Marc McLaren-Caux

The applicant, a non-profit corporation operating a seniors' apartment complex, sought a municipal property taxation exemption under s. 3(1)(12)(iii) of the Assessment Act, claiming to be "organized for the relief of the poor." The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation opposed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant did not demonstrate the required "endeavour" to relieve poverty as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Religious Hospitallers of St. Joseph Housing Corp. and reaffirmed in Stamford Kiwanis Non-Profit Homes Inc. The court also found insufficient evidence that the majority of the applicant's tenants were "poor" within the meaning of the legislation, despite some units being Rent Geared-to-Income and a means test for others.

The defendant in a $195 million procurement dispute served summonses on three non-party witnesses for examination prior to a summary judgment motion.

The non-parties and plaintiffs moved to quash the summonses, arguing they were an abuse of process due to short notice, failure to provide relevant pleadings, and overly broad document requests.

The court agreed, finding the defendant's conduct in serving the summonses and refusing a brief postponement constituted an abuse of process.

The summonses were quashed, and the defendant's motion to compel answers to refusals was dismissed.

The appellant, a real estate development company, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondents regarding a request for proposals for the redevelopment of Toronto waterfront property.

The appellant's proposal was disqualified for listing an ineligible person as an advisor.

When the appellant requested reconsideration, the sponsors declined to rescind the disqualification.

The appellant argued the sponsors owed a duty of fairness in the reconsideration process and that the fairness monitor was inadequately involved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unfairness in the reconsideration process on a factual basis, without deciding the legal question of whether a duty of fairness was owed.

The plaintiff, CG Acquisition Inc., commenced an action against P1 Consulting Inc., Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corporation (IO), and the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) after being disqualified from a Request for Proposal (RFP) process.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss CG's claim, which was framed in tort, alleging breach of a common law duty of fairness and negligent investigation/service provision during the reconsideration of its disqualification.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no freestanding duty of fairness or care owed to a non-compliant bidder, and that the defendants' actions during reconsideration were reasonable and protected by a limitation of liability clause in the RFP.

The applicants sought intervener or amicus status in proceedings under the Dog Owners' Liability Act involving charges of animal cruelty and dog fighting.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to grant such status and, if so, whether it should exercise that discretion.

The court held that while statutory courts may have implied jurisdiction to appoint interveners in exceptional circumstances, the applicants failed to meet the established common law tests for intervention.

The application was denied as the applicants lacked direct interest in the matter, their participation was not practically necessary, and their interests were substantially aligned with the defendants.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that significantly reduced the property tax assessments for a grocery store property.

The Board had found the current value of the property based on its development potential but then reduced the assessment to a fraction of that value by applying a general grocery store valuation model to achieve 'equity'.

MPAC argued the Board erred in its interpretation and application of the equity provisions in the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the Board's interpretation of the law raised sufficient doubt as to its legal correctness and involved an important question of law meriting the court's attention.

The appellant brought a statutory appeal from a decision of the Assessment Review Board confirming an earlier order that corrected a typographical error in a property assessment.

The parties reached a settlement and requested a consent order under section 134 of the Courts of Justice Act to provide a corrected base rate for the assessment and realty taxes.

The Divisional Court granted the requested order to give effect to the parties' agreement and avoid extending the period of miscalculation.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board changing the tax class of its property from farm land to vacant commercial land.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application on the basis that the applicant failed to exhaust its statutory right of appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the judicial review because the applicant bypassed the statutory leave to appeal process.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the current value assessment of its grocery store property.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law by failing to properly determine the current value, ignoring certain comparable properties, and acting without jurisdiction when it amended its initial decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the valuation issues raised were questions of fact, not law, and that the Board had jurisdiction to correct typographical and mathematical errors in its amended decision.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the current value assessment of its independent grocery store.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law by restricting its comparable properties to only the 'most similar' independent grocery stores, rather than considering all 'similar' grocery stores in the vicinity as required by the Assessment Act.

The court found there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision, as limiting comparables to near equivalency could constitute a methodological error of law rather than a mere factual finding.

Leave to appeal was granted.