Rebecca Celia Glass

A police officer and her children sued the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) and several officers, as well as a lawyer designated to prosecute her, for civil conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, negligence, defamation, and abuse of non-criminal proceedings.

The DRPS defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration due to a collective agreement.

The lawyer defendant (Johnstone) moved to strike the claim against him for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, among other grounds.

The court dismissed the DRPS defendants' motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute, involving alleged police misconduct targeting the plaintiff and her family in their private capacities, transcended the collective agreement.

However, the court granted Johnstone's motion to strike, finding the pleadings against him did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and refused leave to amend.

The defendant, a lawyer, brought a motion to dismiss a claim initiated by the plaintiff, an opposing party in prior family law proceedings.

The court dismissed the action on three grounds: the defendant, as counsel, owed no duty of care to the plaintiff; the claims were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege as they arose from the defendant's representation in judicial proceedings; and the action constituted an abuse of process, given the plaintiff's history of vexatious litigation and the nature of suing opposing counsel for their conduct in a case.

The plaintiff, Tegan Adams, brought a motion for partial summary judgment against Ruth Chun and Chun Law Professional Corporation, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and professional negligence.

The motion specifically sought a finding of breach of fiduciary duty or, in the alternative, the existence of a fiduciary relationship.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the evidentiary record incomplete and inadequate for summary judgment, particularly due to a lack of documentary discovery, examinations for discovery, and necessary witness testimony, as well as significant credibility issues.

The court emphasized that the existence of a fiduciary duty could not be bifurcated from the broader issues of the case.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a motion brought by HGR (defendants in a related solicitor negligence action) for trial together and common discoveries in two related actions.

The court had previously granted the request for trial together but dismissed common discoveries.

Both HGR and Mr. Hurst (the plaintiff) claimed substantial success.

The court found divided success but determined HGR was overall more successful.

HGR sought $12,000 in costs, and the court ordered Mr. Hurst to pay HGR $8,500.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a special circumstance to defer the payment of costs.

This is an addendum to the Court of Appeal's decision setting aside a summary judgment granted to the respondents.

The plaintiff sought clarification regarding the treatment of costs awarded in the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the costs of the summary judgment motion be payable in the cause of the action, as the action between the plaintiff and respondents was ordered to proceed.

The plaintiff, an employee of Darwin Productions Inc., claimed unpaid salary and a percentage ownership interest based on an alleged employment agreement.

The respondents denied the terms and moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred.

The motion judge granted the summary judgment, finding no evidence of a demand obligation and concluding the cause of action arose by December 2009.

The intervenor law firm appealed, arguing the motion judge erred by failing to address anticipatory breach of contract and by finding sufficient evidence to decide factual issues on summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by not addressing the anticipatory breach argument and that there was a genuine issue requiring trial regarding the terms of the employment agreement.

The defendants, Alex G. Krek and Francka Krek, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs', William and Dianne Klein, action for delay, pursuant to Rule 24.01(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, stemming from an oil spill 29 years prior, was commenced in 2011 and had seen significant delays and missed timetables.

The Kreks argued the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and caused prejudice, citing the death of a witness and Mr. Krek's frail health.

The Kleins contended their delay was reasonable, particularly given a prior ruling by Wood J. in October 2017 that found their delay reasonable until recently, and subsequent consent timetables.

The court, while expressing "grave concerns" about the slow progress and finding the overall delay inordinate, ultimately denied the motion to dismiss.

This was based on the principle from Stokker v. Storoschuk that where delay has been addressed in a prior court order, only subsequent delay requires explanation.

The court found the delay since Wood J.'s order (17 months) was not inordinate or unexcused, but imposed a peremptory "last chance" timetable for the Kleins to advance the action.

The respondent slipped and fell on a wet floor in the vestibule of a department store operated by the appellants, fracturing her kneecap.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act, concluding that the wet floor caused the fall and that the appellants lacked an effective inspection or maintenance system.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to require proof that the wet floor created an unreasonable risk of harm and erred in rejecting expert evidence about the safety of the tile flooring.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding the trial judge properly applied the statutory duty of care and reasonably rejected the expert evidence.

The appellant mortgaged his family homestead farm for $350,000 and subsequently defaulted on the mortgage.

The mortgagees obtained a default judgment for foreclosure.

The appellant moved to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the motion judge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made four material errors in his analysis: (1) mischaracterizing the appellant's mental frailties as merely a competency issue rather than considering their impact on his responsiveness; (2) viewing the appellant's substantial interest in the property solely as sentimental attachment rather than recognizing the substantial equity remaining after mortgage repayment; (3) confining the "reasonable prospect of repayment" analysis to refinancing rather than considering repayment through sale; and (4) failing to properly weigh the magnitude of the windfall to the mortgagees against the severe prejudice to the appellant.

The Court found that a sale of the property would generate net equity of approximately $250,000 to $337,000 after full repayment of the mortgage, and that the mortgagees would suffer no prejudice while the appellant would lose his life's savings.

The appeal was allowed and the foreclosure was converted to a judicial sale.

The plaintiff, Flirty Girl Fitness Inc. (FGF), brought a summary judgment motion alleging breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, conversion, and professional negligence against the defendants, including a co-founder sister, former corporate lawyers, and a new fitness company.

FGF claimed damages of $180,440.15 plus punitive damages.

The defendants sought summary judgment to dismiss all claims.

The court found that the co-founder sister, Krista Knee, acted in FGF's best interests to salvage the business by transferring assets to Hottie Body Boutique Inc. (HBB), which assumed FGF's significant debts and prepaid customer contracts.

The transaction was deemed fair and beneficial to FGF, despite some corporate governance irregularities and a minor breach of fiduciary duty by the sisters for not fully disclosing future personal ownership plans to passive shareholders, which caused no damage to FGF.

The court also found no breach of fiduciary duty or professional negligence by the corporate lawyer, David Epstein.

Consequently, the court dismissed FGF's action in its entirety, concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.