement conference brief more than two years after it was initially rejected.

The court held that offers contained in settlement conference briefs are not Rule 18 offers under the Family Law Rules but are governed by the law of contract, informed by the Family Law Rules, the Courts of Justice Act, and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although such offers may become binding contracts upon acceptance, they may also be implicitly withdrawn by subsequent written offers that are less favourable to the opposing party.

The court found that later settlement proposals reducing the applicant’s share constituted implicit withdrawal of the earlier offer.

Accordingly, the purported acceptance did not create a binding agreement enforceable by the court.

Following earlier reasons determining that insurance proceeds formed part of an estate and that a claimant qualified as a spouse under s. 57 of the Succession Law Reform Act, the court addressed costs of the proceeding.

The applicants sought full indemnity costs payable from the estate after partial success at trial and on an earlier motion.

The respondents argued the requested costs were excessive and should be denied or reserved.

The court held that a proper costs determination required resolution of outstanding issues, including whether the claimant qualified as a dependant and the amount and form of support to be ordered.

Costs of the prior motion, preliminary motion, and trial phase were therefore reserved to the judge who will ultimately determine the remaining issues.

The applicants, the deceased's common-law partner and their child, sought dependants' relief from the deceased's estate.

The central issue was whether a $1 million life insurance policy, which the deceased had been ordered to maintain with his estranged wife as the irrevocable beneficiary in prior family law proceedings, was available to all dependants under s. 72(1)(f) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court held that the deceased still 'owned' the policy despite the court orders, and the estranged wife was not a 'creditor' under s. 72(7).

The policy proceeds were therefore deemed part of the estate for dependants' relief purposes.

The court also found the common-law partner met the definition of 'spouse' under the Act.