M. Catherine Osborne

An appeal from a summary judgment decision concerning the entitlement of a wrongfully dismissed employee to exercise stock options and restricted share units during the reasonable notice period.

The employer argued that contractual language prevented vesting after dismissal, relying on precedent.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the employee was entitled to damages for lost opportunity to exercise awards that would have vested during the notice period, distinguishing the controlling precedent on the basis that the contractual language lacked sufficient clarity to unambiguously remove common law rights.

The employee's cross-appeal regarding damages calculation was also dismissed.

The court provided supplementary reasons for decision regarding the quantification of damages for the loss of Restricted Share Units (RSUs) and stock options following the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal.

The plaintiff was awarded a 24-month reasonable notice period.

The central issue was determining the appropriate timeframe for calculating the value of these equity instruments, specifically how long after vesting the plaintiff would have sold them.

The court rejected both the plaintiff's claim of immediate sale and the defendant's proposal of 13.7 months based on pre-termination sales activity.

Instead, by examining the plaintiff's actual sales activities during the notice period, the court determined that damages should be calculated on the basis that the plaintiff would have sold the shares five months after their vesting date.

The plaintiff, a senior executive with 22 years of service, was terminated without cause by the defendant.

He brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for wrongful dismissal.

The court granted summary judgment, fixing the reasonable notice period at 24 months.

The court held that the plaintiff's entitlement to commissions was not reduced by 50% under the employer's commission plan, as the reduction clause only applied to voluntary resignations.

The court also awarded damages for lost stock options, restricted share units, pension contributions, and certain benefits that would have accrued during the notice period, deferring the exact quantification of damages to a later date.

The applicants, minors acting through their mother as next friend, filed a human rights application alleging that the respondent swim club discriminated against them based on race and subjected them to reprisals.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to address preliminary issues, including timeliness, a request to amend the application, and whether the allegations had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed the allegations outside the one-year statutory deadline.

The request to amend the application to add new allegations for one applicant (R.B.) was denied, and her application was dismissed.

The request to amend for the other applicant (J.B.) was granted.

The Tribunal found that J.B.'s allegation of racial discrimination had a reasonable prospect of success and directed it to a merits hearing, but dismissed his allegation of reprisal.

The applicant brought a motion to dismiss or adjourn a motion brought by the respondent Ontario Human Rights Commission, which was scheduled to be heard by a panel of the Divisional Court.

The applicant argued that the respondent failed to comply with a production order and a previous costs order.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the outstanding costs order but dismissed the motion to dismiss or adjourn, finding that the applicant's arguments regarding the timing of the respondent's motion should be made to the panel hearing that motion.

The respondent filed a human rights complaint which the Ontario Human Rights Commission decided not to deal with pursuant to s. 34(1)(b) of the Human Rights Code.

On an application for judicial review, the respondent sought production of a legal opinion prepared for the Commission by its in-house counsel.

The motions judge and Divisional Court ordered production, finding the Commission was not adverse in interest to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the legal opinion is protected by solicitor-client privilege, which is a fundamental civil and legal right not abrogated by s. 10 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The applicants, directors of a bankrupt employer, sought a review of Orders to Pay issued under the Employment Standards Act for unpaid wages.

The Ministry of Labour had paid compensation to most claimants under the Employee Wage Protection Program and was subrogated to their claims.

On consent of the parties, the adjudicator ordered that the Orders to Pay be reduced to $30,000, for which the three directors are jointly and severally liable.

The respondent school board applied for an order of costs against the Ontario Human Rights Commission after several allegations in a human rights complaint were dismissed.

The Board of Inquiry found that while a partial dismissal of a complaint satisfies the jurisdictional pre-condition for awarding costs under s. 41(4) of the Human Rights Code, the dismissed allegations were not trivial, frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith.

Furthermore, the Commission's conduct of the case did not cause undue hardship to the respondent.

The application for costs was dismissed.

This is a decision on remedies following a finding that the respondent school boards discriminated against the complainant and subjected him to reprisals in two job competitions.

The Board of Inquiry ordered the successor school boards to pay special damages for wage loss and relocation expenses, general damages for loss of the right to freedom from discrimination, and damages for mental anguish.

The Board also ordered public interest remedies, including the posting of the decision, the development of recruitment policies incorporating reprisal protection, and notice to the complainant of future vacancies.

The applicant union applied for certification to represent security guards employed by the responding party.

Shortly after the application, the responding party lost its contract and an intervenor took over as a successor employer.

The intervenor argued that a representation vote should be held because the workforce had changed and expanded since the application date.

The Board allowed the intervenor to participate but dismissed the request for a representation vote, finding that the 'build-up' principle did not apply as the workforce increase was minimal and the original employees remained sufficiently representative.

The Board granted interim certification to the union.

The complainant alleged that she was fired from her job after five weeks because she refused her employer's demand for sexual intercourse.

The respondent denied the allegations and introduced character witnesses, which led to the admission of his prior criminal convictions for rape and assault.

The Board of Inquiry found that the respondent sexually harassed the complainant in breach of the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The respondent was ordered to pay $395 for lost wages and $1,500 in general damages, and to submit to compliance monitoring for two years.