Ken Dunham

The plaintiff, Kim Thompson, sought default judgment against 10392197 Canada Corp. o/a Ontario Green Savings (OGS) for fraudulent misrepresentations and unfair practices under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.

OGS had induced Ms. Thompson into HVAC equipment rental agreements through deceptive means, including misrepresenting government affiliations, concealing contract terms, and registering excessive security interests on her property.

The court found OGS liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and unfair practices, rescinded the contracts, discharged the security interests, awarded compensatory damages for payments made, and significant punitive damages to deter similar predatory conduct.

The judgment was ordered to survive OGS's bankruptcy.

The action against the co-defendant, Canadian Home Improvement Credit Corporation, was dismissed.

Following an order removing the respondent as estate trustee and appointing the applicant in his place, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought $9,745 on a full indemnity basis payable by the respondent personally, citing his unreasonable conduct and failure to provide information.

The court found the respondent acted unreasonably and breached his fiduciary duties.

Costs were fixed at $9,745 on a full indemnity basis, with half payable by the estate and half payable by the respondent personally.

The applicant sought to remove her brother as the estate trustee of their mother's estate.

The respondent had failed to provide meaningful information about the estate administration, left the estate's primary asset (a house) uninsured, and only disclosed on the eve of the hearing that he was collecting rent from a tenant in the house.

The court found a consistent pattern of non-disclosure and past misconduct that was likely to continue.

The court ordered the respondent's removal as estate trustee, appointed the applicant in his place, and ordered the respondent to pass his accounts.

The defendant, Timothy Elmore, faced charges including assault, mischief, breaking and entering, loitering, and uttering threats.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence applied for a directed verdict on the first four charges, arguing insufficient evidence.

The Crown cross-applied to amend the information to conform with the evidence.

The court dismissed the assault charge, finding the contact accidental.

The mischief charge was dismissed as the damaged property was solely owned by the defendant.

The break and enter and loitering charges were dismissed because the defendant, as a legal owner with an equal right of possession to the matrimonial home, could not be found guilty of breaking into or loitering on his own property, absent a court order or enforceable agreement to the contrary.

The Crown's application to amend the information was denied due to potential prejudice to the defence.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to bar the respondent's action for sexual abuse damages.

He argued the action was precluded by a prior divorce settlement that included a payment for damages related to the children.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that the 2011 Final Order did not constitute a valid infant settlement under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the respondent was not a party to the divorce proceeding, her mother was not acting as her litigation guardian, and a master lacked jurisdiction to approve such a settlement.

Strict compliance with Rule 7.08 is essential for protecting persons under disability.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse, arguing the claim was barred by a prior settlement and consent order in Family Court.

The plaintiff argued she was a party under disability at the time and the settlement did not comply with Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the prior settlement was not approved by a judge as required by Rule 7.08, was improvident, and lacked proper supporting materials.

The court held that strict compliance with Rule 7.08 is necessary to protect parties under disability, and therefore the prior order did not bind the plaintiff or bar her action.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application to remove the respondent as estate trustee, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the applicant's conduct throughout the litigation, which included making demonstrably untrue statements and unfounded allegations of fraud, was reprehensible and worthy of sanction.

The court declined to order costs payable out of the estate, applying the 'loser pays' principle.

The respondent was awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale, fixed at $48,975.94, payable by the applicant from her share of the estate.

The moving party sought costs following a successful motion to be appointed as her husband's litigation guardian.

She sought substantial indemnity costs against two respondents due to their counsel's failure to communicate, and partial indemnity costs against the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) for opposing the motion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs against the respondents, finding their counsel's conduct unprofessional but not warranting an elevated scale.

The court also awarded partial indemnity costs against the PGT, rejecting its argument for presumptive immunity as a statutory agency and finding it had pursued meritless arguments.

The applicant sought to remove the respondent, her uncle, as the estate trustee of her late uncle's estate, alleging a conflict of interest and animosity.

The applicant claimed she was not served with the notice of application for the certificate of appointment, which was proven false.

The court found no evidence of misconduct, conflict of interest, or animosity that would warrant the respondent's removal.

The application was dismissed, the certificate of appointment was ordered returned to the respondent, and the respondent was directed to pass his accounts.

The moving party sought to be appointed as the litigation guardian for her husband, whose capacity was at issue in a proceeding challenging the validity of powers of attorney and wills.

The Public Guardian and Trustee opposed the appointment, arguing that section 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 rendered a litigation guardian unnecessary.

The court held that section 3 counsel and a litigation guardian serve complementary roles, and that appointing a litigation guardian was appropriate to safeguard the husband's legal interests.

The moving party was appointed as litigation guardian, as she had no disqualifying conflict of interest.

The accused, Hamze Abdi Ahmed, was charged with assault with a weapon and aggravated assault.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused stabbed the complainant, Jared Kakegamic, or if the complainant stabbed himself during an altercation.

The court found the Crown witnesses credible and rejected the defence's version of events, including the accused's testimony and that of his witnesses, due to inconsistencies and lack of corroboration.

The court relied on the complainant's immediate 911 call, the paramedic's testimony, and Tracy Hultquist's account.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's oppression application, the successful respondents sought costs of $42,505.20 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued for nominal costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date the respondents made a settlement offer, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Due to excessive hours claimed and lack of detailed breakdown, the court reduced the quantum and fixed total costs payable by the applicant at $21,527 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant sought an interim injunction and judicial review to overturn his disqualification from the position of Vice-President, Student Services for the Carleton University Students’ Association (CUSA) following an election.

The applicant had received the most votes but was disqualified due to alleged electoral offences by another student on his slate.

The court found that the Constitutional Board exceeded its jurisdiction by defining a new electoral offence that was not in force at the time of the election and by disqualifying the entire slate based on this expanded interpretation.

The court concluded that the electoral decisions were subject to judicial review and set aside the disqualification.