Kenneth Wolfe Golish

The defendant, Marta Bueno Troncoso, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with over the legal limit of alcohol.

The court found a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter rights due to an unexplained delay in providing rights to counsel and a failure to facilitate her right to counsel of choice, leading to the exclusion of breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court dismissed claims of s. 8 and s. 10(a) breaches, and found no arbitrary detention under s. 9.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty of the over-limit charge.

However, based on civilian and police observations of impairment, the defendant was found guilty of impaired operation, as alcohol was a contributing factor to her impairment, notwithstanding her claim of fatigue.

The appellant, William James Epp, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of penetration was reasonable given the overwhelming evidence and the appellant's failure to testify.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the seven-year imprisonment sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's age, the appellant's age and prior record, and the harm caused.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences involving his daughter.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing different levels of scrutiny, misapplication of *R. v. W.(D.)*, and misapprehensions of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's entitlement to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the appellant's, and finding no significant errors in the application of legal principles or assessment of evidence.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle while exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The trial judge found Charter breaches (ss. 8, 9, 10(a)) but admitted breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, leading to a conviction.

The Summary Conviction Appeal (SCA) judge upheld the conviction.

The applicant argued errors in admitting uncorroborated police evidence, relying on a defective breath certificate, and admitting evidence despite Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no legal error by the SCA judge and no issue of broader legal significance, affirming that corroboration of police testimony by an Approved Screening Device is not required and that the breath certificate met statutory requirements.

The appellant, Sarah Sefton, appealed her conviction for driving over 80, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her Charter application to exclude breath test results.

The trial judge had found multiple s. 10(b) Charter breaches (delay in facilitating counsel, failure to advise right to wait for counsel of choice) but dismissed the s. 24(2) Charter application, deeming the breath test minimally intrusive.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) analysis by focusing solely on the physical intrusiveness of the breath test rather than the broader impact of the denial of the right to counsel without delay on the accused's protected interests.

Re-evaluating the Grant factors, the appeal court concluded that the serious and multiple breaches of the right to counsel, including prolonged detention without access to a "lifeline" of advice, warranted the exclusion of the breath test samples.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample by means of an approved screening device.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in concluding there was an outright refusal, given the appellant's retraction and subsequent attempts to comply.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by shifting the burden of proof regarding mens rea and the proper functioning of the approved screening device.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the device was in good working order, which was necessary to infer intentional failure.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside, resulting in an acquittal.