Ronald C. Reimer

On a criminal appeal concerning party liability for cocaine trafficking, the appellants challenged convictions entered after the appellate court set aside acquittals.

The court held that, on the trial judge's factual findings, aiding and abetting through protective conduct for the distribution operation was established.

The reasons accepted that the appellants' acts hindered interference and provided assistance and encouragement to the principal offender.

The court affirmed the appellate disposition and dismissed both appeals.

The appellant, a non-citizen convicted of drug offences, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment pursuant to a joint submission.

Neither counsel nor the Crown had advised the sentencing judge that a two-year sentence would strip the appellant of his right to appeal a removal order under the IRPA.

The Supreme Court held that collateral immigration consequences are a relevant factor in sentencing, flowing from principles of individualization and parity, but must not be allowed to skew the sentencing process or produce artificial sentences.

Since the Crown conceded the sentence should be reduced by one day and both sentences fell within the fit range, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant was stopped for speeding.

The police officer smelled freshly burnt marijuana and found a large amount of cash on the appellant's person.

The officer arrested the appellant for possession of a controlled substance and searched his vehicle, finding crack cocaine.

The trial judge admitted the evidence and convicted the appellant of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding the arrest was lawful under the Criminal Code and the search was properly incidental to the arrest, with no Charter violations.

The police suspected the accused of operating a marijuana grow operation and requested the electric utility company to install a digital recording ammeter (DRA) on the power line to his home without a warrant.

The DRA data showed a cyclical pattern of electricity use consistent with a grow operation, which the police used to obtain a search warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DRA data, given the nature of the information revealed and the regulatory scheme permitting the utility to disclose customer information to police.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his residence using an unannounced 'dynamic entry' by a tactical team.

The appellant argued the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights because the police used excessive force, failed to knock and announce, and did not have the warrant on their person upon entry.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police had reasonable grounds to depart from the knock and announce principle due to concerns about officer safety and the destruction of evidence.

The Court also found that s. 29(1) of the Criminal Code was satisfied because the lead investigator, who arrived shortly after the tactical team, had the warrant in his possession.

The police suspected the appellant of operating an ecstasy lab and seized bags of garbage he had placed for collection at the rear of his property adjacent to a public alleyway.

Evidence from the garbage was used to obtain a search warrant for his home, leading to drug charges.

The appellant argued the taking of his garbage violated his s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant had abandoned his privacy interest in the garbage when he placed it for collection at the edge of his property, accessible to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marihuana, arguing that the search warrant was invalid because the information provided by a first-time informant lacked corroboration of criminal particulars.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that corroboration of a criminal particular is not strictly required to establish the reliability of an informant's information for the issuance of a search warrant.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related offences based in part on wiretap evidence obtained under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

At trial, they challenged the admissibility of the wiretap evidence under s. 8 of the Charter and sought leave to cross-examine the police officer who swore the affidavit in support of the authorization.

The trial judge, applying the Garofoli threshold test, denied leave to cross-examine and admitted the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Garofoli leave requirement remains constitutional and that the trial judge did not err in finding no reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would elicit evidence of probative value.