M. Claire Wilkinson

This is a costs decision on appeal from a trial judgment concerning liability for damages arising from an accident.

The appellants sought to challenge the trial judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal determined that liability should be apportioned two-thirds to Safranyos and one-third to Hamilton.

The court made a Sanderson order requiring Safranyos to pay one-third of McHugh's costs of trial and appeal, but declined to impose such an order against Hamilton, as Hamilton made no arguments relating to McHugh's liability at trial or on appeal.

A motor vehicle collision occurred at an intersection in Hamilton when a vehicle operated by Ms. Safranyos failed to yield the right-of-way and was struck by a vehicle operated by Mr. McHugh, who had consumed alcohol and was speeding.

The trial judge found all three defendants liable: Ms. Safranyos at 50%, Mr. McHugh at 25%, and the City of Hamilton at 25%.

The City appealed on grounds that the trial judge misapplied the non-repair standard and improperly used adverse inferences.

Mr. McHugh appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in finding he could have avoided the collision and misused evidence regarding his intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City's appeal but allowed Mr. McHugh's appeal, finding the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and legal analysis regarding Mr. McHugh's liability.

The plaintiff sought damages arising from childhood sexual assaults committed by a priest who stood in a position of trust and authority.

Civil liability was established through the defendant's criminal conviction, leaving quantum as the sole issue.

The court awarded substantial non-pecuniary damages, pecuniary damages for lost college-level earning capacity and future treatment costs, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest.

The court accepted expert psychological and accounting evidence linking the abuse to long-term psychiatric injury, impaired educational attainment, reduced occupational achievement, and ongoing treatment needs.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision awarding the respondent income replacement and housekeeping benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the arbitrator failed to apply the proper causation test and failed to provide adequate reasons, particularly regarding the respondent's pre-existing depression and medical history.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitrator correctly applied the material contribution test and properly treated the respondent as a 'thin skull' rather than a 'crumbling skull' case.

The Delegate held that the arbitrator's factual findings were supported by the evidence and her reasons were adequate.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought income replacement and housekeeping benefits, which the insurer terminated.

The arbitrator found that the accident materially contributed to the applicant's development of chronic pain syndrome, rendering her completely unable to engage in any employment for which she was reasonably suited.

The arbitrator awarded ongoing income replacement benefits and a closed period of housekeeping benefits, along with interest.

The claim for a special award was dismissed, as the insurer's actions, while mistaken, were not unreasonable given the complex medical history.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident in California and settled with the at-fault driver for the policy limits.

They then sued their own insurer in Ontario under the OPCF 44 Family Protection Coverage endorsement for their excess losses.

The insurer argued that Ontario's no-fault provisions (ss. 267.1 and 267.2 of the Insurance Act) applied to limit the claim, characterizing them as issues of 'quantum' under the policy.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory provisions relate to 'liability', not 'quantum', and therefore the substantive law of California governed the liability issues.

The insurer's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision awarding a $10,000 death benefit to each of the deceased's parents under s. 25(2) 5. i of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS-1996).

The insurer argued that only a single $10,000 payment was payable in respect of the death of a dependant, relying on previous decisions under earlier SABS regimes.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding that the subtle shift in language in SABS-1996 contemplated that more than one person could qualify for the payment, entitling both parents to the benefit.

The applicants' 16-year-old son died in a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer paid the parents a joint death benefit of $10,000 under the 1996 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The parents applied for arbitration, arguing they were each entitled to a separate $10,000 benefit.

The arbitrator held that under subparagraph 25(2)5(i) of the 1996 SABS, the insurer is required to pay a benefit of $10,000 to each person in respect of whom the insured person was a dependant at the time of the accident.

The insurer was ordered to pay an additional $5,000 to each parent.