Martin Teplitsky

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their actions challenging the validity of their mother's wills and inter vivos transfers of land to the respondent.

The appellants alleged undue influence and fraud.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to properly use the expanded fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge made conclusory determinations on highly contested facts without conducting a necessary credibility analysis, particularly regarding allegedly fraudulent invoices used to justify the property transfers.

The summary judgment was set aside and the matter directed to trial.

In a business dispute arising from a hotel development venture, the appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing all personal claims against an individual corporate principal while related claims against the corporation continued.

The Court of Appeal held that, under the post-Hryniak summary judgment framework, it was in the interest of justice to finally determine the individual's personal liability and that appellate deference was owed absent material error.

The court found that any factual errors by the motion judge were immaterial, upheld the conclusion that there was no evidence of a personal fiduciary duty, and agreed that the letter of intent was not shown to be a trust asset.

On the findings, the individual acted in good faith and in the corporation's best interests, so the personal tort claims failed and the fresh evidence motion was also dismissed.

The appellant challenged an order arising from misleading comparative advertising directed at the respondent's water heater and rental services business.

The Court of Appeal upheld findings of liability under ss. 7(a) and 22(1) of the Trade-marks Act and rejected the argument that damages had not been proven, holding that unchallenged affidavit evidence and evidence of unusual contract cancellations supported a prima facie case.

The court also upheld liability under s. 52(1) of the Competition Act, finding that the motion judge's conclusion that the brochure was directed at misleading consumers implicitly established the required mental element of knowledge or recklessness.

A separate appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The defendant director brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing claims against him personally in a commercial dispute arising from a proposed hotel development joint venture.

The plaintiff alleged the director breached fiduciary duties and induced breach of contract and trust after removing the plaintiff from negotiations with a municipal authority.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring trial regarding the director’s personal liability.

Directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to third-party stakeholders, and the plaintiff failed to establish a fiduciary relationship or any trust asset arising from the letter of intent.

The court further held that the director’s actions were taken bona fide on behalf of the corporation and were protected by the Said v. Butt principle.

The appellant leased a water heater from the respondent.

The respondent proposed an amendment to the rental agreement requiring customers to deal directly with the respondent to terminate the agreement, rather than using an agent.

The appellant sought a declaration that the amendment was invalid under the Consumer Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the amendment did not comply with the Regulation because the right to terminate was not unconditional.

However, the Court upheld the application judge's decision to invoke s. 93(2) of the Act, binding the appellant to the amendment, as the application was brought for a collateral purpose to benefit a competitor and no consumer was prejudiced.

The respondent lost its major customer due to a bribery scheme orchestrated by a consultant hired by the appellant, a rival supplier.

The respondent sued the appellant, arguing it was vicariously liable for the consultant's tortious conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was not vicariously liable because the consultant was an independent contractor, not an employee, based on a holistic assessment of the relationship.

The Court also held that the trial judge did not err in refusing to reopen the trial to admit fresh evidence from the consultant.

Commercial appeal arising from a bribery scheme that diverted a longstanding supply contract from the plaintiff to the corporate respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the consultant and his company, although described by contract as independent contractors, functioned as integrated members of the corporate respondents' sales organization and therefore attracted vicarious liability under the organization test.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial after post-judgment affidavit evidence from the consultant implicated the principal officer in the bribery scheme, as the evidence was apparently credible and could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained earlier.

Judgment was granted against the corporate respondents for compensatory damages and prejudgment interest, punitive damages were not extended vicariously, and a new trial was ordered on the officer's personal liability.