M. Edward Key

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Perell J. dated April 29, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside the costs provision of a 2018 formal judgment.

The formal order, drafted by the defendants' counsel and approved by the plaintiff's counsel, awarded costs against only one corporate defendant, contrary to the trial judge's endorsement which awarded costs against multiple defendants.

The corporate defendant against whom costs were awarded subsequently declared bankruptcy.

The court found that there was no meeting of the minds between counsel regarding the costs liability and that the formal order contained an error arising from an accidental slip or omission.

The court set aside the costs provision under Rule 59.06 and ordered a rehearing on the issue of costs.

The moving parties, defendants in a motor vehicle collision action, brought a motion to compel the Crown to provide further documentary discovery and produce a representative for oral discovery.

The action against the Crown was brought under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act (PTHIA).

The court considered conflicting jurisprudence on whether the Crown can be compelled to give discovery under the PTHIA.

Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the court followed the Court of Appeal's decision in Longo, holding that the Crown cannot be compelled to submit to documentary or oral discovery in such claims.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving parties sought determination of multiple pre-trial legal questions concerning whether supplier refunds or credits for cancelled educational trips had to be considered under trip contracts, the Travel Industry Act, and excess trip cancellation insurance policies, and also sought to quash a summons to examine their representative.

The court held the motions could not be resolved on a Rule 21 record because material facts remained disputed, the factual matrix was incomplete, and the proposed legal issues overlapped with unjust enrichment, trust, and unlawful means claims that would continue in any event.

The court further held that the requested examination was reasonably necessary because the responding insurers had shown the evidence sought was possibly relevant to the pending issues and the moving parties had not shown the summons was an abuse of process.

The motion to quash was dismissed and the Rule 21 motion was dismissed without prejudice.

The defendant organization moved to dismiss a personal injury action on the basis that the claim against it was commenced outside the applicable two‑year limitation period.

The plaintiffs had initially sued another party following a slip and fall at a fundraising skating event and later added the moving party after learning of its potential involvement through a third‑party claim.

The court considered the discoverability principles under s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and whether reasonable due diligence would have revealed the moving party’s role earlier.

The court found there was no trigger that would reasonably have alerted the plaintiffs to the moving party’s involvement in the ice rink setup prior to receiving the third‑party claim.

As a result, the limitation period had not expired and the action could proceed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim for defamation and mental distress against his former employer, and his third-party claim against an insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment, noting the age of the case.

The Court found no error in the dismissal of the counterclaim, as the employer's actions were justified by its investigation into the appellant's business practices.

The third-party claim was properly dismissed because the appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements of the 'claims made and reported' insurance policy.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Gerald F. Day.

The Court of Appeal substantially agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $2,500.

The Ministry of the Attorney General appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding two orders by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The orders required the disclosure of the total amounts of legal fees paid by the Ministry to lawyers acting for intervenors and for Paul Bernardo on his criminal appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the disclosure of the total fee amounts would not reveal any privileged solicitor-client communications.

The Court also held that the disclosure did not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.