M. Humphrey

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking to admit circumstantial evidence to challenge the accused's narrative of how he came into possession of the handgun used in the Eaton Centre shooting.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence linking a third party to a prior shooting where the same gun was used, and letters suggesting the accused knew the third party.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the suggested links were too speculative and that admitting the evidence to challenge the accused's credibility on a critical issue would be unfair and unreasonable.

The accused, charged with murder and other offences arising from a shooting at the Toronto Eaton Centre, brought a Corbett application to exclude reference to a prior sexual assault conviction and the fact he was on bail at the time of the shooting.

The Crown argued the full record was relevant to the accused's diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder and his credibility.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused's extensive admitted criminal history provided sufficient information for the jury to assess credibility and malingering, and that the sexual assault conviction and bail status would be unnecessarily prejudicial.

The accused brought an application under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code to vary a judicial interim release order by removing a curfew condition.

The accused argued the Crown’s case had weakened due to new potential evidence and that trial delay justified permitting a normal social life pending trial.

The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated changed circumstances sufficient to justify the variation, particularly given the absence of evidence that he had pursued employment or schooling as previously contemplated.

The judge found that the secondary ground concerns underlying the earlier bail restrictions remained unresolved.

The application to delete the curfew condition was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder and attempted murder arising from a street stabbing that killed one victim and seriously injured another.

The court considered the factors under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code for determining the period of parole ineligibility, including the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, and the surrounding circumstances.

Aggravating factors included the unprovoked knife attack on unarmed strangers in a public place and the offender’s role as the aggressor.

Mitigating factors included youth, remorse, family support, and the guilty plea.

The court imposed life imprisonment for second degree murder with a 12‑year parole ineligibility period and a concurrent 10‑year sentence for attempted murder.

The young person was tried for first degree murder as a party to a targeted shooting.

The Crown alleged the young person acted as a lookout and getaway driver for the principal offender, who had previously been convicted of the murder.

Relying on surveillance videos, cell phone records, and witness testimony, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the principal offender committed the planned and deliberate murder.

The court further found that the young person drove the principal offender to and from the scene, was present during the shooting, and intended to assist in the murder.

The young person was found guilty.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by the young person accused to the police: a spontaneous utterance upon arrest and a videotaped statement at the police station.

The court found the videotaped statement was made voluntarily and in full compliance with section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, rendering it admissible.

However, the spontaneous utterance was ruled inadmissible because the police failed to advise the accused of his rights under the YCJA immediately upon arrest, despite having a reasonable opportunity to do so.

The young person, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from multiple search warrants and a warrantless search of his cell phone incident to arrest.

The court held that the young person had standing to challenge the seizure of text messages from third-party cell phones, as text messages carry a reasonable expectation of privacy akin to telephone conversations.

However, the court upheld the validity of the search warrants.

Although the warrantless search of the young person's cell phone breached section 8 of the Charter, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach inconsequential.

In a judge-alone trial for first degree murder involving a young person, the prosecution sought to admit text messages showing the accused's involvement in planning robberies with firearms.

The defence argued the messages constituted inadmissible prior discreditable conduct.

Applying the principles from leading authorities on similar fact and discreditable conduct evidence, the court held that such evidence may be admitted where its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The messages were found relevant to the accused’s knowledge of planned criminal activity and to rebut any innocent explanation for association with a co‑accused on the day of the murder.

Because the trial was before a judge alone, the risk of misuse was reduced.

The text messages were admitted for a limited purpose.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the trial judge considered whether the Crown could advance two alternative theories of liability: that the accused was the shooter or that he orchestrated the killing by recruiting another individual to carry it out.

The issue arose after evidence concerning a white jacket containing gunshot residue and security footage suggesting another person had previously worn the jacket.

The defence argued the alternative theory lacked an evidentiary foundation and risked prejudicing the accused by providing the jury with an unsupported route to conviction.

Applying the “air of reality” test and relying on authorities concerning alternative routes to liability, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to permit the Crown to advance the second theory.

The judge concluded the jury could reasonably find the accused liable as either the shooter or a joint principal who arranged the killing.

During a murder trial, the prosecution sought to admit rap lyrics recorded by the accused while in custody and later posted online.

The Crown argued the lyrics demonstrated adherence to a “code of silence” relevant to motive for the killing of a witness who had previously testified against the accused.

The defence objected on the grounds that the lyrics constituted prejudicial bad character evidence and that the evidence was introduced too late in the trial.

The court held that the lyrics were relevant and had probative value as a potential admission against interest and as evidence supporting the Crown’s motive theory.

The court concluded the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and ruled the lyrics admissible.

The accused is charged with first-degree murder.

The prosecution sought to introduce a video re-enactment created by the police to demonstrate that a distinctive jacket found in the accused's residence could be the same jacket worn by the suspect in a poor-quality security video.

The defence objected to the admissibility of the re-enactment, arguing prejudice due to late disclosure and differing conditions.

The court held that the probative value of the re-enactment outweighed any prejudice from its late disclosure, and that differences in conditions could be addressed through cross-examination and jury instructions.

The video re-enactment was ruled admissible.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct, specifically that the deceased had previously identified the accused and his brother as the perpetrators of an earlier attempted murder.

The charge against the accused was withdrawn after he spent 13 months in custody, and his brother was acquitted.

The Crown argued this history provided a motive for the murder.

The accused objected, citing issue estoppel and abuse of process.

The court ruled the evidence admissible to show motive, finding that issue estoppel did not apply because the Crown was not trying to prove the accused committed the prior offence, but rather that the accusation and resulting incarceration created animus.

The court also ruled on several related evidentiary issues, excluding highly prejudicial evidence such as the accused's tattoo and hearsay regarding retaliation.

In a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to introduce evidence that the accused was involved in two fights while in custody with two individuals later implicated in the murder.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to demonstrate the nature of the relationship and loyalty between the accused and those individuals.

The court applied the rule against admitting prior discreditable conduct and assessed whether the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.

Because the defence admitted that the individuals were acquaintances and the proposed evidence added little probative value while posing a risk of propensity reasoning by the jury, the evidence was excluded.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from cell phones seized under a search warrant, arguing that the Information to Obtain failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds and lacked particularization that cell phones would be found in the residence.

The court held that the affiant reasonably believed a suspect seen on security video was using a cell phone and that police knowledge of the accused’s cell phone use supported the inference that such devices could contain relevant investigative information.

The court further found that it was a reasonable inference that a suspect who used a cell phone might keep it at his residence.

Reviewing the ITO as a whole, the court concluded that reasonable and probable grounds existed and that the warrant was valid.

The Charter application was dismissed.