J. Bradford Nixon

Canadian Tire Corporation brought a motion to disqualify Municipal Tax Equity Consultants Inc., MTE Paralegal Professional Corporation, and their expert consultant from acting for various municipalities in assessment appeals.

The expert had previously worked for Canadian Tire's consultant on the same appeals and had access to confidential information and strategy.

The Assessment Review Board found it had jurisdiction to disqualify representatives to prevent abuse of process.

Applying the MacDonald Estate and Stewart tests, the Board concluded the expert received confidential information, the presumption that this information was imparted to the new firm was not rebutted, and the risk of prejudice required their removal from the record.

The appellants appealed a decision quashing a property assessment against the respondent for advertising displays at Pearson International Airport.

The lower court had found that the respondent was not an occupant and that the assessment was arbitrary and discriminatory.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent was an occupant under the Assessment Act as it had actual occupation, exclusive possession, value, and permanence.

The court also held that the doctrine of paramount occupancy did not apply, or alternatively, that the respondent was the paramount occupier.

Finally, the court found no evidence that the assessment corporation acted arbitrarily or discriminatorily.

The City of Toronto brought a stated case from the Assessment Review Board to determine whether the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) or the Assessment Review Board (ARB) has the jurisdiction to alter a property's current value when issuing an omitted or supplementary assessment to change its tax status from exempt to taxable.

The Divisional Court held that neither MPAC nor the ARB has the power to change the current value of a property in these circumstances unless there has been a physical change to the property.

The power to issue omitted or supplementary assessments is limited to reflecting the change in tax status.

The applicant, Clear Channel, held a non-exclusive licence to install and maintain advertising displays at Pearson Airport.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) assessed Clear Channel as a taxable tenant of the Crown under section 18(1) of the Assessment Act.

Clear Channel brought an application arguing it was a licensee, not a tenant.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Greater Toronto Airports Authority (GTAA) retained total control over the premises and paramount occupancy, while Clear Channel merely provided a service.

The court concluded Clear Channel was not a tenant and quashed the assessments.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the assessment of a Canadian Pacific Railway rail yard in Hamilton.

MPAC argued the Board erred in applying a Market Adjustment Factor (MAF) and in finding that CP was not in actual use and occupation of the portion of lands leased to Steelcare Inc. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision on either issue, as the Board properly applied the relevant provisions of the Assessment Act and case law.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board confirming the assessed value of its two senior citizen apartment buildings.

The appellant argued the Board erred by relying on actual rents that included fees for non-realty services rather than fair market rents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the Board made no error of law and that the appellant failed to discharge its onus under section 60(1) of the Assessment Act to prove the assessment was inequitable compared to similar properties in the vicinity.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board (ARB) which changed the property tax class of five suite hotels from 'hotel' to 'residential/farm' and 'multi-residential'.

The ARB had concluded that the suite hotels did not meet the definition of a hotel under the Hotel Registration of Guests Act.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the correctness of the ARB's decision because it failed to make findings on the evidence or provide an analysis of why a suite hotel is not included in the definition.

The court also found the issue to be of sufficient importance as it would impact numerous other suite hotels in Ontario.

The appeal concerned a municipal restructuring proposal that combined a minor land transfer between neighbouring municipalities with the annexation of multiple unorganized townships, thereby avoiding the need for majority support from electors in the affected unorganized territory.

The court held that municipalities must act within both the letter and the purpose of their enabling legislation, and that a by-law inconsistent with the policy underlying the Municipal Act is ultra vires and illegal.

The impugned by-law and resolution were found to be a device to circumvent the statutory consultation and support structure contemplated by s. 25.2.

The appeal was dismissed and the quashing order upheld.

The appellants challenged a Divisional Court decision that held development lands zoned for industrial and commercial use could not receive farm land assessment treatment because agricultural use was illegal under the zoning by-laws.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 19(3) of the Assessment Act focuses on actual use of the land as a factual matter, not on zoning legality, and that the ordinary meaning of the provision should govern absent compelling contrary indicators.

The court found no basis to read the word “lawfully” into the statute, noted the legislative scheme and policy favoured continued agricultural production, and concluded the Ontario Municipal Board reasonably found the lands were farm lands used only for farm purposes.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and the Board's order was restored.

Appeal from a Divisional Court order quashing a municipal restructuring commission’s final proposal amalgamating several municipalities and annexing unorganized territory.

The Court of Appeal held that judicial review of a restructuring commission performing a political and legislative function is narrowly confined to whether the commission acted according to law, and does not permit the court to revisit the merits of restructuring policy.

The Divisional Court erred in finding illegality, inadequate consultation with First Nations as a free-standing jurisdictional defect, failure to apply the former OMB 'three filters' test, an impermissible 'tax grab', and bias.

The cross-appeal seeking a declaration under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 was dismissed without prejudice because the record was inadequate for determination of the constitutional issue.