Nora Isak

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle on a highway without insurance, failing to affix a valid number plate, and failing to wear a seatbelt.

The defendant claimed his pickup truck was a self-propelled implement of husbandry (SPIH) and therefore exempt from these requirements.

The defendant also raised Charter rights concerns regarding detention and the right to counsel.

The court found that the defendant's Charter rights were not infringed during the routine traffic stop and that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving the vehicle qualified for the SPIH exception.

The court convicted the defendant on all three counts.

The accused brought a motion seeking recusal of the Justice of the Peace, a declaration of mistrial, and costs against the Crown.

The motion alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding disclosure vetting and content, as well as misapprehension by the Justice of the Peace regarding disclosure materials.

The accused was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court dismissed all grounds of the motion, finding that the accused failed to meet the high threshold required for recusal, that any disclosure errors were unintentional and remedied, and that the Crown's conduct did not constitute a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards warranting a costs award.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while suspended contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether an electric-assisted bicycle (e-bike) with one pedal missing or inoperable constitutes a "power-assisted bicycle" exempt from the definition of "motor vehicle," or whether it becomes a motor vehicle requiring insurance and a valid driver's license.

The trial judge found the e-bike to be a motor vehicle because the pedals were not operable.

On appeal, the court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding that a power-assisted bicycle with readily available but temporarily detached pedals remains a power-assisted bicycle and is not a motor vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act: operating a motor vehicle without insurance and knowingly using a false insurance card.

The trial proceeded in the defendant's absence.

The Crown proved that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on Highway 403 in Oakville on November 7, 2011, and that she was the registered owner of the vehicle.

The defendant's insurance policy had been cancelled on October 8, 2011, due to non-payment of premiums.

The defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle was insured at the time of the offence.

The defendant also failed to establish the defence of reasonable care.

The Crown stayed the second count, and the defendant was convicted on the first count.

Three consolidated appeals of driving while suspended charges.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of charges against three respondents where the trial judge excluded documentary evidence of licence suspension under section 210(7) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge rejected the documents on the basis that they were incomplete copies and that driving records would be prejudicial to fair trial interests.

The appellate court found these exclusions constituted reversible error, holding that section 210(7) mandates receipt of properly certified documents and that driving records are admissible evidence of an essential element of the offence.

The court allowed the appeals, ordering a new trial for Lamanna and substituting convictions with minimum fines for Jane and Caldwell.

The Crown appealed two acquittals of the respondent on charges under the Highway Traffic Act and Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The respondent was charged with operating a motor vehicle without insurance, without a licence, and without displaying a licence plate, as well as operating a motorcycle without a helmet.

The respondent's defence in both trials was that he was operating a power-assisted bicycle (e-bike), which is exempt from the definition of motor vehicle under the HTA.

The key factual issue was that at the time of each police stop, the respondent's e-bike had one or both pedals removed or disabled.

The Crown argued that without operable pedals, the vehicle lost its exemption and became a motor vehicle.

Both trial courts acquitted the respondent, finding the vehicle remained a power-assisted bicycle despite the missing pedals.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeals, holding that the trial courts did not err in law.

The applicant brought a constitutional application challenging the endorsement of a "Jenkins Caution" on the reverse side of his charging information for driving while under suspension.

The applicant argued that the endorsement violated his Charter rights under sections 7 and 11(d) by prejudicing the trier of fact regarding the existence of previous convictions and preventing him from receiving a fair and impartial trial.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Jenkins Caution endorsement was an administrative pro-active measure documenting the prosecution's obligations and did not constitute a breach of Charter rights.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle without insurance and failing to display license plates.

The central issue was whether the vehicle operated by the defendant—a power-assisted bicycle with detachable pedals that were removed at the time of operation—constituted a "motor vehicle" under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that the vehicle qualified as a power-assisted bicycle within the statutory exception to the definition of motor vehicle, and therefore was not required to be registered or insured.

The charges were dismissed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to driving without a contract of automobile insurance contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The prosecution sought the minimum penalty of $5,000 for a first offence.

The court considered whether to apply section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to provide relief from the minimum penalty.

The defendant had recently been released from hospital treatment for severe anxiety and depression, was receiving ODSP, and the fine would be crushingly oppressive relative to his circumstances.

The court imposed a reduced fine of $3,000 with a one-year payment period, finding exceptional circumstances existed and that imposing the minimum fine would be unduly harsh and not in the interests of justice.