S. Stauffer

The applicant tenant brought an application for a declaration that it validly exercised its option to purchase two commercial properties from the respondent landlord.

The landlord argued the tenant had exercised the option earlier via an email and subsequently forfeited it by failing to close.

The court found the tenant clearly and unequivocally exercised the option on January 21, 2023, in strict conformity with the lease terms, and was entitled to purchase the properties.

The court also noted it would have granted relief from forfeiture if necessary.

Costs of $35,000 were awarded to the tenant.

The plaintiff condominium corporation brought motions to extend the set down deadline in a 2012 construction deficiency action and to have a related 2017 solicitor's negligence action tried together with it.

The defendants in the construction action cross-moved to dismiss for delay.

The court granted the extension peremptorily to December 31, 2023, finding the delay adequately explained and no actual prejudice to the defendants.

The court dismissed the motion to try the actions together and instead stayed the solicitor's negligence action, finding the construction action significantly more complex and that a stay would prevent unnecessary duplication of resources.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder following a home-invasion robbery, applied for bail under s. 522 of the Criminal Code based on a material change in circumstances since her initial detention order.

The court found that the COVID-19 pandemic and the availability of a new, highly reliable surety constituted material changes.

The court concluded that the applicant met her onus on the secondary and tertiary grounds, noting the stringent release plan involving house arrest, electronic monitoring, and substantial sureties.

The applicant was granted judicial interim release.

The applicant, who was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced as a youth to ten years, applied for an annual review of his sentence under s. 94(6) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

He sought to serve the remaining two years of his custodial sentence in open custody to attend college, rather than being transferred to an adult provincial facility upon turning twenty-one.

The court found that the applicant had made tremendous rehabilitative gains, including completing high school despite a learning disability, and demonstrated significant maturity.

The application was granted, and the sentence was varied to open custody to reward his progress and further his rehabilitation.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash their committal for trial on a charge of first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They conceded that evidence supported committal for second degree murder but argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by finding evidence capable of supporting planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court held that certiorari is only available where a preliminary inquiry judge commits an accused without any evidence of an essential element or relies on irrational inferences.

The court concluded the hearing judge properly distinguished between speculation and rational inference and applied the correct circumstantial evidence test.

Viewing the evidence as a whole, a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation.

The applications were dismissed.

The young person was tried for first degree murder as a party to a targeted shooting.

The Crown alleged the young person acted as a lookout and getaway driver for the principal offender, who had previously been convicted of the murder.

Relying on surveillance videos, cell phone records, and witness testimony, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the principal offender committed the planned and deliberate murder.

The court further found that the young person drove the principal offender to and from the scene, was present during the shooting, and intended to assist in the murder.

The young person was found guilty.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by the young person accused to the police: a spontaneous utterance upon arrest and a videotaped statement at the police station.

The court found the videotaped statement was made voluntarily and in full compliance with section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, rendering it admissible.

However, the spontaneous utterance was ruled inadmissible because the police failed to advise the accused of his rights under the YCJA immediately upon arrest, despite having a reasonable opportunity to do so.

The young person, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from multiple search warrants and a warrantless search of his cell phone incident to arrest.

The court held that the young person had standing to challenge the seizure of text messages from third-party cell phones, as text messages carry a reasonable expectation of privacy akin to telephone conversations.

However, the court upheld the validity of the search warrants.

Although the warrantless search of the young person's cell phone breached section 8 of the Charter, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach inconsequential.

In a judge-alone trial for first degree murder involving a young person, the prosecution sought to admit text messages showing the accused's involvement in planning robberies with firearms.

The defence argued the messages constituted inadmissible prior discreditable conduct.

Applying the principles from leading authorities on similar fact and discreditable conduct evidence, the court held that such evidence may be admitted where its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The messages were found relevant to the accused’s knowledge of planned criminal activity and to rebut any innocent explanation for association with a co‑accused on the day of the murder.

Because the trial was before a judge alone, the risk of misuse was reduced.

The text messages were admitted for a limited purpose.