Sean J. May

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach because the police officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the respondent's body, despite smelling alcohol and an admission of consumption 10 hours prior.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the odour of alcohol and admission of consumption were sufficient to form reasonable suspicion, and the absence of impairment signs or the possibility of alcohol elimination did not negate that suspicion.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and two counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The trial judge sentenced the accused to 90 days' imprisonment to be served intermittently, and adjourned sentencing on the remaining counts to later impose an additional 60 days intermittent.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge exercised her discretion for an illegal purpose by bifurcating the sentencing to circumvent the 90-day limit on intermittent sentences under s. 732(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court also found the original sentence demonstrably unfit and varied the sentence to a total of 15 months' imprisonment, less credit for time served.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80.

The trial judge had excluded the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and failed to make the breath demand as soon as practicable.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by requiring the facts to be exclusively consistent with alcohol impairment to form reasonable grounds, and misapprehended the evidence regarding the timeline of the breath demand.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged convictions for two counts of defamatory libel arising from sexually explicit communications sent and posted online in the complainant's name after a restaurant service dispute.

The court held the circumstantial evidence, including the origin of the IP address, password-protected internet access, and similarities in writing style, reasonably supported the finding that the appellant authored the communications.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted in part.

While a 90-day custodial sentence remained fit, the court held the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the impact of non-intermittent custody on the appellant's young children and varied the sentence to intermittent service.