Ian Barclay McBride

The court considered Jack Shapiro’s application for dependant support and a declaration of trust over a condominium following the death of his wife, Carol-Sue Shapiro.

The court found that Jack was a dependant under the Succession Law Reform Act and that Carol-Sue had not made adequate provision for his support in her will.

The court ordered that title to the matrimonial condominium be transferred to Jack, in addition to the $250,000 bequest, balancing Jack’s needs and Carol-Sue’s testamentary intentions to leave the majority of her estate to her son, Michael Shapiro.

This case concerns an application for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee, which was challenged by the deceased's husband and daughter on grounds of undue influence and testamentary fraud.

The objectors alleged that the deceased's son and his wife fraudulently influenced the deceased to disinherit her daughter and significantly reduce her husband's inheritance by instilling false beliefs about the daughter's husband and the husband's financial well-being.

The court found no evidence that the son and his wife perpetrated or encouraged these alleged falsehoods.

The deceased's testamentary changes were determined to be her own decisions, made gradually over time, based on her long-standing concerns about protecting the family's wealth from her son-in-law, and after receiving independent professional advice.

The court dismissed the objections, declared the wills valid, and granted the application for the Certificate of Appointment.

The applicants sought an order directing an assessment of legal accounts paid to Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP for work performed for Carolyn Brown.

Gowlings consented to the assessment but raised concerns about solicitor-client privilege over portions of its file, particularly for the period before formal counsel appointment, questioning if the applicants (Carolyn's litigation guardians) could waive this privilege.

The court ruled that the guardians, acting as guardians of property, had a legitimate purpose to obtain disclosure to ensure reasonable billing, thereby waiving the solicitor-client privilege for the assessment.

The court emphasized that while a person lacking capacity retains dignity and privacy, disclosure is permissible when necessary to protect their interests, and the assessment officer will determine the appropriate scope of production.

This supplementary costs endorsement addresses a request to reconsider a previous costs decision.

The court had initially ordered Gordon Brown to pay Christina Rudin-Brown and Jeanne Brown $150,000 in costs, which was a reduction from $200,000 due to a $50,000 payment their lawyers received from Carolyn Emily Brown's assets.

Christina Rudin-Brown and Jeanne Brown sought reconsideration, arguing the deduction effectively shifted their contribution to Gordon Brown's costs.

The court, exercising its jurisdiction to reconsider, found that while accounting for the $50,000 payment was appropriate, deducting the entire amount penalized the applicants.

To ensure fairness and avoid over-compensation, the court adjusted the deduction by 25%, reducing it to $37,500.

Consequently, Gordon Brown was ordered to pay Christina Rudin-Brown and Jeanne Brown $162,500 in substantial indemnity costs.

The court also provided direction on how these costs should be paid.

The defendants, EBC Inc. and Guarantee Company of North America, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, Bolton Mechanical Inc., in a "bond action" that was substantively duplicative of a prior "lien action." In the lien action, security for costs had already been ordered against Bolton due to insufficient assets.

The court dismissed the current motion, finding that the issues added by the bond action were insignificant and that the defendants' delay in bringing the motion was tactical, amounting to a collateral attack on the prior order.

The defendants, JP Gravel Construction Inc. and Jean-Pierre Gravel, brought a motion seeking leave to discharge a construction lien registered by the plaintiff, 9585800 Canada Inc. o/a Earth Movers, and to dismiss the lien action.

The plaintiff had initially registered a "First Lien" with a typographical error in the timeframe of services, discharged it, and immediately registered a "Second Lien" with the corrected timeframe.

The defendants argued the second lien was invalid under s. 48 of the Construction Lien Act due to the discharge of the first, and was exaggerated.

The court granted leave for the motion but dismissed the defendants' request to discharge the second lien, finding the first lien to be a nullity due to the incorrect timeframe, thus making s. 48 inapplicable to the valid second lien.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant, a numbered company controlled by Ali Karimi, appealed a motion judge's decision to stay civil proceedings for abuse of process.

The civil actions sought damages for alleged theft against the respondents.

The respondents had previously been victims in a 2011 criminal trial where Karimi was convicted of extortion and criminal harassment based on false theft allegations against them.

The motion judge found that permitting the civil actions to proceed would constitute an abuse of process, as it would allow Karimi to continue the persecution for which he had been criminally convicted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay, finding that the motion judge properly applied the abuse of process doctrine and that it was open to conclude the jury implicitly found no theft had occurred.

The Estate Trustee sought court directions regarding the validity of three potential holograph codicils and the disposition of life insurance proceeds from the estate of Franklin Walter Briggs.

The court found two documents (July 29, 2013, and August 8, 2014) to be valid holograph codicils, but a third document, the "Notes Document," was deemed a planning document and not a valid testamentary instrument due to lack of signature, date, and formal language.

The court also ruled that the July 29, 2013 document, despite being a valid codicil, did not constitute a valid declaration under the Insurance Act to change the beneficiary of life insurance policies, as it failed to specifically identify the insurance contract or fund.

Consequently, the life insurance proceeds belonged to the estate, not a specific beneficiary.

The moving parties sought directions regarding compliance with a prior court order addressing undertakings, advisements, and objections arising from examinations for discovery.

The dispute concerned whether the defendants had adequately addressed issues relating to corporate ownership and control, particularly whether a named entity was a subsidiary of other defendants.

The court accepted admissions provided by defence counsel confirming the relevant corporate relationships and held that these admissions satisfied the earlier order’s requirements.

The admissions were permitted to be entered into evidence to prove the truth of their contents.

The moving parties were awarded modest costs payable by certain defendants.