S. Fraser

The accused was tried on a sexual assault charge arising from a sexual encounter arranged through a dating application.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to specific sexual acts during an otherwise acknowledged sexual encounter, and whether the accused could rely on communicated consent.

Applying the reasonable doubt framework and the governing consent principles, the court preferred significant portions of the accused’s detailed evidence about ongoing questions and responses during the encounter.

The court found the accused’s evidence raised a reasonable doubt on the issue of non-consent and entered an acquittal.

Following a judge-alone trial on a sexual assault charge arising from a sexual encounter arranged through a dating application, the court acquitted the accused.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the impugned sexual acts, including biting, slapping, choking, and related conduct during an otherwise consensual encounter.

Applying the principles governing reasonable doubt, witness assessment, and the law of consent, the court found the accused to be a credible and reliable witness whose evidence left a reasonable doubt on the complainant's lack of consent.

An acquittal was entered.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the accused was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child in the household.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and held that, although the accused withstood cross-examination and merely denying the allegations could in many cases raise a reasonable doubt, the complainant's evidence contained internally specific details and was reinforced by corroborative post-disclosure evidence.

The court also considered prior similar fact ruling context but warned itself against propensity reasoning.

On the totality of the evidence, the Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary committal under the Mental Health Act.

He argued that the Board erred in finding he met the criteria for committal, that his initial Form 1 assessment upon completion of a criminal sentence ('psychiatric gating') was defective, and that his ongoing detention violated his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's mental disorders and risk of harm.

The court also held that the initial Form 1 was validly executed and that the civil committal regime under the Mental Health Act does not constitute arbitrary detention or double punishment, and thus does not violate the Charter.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board under the Mental Health Act concerning ongoing involuntary detention at a maximum security psychiatric facility.

The appeal raised issues regarding the standard of review, the application of the statutory criteria for detention, and alleged breaches of Charter rights under ss. 7, 9, 11(h), and 12.

During the hearing, the Court of Appeal released its decision in P.S. v. Ontario, which addressed the constitutionality of long-term involuntary committals and the limited powers of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The court held that the appellate ruling fundamentally altered the legal landscape and rendered the issues raised in the appeal moot, as the appellant fell within the class of long-term involuntary patients affected by the constitutional findings in that decision.

The applicants sought to stay an ongoing coroner's inquest into the deaths of a mother and two children in a fire, pending judicial review of the coroner's refusal to expand the scope of the inquest and call certain witnesses regarding social services in the Jane-Finch community.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR MacDonald test and dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured completing the inquest.

The applicant employer applied to terminate the respondent union's bargaining rights under section 60 of the Labour Relations Act, alleging the union failed to give notice to bargain within sixty days following certification.

The union explained the delay was due to staffing difficulties at its regional office and that notice was served shortly after the application was filed.

The Board dismissed the application, finding the delay was not lengthy, resulted from inadvertence rather than an intention to sleep on rights, and did not cause prejudice to the employer.