Heather Ferg

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences after police obtained his IP addresses from a third-party payment processor without judicial authorization, then used a production order to compel the ISP to disclose subscriber information, and subsequently executed search warrants on residential premises.

The majority held that an IP address attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter because it is the crucial link between an Internet user and their online activity, capable of revealing biographical core information with or without a Spencer warrant.

The dissent held that IP addresses alone reveal only the user's ISP, not biographical core information, and that the police acted properly by obtaining a production order consistent with R. v. Spencer before accessing subscriber information.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to intentionally discharging a firearm into or at a place knowing or being reckless as to whether another person was present, contrary to s. 244.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of four years' imprisonment under s. 244.2(3)(b) on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical involving a young person firing an air-powered pistol or rifle at a residence incapable of perforating its walls.

The majority held that the mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate under s. 12 of the Charter because the offence captures a wide spectrum of conduct ranging from acts that present little danger to the public to those that pose a grave risk, and the fit sentence for the hypothetical youthful offender would be a suspended sentence of up to 12 months' probation — rendering a four-year custodial term totally out of sync with sentencing norms and incompatible with human dignity.

The declaration of invalidity was applied retroactively and the three-and-a-half-year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was reinstated.

Côté J. dissented, finding that the hypothetical was not a reasonably foreseeable application of the offence and that the mandatory minimum did not meet the high threshold for cruel and unusual punishment.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Alberta had dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, finding the verdict was not unreasonable and the convictions were properly upheld.

Two accused appealed convictions for failing to provide the necessaries of life to their son.

The court agreed with the dissenting appellate reasons that the trial judge conflated actus reus and mens rea and inadequately explained marked departure to the jury.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

In a criminal appeal concerning circumstantial proof of possession of child pornography, the Court clarified that alternative inferences consistent with innocence may arise from evidence or absence of evidence, but must be reasonable rather than speculative.

The Court held there is no mandatory formula for circumstantial-evidence instructions, though juries should be cautioned against inferential gap-filling and premature conclusions.

Reading the trial reasons as a whole, the Court found no reversible legal error in the treatment of inferences, burden, or standard of proof.

The guilty verdict was held reasonable on the totality of the evidence.

The acquittal was set aside and Charter ss. 8 and 24(2) issues were remanded to the provincial appellate court.

On a criminal appeal concerning party liability for cocaine trafficking, the appellants challenged convictions entered after the appellate court set aside acquittals.

The court held that, on the trial judge's factual findings, aiding and abetting through protective conduct for the distribution operation was established.

The reasons accepted that the appellants' acts hindered interference and provided assistance and encouragement to the principal offender.

The court affirmed the appellate disposition and dismissed both appeals.