G. Greg Brodsky

Criminal appeal from convictions for two counts of first degree murder.

The court held that the deceased’s statement of intention and police evidence of a witness’s out-of-court identification were inadmissible hearsay, and clarified that traditional hearsay exceptions must conform to the principled approach of necessity and reliability.

The court further held that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was deficient because it failed to explain that the criminal standard is higher than proof on a balance of probabilities and wrongly suggested the phrase had no special legal meaning.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant shot and killed his grandfather and subsequently raised the defence of mental disorder at trial.

Two psychiatrists testified that the appellant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and lacked the capacity to appreciate that his actions were morally wrong.

The Crown did not call rebuttal expert evidence but challenged the experts on cross-examination.

The jury convicted the appellant of second degree murder, and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was unreasonable as the totality of the evidence, including the uncontradicted expert testimony, established that the appellant did not know his actions were morally wrong.

The appellant was convicted of murder.

Prior to trial, there was media publicity regarding the search for the victim's body and the backgrounds of both the victim and the accused.

At trial, the appellant sought to challenge each prospective juror for cause based on potential partiality arising from this pre-trial publicity.

The trial judge refused the general challenge, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the right to challenge for cause is fundamental to a fair trial, there must be a realistic potential for partiality before the challenge can proceed.

The pre-trial publicity in this case did not meet that threshold.

The appellant, a battered woman, shot and killed her common law partner in the back of the head as he left the room following an argument where he physically abused her and threatened to kill her.

At trial, a psychiatrist testified as an expert on battered woman syndrome to explain her state of mind and why she reasonably apprehended death or grievous bodily harm.

The jury acquitted the appellant, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible to assist the jury in assessing the reasonableness of a battered woman's apprehension of death and her belief that lethal force was necessary.

The applicants, whose murder convictions were upheld on appeal, sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Counsel for one of the applicants argued that under section 45 of the Supreme Court Act, the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the application without an oral hearing.

The Court held that it had jurisdiction to determine the application on the basis of written materials without an oral hearing, as section 45 was intended to establish a uniform procedure of general application for leave applications.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction to the Court of Appeal and applied to adduce fresh evidence consisting of traffic offence notices.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to admit the evidence but subsequently dismissed the appeal, applying the curative proviso and concluding the evidence could not have affected the verdict.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that once fresh evidence is admitted on the basis that it might reasonably affect the verdict, the court cannot later conclude it had no such effect without usurping the jury's function.

The curative proviso cannot be applied where no error at trial is shown and the issue is solely the admission of fresh evidence.