Frank G. Csathy

The plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury after being hit by a golf ball hit by the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion to increase the damages claimed and to strike the jury notice due to anticipated trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the amendment to damages on consent.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice, adopting a 'wait and see' approach to determine if the region's new civil trial protocol could accommodate urgent civil jury trials, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to renew the motion later.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that their medical malpractice action against the hospital defendants had been settled.

The motion judge had found that the appellants' offer to consent to a dismissal was contingent on the remaining defendants undertaking not to allege negligence against the hospital defendants, and that this undertaking had been fulfilled.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellants had revoked their offer in writing before the remaining defendants purported to fulfill the undertaking.

As the offer was withdrawn before the condition precedent was met, no settlement was reached.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an insurance claim for economic loss following a fire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to reject a financial planner's letter and his conclusion that the appellant failed to prove economic loss for the period beyond the policy coverage based on tax returns.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The insurer moved for an order compelling the insured to attend a psychological examination pursuant to subsection 23(2) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insured argued the insurer's right to require an examination expired after mediation.

The arbitrator held that the insurer was entitled to require the examination to assess the ongoing claim for weekly benefits.

However, the arbitrator concluded that she lacked the express or implied statutory authority under the Insurance Act or the Schedule to compel the insured to attend the examination.