Marc McLaren-Caux

The appellants appealed the 2022-2025 property assessments for a property in Hamilton, including supplementary assessments made under s. 34 of the Assessment Act.

The Board raised a preliminary question of law regarding the applicable valuation day for the s. 34 assessments.

Although all parties agreed the valuation day was January 1, 2016, the Board required legal submissions to determine if this was correct in law, departing from previous Board decisions that suggested a different valuation day applied to supplementary assessments.

The Board concluded that s. 19.2 of the Act prescribes the valuation day for all assessments for a taxation year, including s. 34 supplementary assessments.

Therefore, the valuation day for the s. 34 assessments is January 1, 2016.

The applicant, a non-profit corporation operating a seniors' apartment complex, sought a municipal property taxation exemption under s. 3(1)(12)(iii) of the Assessment Act, claiming to be "organized for the relief of the poor." The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation opposed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant did not demonstrate the required "endeavour" to relieve poverty as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Religious Hospitallers of St. Joseph Housing Corp. and reaffirmed in Stamford Kiwanis Non-Profit Homes Inc. The court also found insufficient evidence that the majority of the applicant's tenants were "poor" within the meaning of the legislation, despite some units being Rent Geared-to-Income and a means test for others.

The defendant in a $195 million procurement dispute served summonses on three non-party witnesses for examination prior to a summary judgment motion.

The non-parties and plaintiffs moved to quash the summonses, arguing they were an abuse of process due to short notice, failure to provide relevant pleadings, and overly broad document requests.

The court agreed, finding the defendant's conduct in serving the summonses and refusing a brief postponement constituted an abuse of process.

The summonses were quashed, and the defendant's motion to compel answers to refusals was dismissed.

The appellant, a real estate development company, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondents regarding a request for proposals for the redevelopment of Toronto waterfront property.

The appellant's proposal was disqualified for listing an ineligible person as an advisor.

When the appellant requested reconsideration, the sponsors declined to rescind the disqualification.

The appellant argued the sponsors owed a duty of fairness in the reconsideration process and that the fairness monitor was inadequately involved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unfairness in the reconsideration process on a factual basis, without deciding the legal question of whether a duty of fairness was owed.

The plaintiff, CG Acquisition Inc., commenced an action against P1 Consulting Inc., Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corporation (IO), and the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) after being disqualified from a Request for Proposal (RFP) process.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss CG's claim, which was framed in tort, alleging breach of a common law duty of fairness and negligent investigation/service provision during the reconsideration of its disqualification.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no freestanding duty of fairness or care owed to a non-compliant bidder, and that the defendants' actions during reconsideration were reasonable and protected by a limitation of liability clause in the RFP.

The applicants sought intervener or amicus status in proceedings under the Dog Owners' Liability Act involving charges of animal cruelty and dog fighting.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to grant such status and, if so, whether it should exercise that discretion.

The court held that while statutory courts may have implied jurisdiction to appoint interveners in exceptional circumstances, the applicants failed to meet the established common law tests for intervention.

The application was denied as the applicants lacked direct interest in the matter, their participation was not practically necessary, and their interests were substantially aligned with the defendants.

The moving party, MPAC, brought a motion seeking an order requiring the respondents to produce all lease documents related to the subject properties for the 2011, 2012, and 2013 fiscal years, as well as subsequent tenancies.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing that MPAC already had the relevant information from statutory questionnaires and asserting confidentiality concerns.

The Assessment Review Board granted the motion, finding that the leases had a 'semblance of relevance' to the income approach to valuation and were necessary to clarify ambiguities in the provided information.

The Board noted that confidentiality concerns could be addressed through conditions, but the respondents failed to propose any.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that significantly reduced the property tax assessments for a grocery store property.

The Board had found the current value of the property based on its development potential but then reduced the assessment to a fraction of that value by applying a general grocery store valuation model to achieve 'equity'.

MPAC argued the Board erred in its interpretation and application of the equity provisions in the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the Board's interpretation of the law raised sufficient doubt as to its legal correctness and involved an important question of law meriting the court's attention.

The appellant brought a statutory appeal from a decision of the Assessment Review Board confirming an earlier order that corrected a typographical error in a property assessment.

The parties reached a settlement and requested a consent order under section 134 of the Courts of Justice Act to provide a corrected base rate for the assessment and realty taxes.

The Divisional Court granted the requested order to give effect to the parties' agreement and avoid extending the period of miscalculation.

The moving party, Baybridge, brought a motion for an order permitting alternative service of a production motion on non-party property owners.

The underlying appeal was brought by the City of Toronto regarding the assessment of Baybridge's property.

Baybridge sought to compel MPAC to produce documents containing confidential information from other property owners of comparable properties.

The Assessment Review Board granted the motion on consent, ordering that the production motion be served by registered mail to the last known mailing address on the roll, and by fax to the owner's representative if there are outstanding appeals.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board changing the tax class of its property from farm land to vacant commercial land.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application on the basis that the applicant failed to exhaust its statutory right of appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the judicial review because the applicant bypassed the statutory leave to appeal process.

The application was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion on consent to correct a palpable error in the assessment roll for a condominium parking unit for the 2011-2014 taxation years.

The property had remained on the parent roll with the developer listed as the assessed person, resulting in the moving party inheriting historic tax arrears.

The City wrote off the arrears, leaving only the incorrect ownership and description on the roll.

The Assessment Review Board found that the failure to apportion and reflect the correct ownership was a palpable error under s. 40.1(a) of the Assessment Act and ordered the roll corrected.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the current value assessment of its grocery store property.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law by failing to properly determine the current value, ignoring certain comparable properties, and acting without jurisdiction when it amended its initial decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the valuation issues raised were questions of fact, not law, and that the Board had jurisdiction to correct typographical and mathematical errors in its amended decision.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the current value assessment of its independent grocery store.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law by restricting its comparable properties to only the 'most similar' independent grocery stores, rather than considering all 'similar' grocery stores in the vicinity as required by the Assessment Act.

The court found there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision, as limiting comparables to near equivalency could constitute a methodological error of law rather than a mere factual finding.

Leave to appeal was granted.