Thomas D. Galligan

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Belleville Police respondents for false arrest and false imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for possession of stolen property, and that the police were not required to accept the appellants' innocent explanation before laying charges.

The Court also agreed that the intentional tort claims were statute-barred as the limitation period commenced on the date of arrest, and that summary judgment was appropriate as the liability of the Belleville respondents was severable from the other defendants.

The appeal and motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an action alleging professional negligence, breach of contract, and misrepresentation arising from accounting advice regarding a corporate “butterfly transaction.” The defendants argued that a broadly worded mutual release executed during settlement of a prior fee dispute barred the action under the doctrine of res judicata.

The court held that the release applied only to claims existing at the time of settlement and did not bar claims based on negligence that the plaintiffs discovered years later.

The court further held that the action raised multiple triable issues, including when the accountant became aware of the alleged error and whether the plaintiffs incurred significant tax exposure as a result of the advice.

Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate and the action was permitted to proceed to trial.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal upholding the accused's acquittal on dangerous driving counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that while there was evidence upon which a trier of fact could make a finding of dangerous driving, the failure to do so did not amount to an error of law.

The appellant argued that delayed and incomplete disclosure led to the loss of a 9-1-1 audio tape, compromising the ability to make full answer and defence.

The court held the police conduct was reasonable and the loss of the tape was entirely inadvertent, with its existence only becoming known at trial to all parties simultaneously.

Even assuming a Charter breach, the only remedy sought was a stay, which required proof of irreparable prejudice in one of the clearest of cases.

The court upheld the finding that no irreparable prejudice was shown and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence after a jury convicted him of forcible confinement and acquitted him of break and entry with intent to commit an indictable offence and attempted kidnapping.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments based on inconsistent verdicts, the admission of prior convictions on a Corbett application, and the admission of reply evidence regarding travel arrangements.

On sentence, the court held that the trial judge erred by treating the case as involving a plan to kidnap despite the jury's verdict.

The original five-year penitentiary sentence was found to be outside the appropriate range and was replaced with a sentence of two years' imprisonment plus three years' probation.

The appellants, who were minors at the time of their respective motor vehicle accidents, commenced actions for damages more than two years after the accidents but within two years of reaching the age of majority.

The central issue was whether the two-year limitation period in section 180(1) of the Highway Traffic Act excluded the operation of section 47 of the Limitations Act, which postpones the running of limitation periods for persons under legal disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are not inconsistent and that section 47 applies to postpone the limitation period for minors.

The appeals of the minor plaintiffs were allowed.

However, the adult plaintiff's claim, which was commenced after the limitation period expired, was held to be incurably out of time and was dismissed.