John Petrosoniak

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings under the Fisheries Act arising from a highway washout that deposited debris into fish-bearing waters and damaged fish habitat.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting a due diligence defence and in concluding that a highway and culvert constituted a “work or undertaking” under the Act, and further argued that the Kienapple principle should bar convictions on both counts.

The court held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in rejecting the due diligence defence and properly applied the relevant factors.

It further held that maintaining road infrastructure constitutes “carrying on a work or undertaking” for the purposes of s. 35 of the Fisheries Act and that the two offences addressed distinct statutory purposes.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions under the Highway Traffic Act, arguing his modified 1976 Chevrolet pick-up truck was exempt as a 'self-propelled implement of husbandry'.

The vehicle had been modified with a diesel engine, four-wheel drive, snow tires, and a heavy hitch for towing irrigation equipment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the modifications did not objectively transform the essential character or function of the vehicle for a specific use in farming, but merely made it better suited for general farm use.

The responding party's driver's licence was downgraded from class 'B' to 'G' due to a heart condition, preventing him from working as a school bus driver.

He appealed the decision to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT), which upheld the downgrade and addressed his human rights arguments.

The responding party subsequently filed an application with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The moving party brought a Request for Order during Proceedings seeking to dismiss the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the LAT proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the human rights application and dismissed the application to avoid duplication of proceedings.

The appellant operated a sports bar and attempted to circumvent the Smoke-Free Ontario Act by designating it as a private club where patrons paid a small membership fee to smoke indoors.

He was convicted of several offences under the Act.

On appeal, he argued the premises were not an 'enclosed public place' because the public was not ordinarily invited or permitted access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Act is public welfare legislation designed to protect the public from second-hand smoke, and that members of the club were still members of the public.

The court found the definition of 'enclosed public place' was not vague or ambiguous.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability after his 'B' driver's licence was downgraded to a 'G' licence due to a heart condition.

The respondent challenged the Tribunal's jurisdiction, arguing that the applicant's efforts to reinstate his licence fell under s. 17(2) of O. Reg. 340/94, which is exempted from the Human Rights Code by s. 19(2).

The Tribunal found that the respondent failed to clearly demonstrate it was operating under s. 17(2), as its communications referred to a waiver application under s. 21, which is not exempt from the Code.

The Tribunal concluded it has jurisdiction to hear the application.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to pay the Ministry of Transportation for a fire department invoice arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued there was a reasonable apprehension of bias because the deputy judge was a former mayor of a neighbouring municipality and an associate at his law firm was a volunteer firefighter for the responding fire department.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and no palpable and overriding error in the deputy judge's factual findings that the fire department provided a compensable service.

The respondent pleaded guilty to a third drinking and driving offence, which was treated as a second offence for sentencing purposes.

Due to an administrative error, the Ministry of Transportation also treated it as a second offence, suspending his licence for three years instead of indefinitely.

After the respondent completed the requirements, the Registrar reinstated his licence.

Two years later, the Ministry discovered the error and suspended the licence indefinitely.

The Divisional Court granted mandamus to reinstate the licence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Ministry's appeal, holding that the Ministry could not disavow the Registrar's earlier exercise of statutory authority to reinstate the licence after the respondent had relied on it.

The moving parties sought a stay pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from an order of the Court of Appeal refusing leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The Divisional Court had upheld the revocation of the moving parties' motor vehicle inspection licences.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the moving parties failed to demonstrate a serious question to be tried or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, given the public safety concerns.

The motion for a stay was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the revocation of their motor vehicle inspection station and mechanic's licences.

The Director alleged that false statements were made in numerous safety standards certificates and that inspections were incompetently performed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence accepted by the Tribunal provided clear and cogent proof to support the Director's proposed action.

The Superintendent of Financial Services issued an interim cease and desist order against the applicants for advertising illegal insurance products on their website.

The applicants requested a hearing to challenge the requirement that the corrective website notice specifically name the unlicensed entities involved.

The Financial Services Tribunal upheld the Superintendent's requirement to include the specific names, but modified the notice wording on consent to clarify that the warning was based on advice from the Financial Services Commission of Ontario.

The Superintendent of Financial Services issued an interim cease and desist order against Executive Barter Exchange Inc. and its principals for promoting insurance products of unlicensed insurers.

The respondents requested a hearing but subsequently agreed to a consent order.

The Financial Services Tribunal ordered the respondents to immediately cease advertising unlicensed insurance, post a warning notice on their website, provide information regarding their insurance-related transactions to the Superintendent, and repay any insurance monies collected from the public.