Matthew C. MacIsaac

The plaintiff brought an action against the City for injuries sustained after slipping and falling on a snow-covered tree root on private property adjacent to a City sidewalk.

The plaintiff had stepped off the plowed sidewalk to avoid people waiting at a bus stop.

The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the fall occurred on private property, the claim was barred by the 10-day notice requirement under the Municipal Act, and there was no gross negligence.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable excuse for the late notice and that the City had met its duty of care by plowing the sidewalk.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after allegedly falling while entering her parked motor vehicle.

The respondent denied benefits, arguing the incident was a slip and fall on ice and not an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Tribunal applied the two-part purpose and causation test, finding that while the purpose test was met, the causation test was not.

The Tribunal concluded that the slip and fall on ice was an intervening act and the dominant feature of the incident, meaning the use or operation of the vehicle did not directly cause the injuries.

The application was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Boswell J. dated September 1, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $1,500.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The respondent denied certain medical benefits and assessment costs on the basis that the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The applicant argued that pre-existing conditions, including neck and back pain, ankylosing spondylitis, and chronic pain, prevented maximal medical recovery under the MIG.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's pre-existing conditions were not exacerbated by the accident and did not prevent maximal medical recovery.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's injuries were predominantly minor and subject to the $3,500 MIG limit, which had already been exhausted.

The claims for additional benefits and an award for unreasonable delay were dismissed.

In a motor vehicle chain-reaction collision case, the moving defendants in the lead vehicle sought summary judgment dismissing the action and a co-defendants' cross-claim against them.

The responding defendants argued the motion was premature because the police file had not yet been produced and further discovery remained outstanding.

Applying the summary judgment approach in Hryniak, the court held the record was sufficiently developed, the responding defendants had ample time to investigate, and there was no air of reality to the suggestion that further evidence would establish negligence by the lead vehicle.

The court further relied on the settled presumption that the striking rear vehicle is generally at fault in a rear-end collision and dismissed the action and cross-claim against the moving defendants.

The appellants successfully sued the respondents for damages from a motor vehicle accident.

Prior to trial, the respondents' insurer twice refused the appellants' requests to participate in mandatory mediation under the Insurance Act, claiming the injuries did not meet the statutory threshold.

The trial judge awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the insurer's refusal was a genuine available position.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that participating in mediation is a mandatory statutory obligation with no exceptions.

The Court increased the trial costs award by $40,000 as a remedial penalty for the insurer's failure to mediate.